Faces of Republican Turkey Beyond the Modernization Hypothesis

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INTRODUCTION

FACES OF REPUBLICAN TURKEY: BEYOND THE MODERNIZATION HYPOTHESIS

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Methodologies and problématiques in social sciences and humanities are closely linked with the dominant ideologies in which they are produced, which, in turn, are deeply embedded in a specific social and economic formation. Thus, it is not a coincidence if, throughout the twentieth century, Turkish politics and society have been frequently analyzed through the lens of modernization. Generations of thinkers, politicians, social scientists, and historians have asked questions related to a presupposed transition from traditional to modern society in Turkey. Some of them supposed that the transition took place in the early republican period, in the 1920s and 30s, in an abrupt way, while it was a smooth, lengthy process, spanning from the late 18th to the late 20th century. Those idealizing the modernization and exaltating the modernizers were confronted by critiques of modernity; while the former camp was a heterogenous mixture of various political and historiographic tendencies, the latter was also far from being homogenous, and included both traditionist and post-modernist critical voices towards modernity.

While differences of opinion and methodology within and between the modernist and anti-modernist tendencies are striking, there are also common denominators uniting them in a single narrative. According to this narrative, modernity consists of a set of references allegedly developed in Western Europe: Women's emancipation, bureaucratization of state apparatus, development of literacy and creation of a new education system, secularization in political references, anticlerical politics, transition towards a representative democracy, and many other developments are considered within a single, unitary process of (Western) development. Whig historians, Hegelian philosophers, and positivist thinkers praised this supposedly combined development as the March of Intellect, and late-19th century vitalism, culminating in the works of Friedrich Nietzsche, condemned it as a unitary process of decadence of humanity.

Both pro- and anti-modernist approaches to the 20th-century politics and society in Turkey are heir to these broader pro- and anti-modernist theories. Through this scope, the foundation of the Turkish Republic was praised or criticized as the culmination of a modernization process launched by a conscious, Westernizing elite. The modernization literature, despite its considerable contribution to the understanding of modern Turkish politics and society, suffers from striking shortcomings. As a teleological approach, it transforms specific historical events and tendencies into the moments of one single line of development towards modernization: Electoral reforms, administrative centralization, or the rise of the printing press are taken as the examples of a grand march towards modernity, or as the symptoms of a belated involvement in modernization. As an opinionated approach, the modernization literature takes for granted a series of debatable assertions: The bureaucratic circles of the late Ottoman and early republican Turkey are conceived of as independent social and political actors, and the republican state is placed in continuity with an allegedly all-powerful Ottoman state apparatus.

The present volume, *Faces of Republican Turkey*, is an attempt at presenting an alternative reading of Turkey's twentieth-century politics. Rather than drawing on an elite-based study of Turkish politics, it examines the interplay between the variety of social actors, and their relationship with political power. Avoiding a homogenizing look towards society, it focuses on the analysis of gender and property relations within the society, and emphasizes the embeddedness of political thought and institutions in the social dynamics. The contributors use a wide range of critical methodologies, including, amongst others, historical materialism, social reproduction theory, social and political memory analysis, discourse analysis, and Frankfurt School critical theory. Each contribution is expected to focus on a topic related to

Turkish politics and society. The authors present a critical account of the modernity and modernization-centered literature on the selected topic, and develop alternative approaches through the analysis of a specific case, using qualitative and historical research methodologies.

The transformation of gender roles and the emancipation of women has been evaluated as a consequence of the modernizing will of the republican elites in the modernization literature. This hypothesis has been questioned by a revisionist historiography from the 1980s on, and the history of the women's movement in the late 19th century has been widely documented. Ayla Ezgi Akyol's contribution on "Contradictory Process of Women Liberation during the Emergence of Modern Turkey" is both heir to, and critical of, the revisionist historiography. The author analyzes the question of women's liberation from the perspective of social history. After defining gender as a class relation, she analyzes the articles of the review *Kadınlar Dünyası*, published in the 1910s in Istanbul, in the light of the transformation of relations of production and social reproduction.

For both modernist and revisionist historiographies, the early republican discourse reflected a self-confident, even triumphalist, attitude. Mehmet Arısan's chapter on "Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu and The Republican Imagination" questions this widespread presupposition. Karaosmanoğlu was an influential novelist and columnist of the early republican era, and his two famous novels, *Yaban* (1932) and *Ankara* (1934), are analyzed by Arısan as documents that indicate the paradoxes in the mentalities of the Westernizing intelligentsia in Turkey, which was bifurcated between the uncertainties of the Republican transition and the imperial nostalgia.

E. Zeynep Suda, in her chapter entitled "Building the Memory of the Early Republican Period: *La Turquie Kemaliste*", focuses on the construction and reconstruction of social memory in the 1930s. Her main source, the journal *La Turquie Kemaliste* is relevant and interesting in many senses: It was not only a propaganda journal sponsored directly by state authorities, but also a publication in French, designated to build a self-image for being consumed in the West. After enumerating a variety of visual examples that reflect the self-representation of the republican elites, Suda points to the absence of daily life and lower classes in this self-image.

The late 1940s, and the 1950s, that is, the period of transition to multi-party politics in Turkey, has been widely analyzed in the scholarly literature. Sinan Yıldırmaz focuses in a lesser-explained aspect of that period: The restructuring of academic knowledge. In his article on "Developmentalism and Rural Sociology: The Ideological Reconstruction of Academic

Knowledge in the Early Cold War Period in Turkey", he presents a concise history of sociological thought in Turkey, and explains the reconstruction of rural sociology as an academic field as a result of a broader social and economic transformation in the early Cold War Period, namely, the transition from the self-sufficient small scale agricultural production to cash-crop production.

Güven Gürkan Öztan and Elif Çağlı Kaynak deal with another aspect of Turkey's politics and society in the 1950s: Anti-communism in education, in their chapter on "Anti-Communism in Turkish Education and Childhood in the 1950s". Drawing on primary source material, including the debates in the Turkish parliament, comments in newspapers, and journals destined to educators, they reconstruct the ideological sphere in the 1950s with its manifold of actors, including political parties, bureaucrats, technocrats, and USA experts in education, whose interplay shaped the restructuring of education policies in Turkey in the early Cold War period.

Cangül Örnek's study of "The Bureaucracy and its Discontents in Modern Turkey" starts with an analysis of the Democratic Party period, and covers the subsequent decades. She questions the mainstream approaches that take bureaucracy as a supra-historical actor, and she historicizes Turkey's bureaucracy in many senses; she points to the differences between traditional and republican bureaucracies, but she also stresses on the complex relationship between the relations of social production and the transformation of ideologies. Örnek establishes links between the bureaucracy and capitalist classes and states that "anti-bureaucratic discourse and the actual policies to re-structure the state institutions and to staff the bureaucracy in the neo-liberal fashion have resulted in a serious erosion in the institutional infrastructure of Turkish capitalism".

Emre Eren Korkmaz, in his chapter on "Building a Public Sphere: Turkey-origin Workers in Germany", elaborates on a theme that is crucial for republican Turkey and that has a transnational importance: Workers' migration to Germany. He not only draws a brief history of workers' migration from Turkey to Germany since the 1960s, he also establishes a theoretical framework for analyzing the building of a workers' public sphere amongst the Turkey-origin workers in Germany, thus enriching the existing critical literature on public sphere in Turkey with a focus on a labor-centered and transnational approach.

CHAPTER 1

CONTRADICTORY PROCESS OF WOMEN LIBERATION DURING THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN TURKEY: THE CASE OF THE JOURNAL "*KADINLAR DÜNYASI*"

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Abstract

The literature on Turkish modernization presumes a linear and positive relationship between modernization and women's liberation. According to this literature, the process that began in the 19th century has increasingly improved the social position of women by establishing a secular order and making women legal subjects as well as equal citizens. Such a positive perception neglects the contradictory nature of the modernization process The modernization process could be seen *as a contradictory process* which brings not only rights but also new types of obligations and subordinations as well *as a contadictory movement* conducted by the struggles of women. Thus, "new women" is not a political project just imposed from above but a consequence of a contradictory process on three levels. The first level signifies the change in women's position in the relations of production, that is, their process of becoming a productive labor force. The second level indicates their position at home which is the change in their reproductive functions. The third level comprises the change in the position of women as mothers manifesting itself in reproducing the nation. This article argues the process of women liberation by referring to the contradictions in these three levels at the beginning of 20th century and by addressing the journal *Kadınlar Dünyası* (Women's World) published between 1913-1921 and known as the first feminist journal of Ottoman women.

Keywords: Women, Liberation, Contradiction, Labor, Production, Reproduction, Work, Nation.

"We, poor women, are always just a fruit, just a commodity in the eyes of men. Our actions, our right to live have been restricted. Besides, we could never be a heartfelt friend or companion and a partner to men in its fullest sense. We are not even the regulators of our houses, the ministers of our dominions either. They have always insulated us in a separate living space, enslaved us and obliged to men. The situation has been the very same in the times of ancient people and in the present civilized nations!... Each nation has enslaved its women according to its customs and laws"

Women's World, 1st issue, 17 April 1913

In the first issue of *Kadınlar Dünyası*[1] (Women's World), the article published under the signature of *Kadınlar Dünyası* defined enslavement as a universal question of womanhood not specific to Ottoman women. The editors of *Kadınlar Dünyası* considered Ottoman Women to be a part of the universal movement of women against male domination. They used the expressions "our sisters" or "the member of our class" when they spoke of women in Europe as well as in Ottoman society. They defined womanhood as a "class", and woman as a "commodity" in the hands of men by referring to common experiences of all women despite the socio-economic differences among them. The term "commodity"used to signify objectification of women as a labor force both in production and reproduction . In this way, the editors of *Kadınlar Dünyası* -just before the First World War- attracted attention to the contradiction of the modernization process identified with equal citizenship, the contradiction of the capitalist social relations promising wealth and freedom as well as the contradiction of the nation which appeared as a coherent unity.

The editors of *Kadınlar Dünyası* dealt with these contradictions in a contradictory way. They mostly applied to modern, capitalist and nationalist means and discourses while they were struggling against its devastating symptoms. They did not stand for a homogeneous worldview or respond to existing questions coherently. In this sense, one can define the journal *Kadınlar Dünyası* as a common ground for women from different tendencies and approaches who sought the ways of changing their social position. Rather than complete

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1   *Kadınlar Dünyası,* published between 17 April 1913 and 21 May 1921, is a journal whose editors were solely composed of women. Men were not allowed to write in the columns of the journal for the purpose of driving attention to the sexual hierarchy between women and men. The editors of *Kadınlar Dünyası* declared their aims as to defend the rights and interests of womanhood without discrimination against sex or religion. This journal is defined as first feminist journal whose editors and readers are composed of various segments of the society (Çakır, 2007).

responses, they formulated questions related to the society they lived in and to the social change arising from modernization and capitalization processes that crystalized the main social contradictions. They asked why men dominated the public space and controlled the mobility of women, why women were subjected to harassment because of their clothing, and why women could not share the same places with men in the public space. They also asked why women were excluded from many sectors of wage labor and fell into poverty or became obliged to men. As mothers who reproduced all the society why did women have no right to choose their husbands and why were they deprived of the means to improve their positions at home? In this way, they expressed how the devaluation of women was reproduced in a different way despite the liberal atmosphere which reigned after 1908 revolution.

Hegemonic approach in Turkish historiography, in line with modernist discourse, tends to explain these questions as results of the immature modernity specific to peculiar state-society relations in the Ottoman Empire. These questions are presumed to be gradually eliminated in parallel with modernization. From this perspective, the social position of women improved and progressed from the Tanzimat reforms to the republic era. On the other hand, the critical approach emphasizes the negative impacts of modernity by describing it in terms of disciplining bodies and minds that produce new forms of subjection. In this context, modernity has reinforced the dependence of women to men through invisible means of control. Both positive and negative approaches discuss modernity as a static project imposed from above and regard women as simple carriers of this project. Both of them presuppose an identity between state elites and women, and in this way, they ignore the political and social struggles as well as the challenges of women in the face of the conceptualization of modernity of state elites. Secondly, both these approaches tend to analyze the questions of modernization regardless of its relation to immanent contradictions of capitalism. Turkish historiography frequently identifies capitalism with natural but dependent development which is unable to change the relations of production sufficiently because of the peculiarity of state-society relation in the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, it cannot properly analyze the economic violence related to primitive accumulation such as dispossession and proletarianisation which are also preconditions of the change in relations of production. This issue makes it difficult to define the struggle of women against "pre-modern" forms of domination as a struggle also against their new roles within capitalist social relations. Thirdly, both approaches analyze historical facts and events as the justification or affirmation of the intended results. They do not see facts and events as open processes which include various potentials, possibilities and conflicts that make the result unpredictable. In this context, they do not deal with the contradictions

within which women struggle either nor discover the potential paths in which the struggle of women channels itself.

Regarding modernity as neither a positive nor a negative project imposed from above but as an open process in which women take part in a contradictory way, this article aims to discuss how the contradictions of capitalism, modernity and nation have been discovered from a gender perspective and the types of struggle during the change by examining *Kadınlar Dünyası*.

1. Duality within Historiography of Ottoman Women

The historiography on Ottoman feminism has predominantly attempted to analyze feminism with respect to its relationship with the formation of the modern nation state. This historiography either deals with ideological stances of some feminist figures who took sides with the ruling class or concentrates on the aims of the institutions founded by an organized segment of women. From this perspective, feminism is not a social movement but rather a current of thought which is supported by upper class women who took part in political discussions of the era. For this reason, historiography mainly discusses to what extent Ottoman feminism may be thought as a kind of state-feminism; and how Ottoman feminists contributed to Turkish nationalism and formation of the modern state (Altınay, 2013; Berktay, 2009; Durakpaşa, 2000; Kandiyotti, 1987; Sancar, 2014; Sirman, 1989; Tekeli, 1995; Zihnioğlu, 2003). Such a state-centered and institutionalist approach derives from some objective difficulties. First of all, Ottoman archives provide a limited source for writing ordinary people's history. In many cases, historians are obliged to benefit from state documents which give quite limited place to information about the lower classes (Faroqhi, 1994). The case gets more difficult in studying the history of women because the existence and activities of women are mainly invisible in Ottoman social formation. Information about women began to be registered in a relatively late period because the Ottoman state would only recognize the man as the legal head of the household (Faroqhi, 1994). For this reason, feminist studies dealing with the history of women were firstly obliged to challenge the gender-blinded historiography and to make women visible before discussing their real practices and social relations. Among these studies, Serpil Çakır's study on the journal *Kadınlar Dünyası* (1994) provides extensive knowledge about the way of thinking of feminist women who organized themselves independent from not only men but also ruling class. Thus, this study may be defined as an important contribution to defining feminism as a social opposition rather than a thought or a debate within the state.

In addition to feminist literature, certain works within labor studies pay specific attention to the history of women workers (Balsoy, 2009; Güzel, 1985; Os, 1997; Quataert, 1991, 2001; Shahr, 2001). These works contribute to an understanding of the subjectivity of working women who participated in the labor market, and in this way, to the gender division of labor which functioned during capitalist development. In addition, Yavuz Selim Karakışla (2015), Yiğit Akın (2014), Elif Mahir Metinsoy (2016) and Müge Özbek (2010, 2016) deal with how women were economically impoverished and became dispossessed in rural and urban areas as well as how they reacted against dispossession processes. Zafer Toprak (2016) analyzes the change in women's economic, social and political conditions during the modernization process from the state and society perspective.

Despite the attempts at revealing women subjectivity in history, the duality between feminist historiography which examines institutional and political history of feminism and the historiography on lower class women which mainly handles women's social and economic history remains constant. In other words, the struggle of women is sought outside of the class struggle and vice versa. To overcome this duality, one should think of the relationship between patriarchy and capitalism as well as gender and class.

1.1. Gender as a Class Relation and Transition to Capitalism

A modernist approach to history presumes a negative relationship between patriarchy and capitalism by claiming that capitalist development would dissolve all previous social relations and modes of domination via liberating labor from personal ties and placing it within free market relations. This assumption, on the one hand, derives from the "progressist" thesis which regards the origin of capitalism as self-development of productive forces through the development of world trade instead of transformation of property and class relations.[2] Therefore, political processes of primitive accumulation -such as separation of free producers from land as well as from the means of production and reproduction- cannot be understood as the basis or preconditions for capitalism. Turkish historiography, in line with such a progressist approach, presumes that state functions exist outside and above society as a result of dependent capitalist development and peculiar state-society relations in Turkey. Thereby,

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2   Some political Marxists criticized modern perceptions of capitalism which handle capitalist development as a natural accumulation enabled by an invisible hand of market and trade or a phenomenon emerged only related to bourgeois revolutions. Contrary to the modern and progressist thesis, they emphasized transformation of relations of production at the origin of capitalist mode of production. To better understand the discussions of political Marxists see: Robert Brenner, (1982). The Origins of Capitalist Development: A Critique of Neo-Smithian Marxism in Introduction to the Sociology of "Developing Societies" eds.H. Alavi et al. (pp.54-71) Macmillan Publishers Limited; Ellen Meiksins Wood, (1991). *The Pristine Culture of Capitalism: A Historical Essay on Old Regimes and Modern States*, London: Verso.

it assumes the state to be the main actor of the accumulation of capital. From this perspective, the extensive role of the state on capital accumulation prevented transformation of relations of production and emergence of social classes. In this way, social change in Ottoman state and society which has become more open since the 17th and 18th centuries could not be attributed to primitive accumulation but rather discussed as conflicts within the state.

Another aspect of the progressist approach is about the concept of free labor. This approach identifies free labor with the source of value, more generally the source of wealth, and considers the forms of unfree labor as the anomalies of capitalism which will be increasingly eliminated along with capitalist development. This assumption denies that the inner movement of capitalism is not based on liberating labor but extracting surplus through exploitation. Unfree labor is not an anomaly but the necessity of capitalism, which could be seen in the exploitation of slave labor during capitalist accumulation (Federici, 2009, p.198). However, the progressist thesis locates women's domestic labor outside of capitalist relations by associating it with unfree labor or pre-capitalist mode of domination, and expects it to be eliminated through participation of women in the labor market during capitalist development.

In addition to modern historiography, socialist feminist critics in the 1960s and 1970s theorized patriarchy and capitalism as two different systems external to each other. Dual system theory formulated mainly in the works of Hartmann (1979) and Mitchel (1974) implies that patriarchy and capitalism are two distinct systems which are historically independent social relations but interact in concrete social formation (Osterud, 1993, p.16). From this perspective, patriarchy cannot be simply reduced to capitalism, firstly because it predates capitalism, and penetrates into not only labor relations in the public space but also into male-female relations in private spaces (Hartmann, 1979). Secondly, patriarchy refers not only to economic exploitation through wage labor but also to domination in cultural, ideological and psychological sense (Mitchel,1974). In this dual perception, female subordination is realized through two forms of exploitation in which capital exploits women as wage labor and men exploit women as domestic labor (Delphy, 2013; Walby, 1991).

Dual system theory is criticized since it dehistoricises patriarchy by representing it as a universal, untransformed system and ignores the dialectic relationship between capitalist class structure and hierarchical sexual structuring through gender division of labor (Eisenstein, 1979; Young, 1981). While hierarchical sexual structuring in the production process is associated with capitalism, the roles of women performed in the reproduction process are attributed to patriarchy. The theorists of dual system theory describe ostensible separation

between production and reproduction as a real separation. Therefore, they claim that patriarchy and capitalism correspond to two different contradictions which may be intersected in some situation, rather than a single contradiction of capital accumulation which operates as *patriarchal capitalism* (Eisenstein, 1979; Mies, 1986; Young, 1981). For this reason, they cannot explain how the family becomes a unit of capitalist accumulation like the workplace. In addition to the dualistic feature, this theory ignores the historical formation of the relationship between gender and class which could only be understood through researching concrete moments and relations in history and social processes (Pollert, 1996).

Certain studies which are concentrated on capitalist accumulation through women's reproductive labor may serve to transcend the dichotomy between gender and class (Dalla Costa & James, 1975; Federici, 2009; Fortunati, 1995; James, 2012). These studies argue that women's unpaid domestic labor is directly related to capitalist accumulation since women produce and reproduce the means of production. As mothers and housewives, women produce value during their reproduction work, because they produce and reproduce all the workers of the world (James, 2012; Dalla Costa & James, 1975). The value form of reproduction corresponds to the specific form of female subordination under capitalism. The economic aim of the previous modes of production depends on the reproduction of human beings. However, the aim of the capitalist production is not the reproduction of human beings but production of exchange values by way of devaluation of human beings under the form of labor power (Fortunati, 1995). Reproduction work has been feminized and devalued in parallel with the devaluation of human beings who become mere labor powers and commodities within capitalist social relations. In this way, gender becomes an issue of class relations as well as class struggle, firstly because a woman is directly exploited by capital as the unpaid producer and reproducer of the means of production; and secondly, she is exposed to systematic capitalist devaluation and degradation to guarantee the continuity of her practice.

Feminization and devaluation of the reproductive work is historically constructed in parallel with working class formation, and it became a crucial aspect in the transition to capitalism. Federici (2009) explains how women were reduced to mere reproductive workers and became dependent on men via dispossession and degradation during the primitive accumulation process. She states that this process was realized firstly by expelling women from not only many waged jobs but also public spaces and streets. This was an attempt at confining women to houses and making them more obliged to men through both sexual violence and references about the biological inferiority of women. Secondly, traditional midwives who had knowledge and experience of traditional birth control methods were

criminalized and annihilated through witch-hunts during the 16th and 17th centuries. The third aspect of the process was that of the social policies of state which promoted marriage and fertility for women in parallel with discourses on moral inferiority of those who refused marriage and applied for abortion.

Turkish feminist historiography has typically not handled the women's struggle as related to a struggle against primitive accumulation and devaluation with respect to the change in the relationship between production and reproduction. They interpret Ottoman feminism as a modern thought that complied with a modern project of state elites and emerged in parallel to Westernization. On the other hand, when one considers gender as an internal contradiction of capital accumulation which is historically constructed, a modernization history of Turkey reveals quite different results about gender relations.

2. Alternative History of Gender Relations

Turkish historiography supposes a systematic progress in women's social position by emphasizing promulgation of the Land Code which defines legal inheritance in a more egalitarian framework in 1858 and the legislation of universal suffrage enacted in 1934. However, some works which examine gender relations in the 19th century show that this process indicates the formation of the preconditions of a new form of patriarchal relations developed through dispossession and devaluation of women, and emergence of modern state controls on women bodies as well as their reproductive capacities. For example, Madeline Zilfi's study (2010) on women slavery in the late Ottoman Empire examines the restriction of women's physical mobility through social surveillance, the state decrees promulgated between the late 18th and early 19th century for regulating women's clothing and the forms of punishment in the case of breaking the rules.

In addition to this, some works deal with the Criminal Code of 1858 which adopts a gendered citizenship rather than equal citizenship via a new type of sexual agreement (Tuğ, 2014; Ze'evi, 2006). The penal code which regulates sexual crimes and adultery defines women as victims and passive subjects whose rights of honor should be protected by the state in the cases of sexual assault (Tuğ, 2014, p.11). However, women should accept their legally unequal position in terms of sexual liberty and consent to state control over their sexuality for benefiting from state protection. In this way, the state becomes responsible for protecting a woman not as an equal citizen but protecting her as a reproductive member of the family (ibid: 11). With this penal code, women become more subordinated to men in parallel with redefinition of their role within the family. On the other hand, some other works emphasize

that this process signifies also the loss of the right of women to have control over their reproduction capacity. In the 19th century, while policies and discourses which aimed at the rise of population became widespread, fertility became the subject of public health through registration and control by the agents of state. Ameliorating infertility through modern medical applications and financial support for promoting fertility became the main policies of the state. In parallel to this, antiabortion state policies through surveillance and criminalization of traditional midwives and punishment of women who committed abortion become significant during this period (Balsoy, 2012; Demirci&Somel, 2008; Fahmy, 1998; Hatem, 1997). In terms of state promotions, Mehmet Alkan mentions legal regulations in the Tanzimat period which facilitate marriages by recognizing the right of marriage to young girls and widows and prohibiting financial constraints that prevent marriages to men from lower classes (Alkan, 1990, pp.90-91). In parallel to this, he refers to state control on social mobility of woman through restrictive legislation during the same period.

Although these works imply that the modernization process does not signify improvement of social positions of women, but rather regulates their reproductive roles, many of them explain this regulation as an aspect of the modernization process of the state which penetrates more and more into social life by controlling and disciplining bodies. However, one can think of these regulations as an aspect of transition to capitalism, in other words, devaluation and dispossession processes of women related to primitive accumulation as Federici points out. The signs of primitive accumulation became more apparent in the 19th century in Ottoman society. Gradual integration to world economy, commercialization of agriculture and privatization of the fiscal system had created dispossessed and indebted peasants who abandoned the land, migrated to cities during 17th and 18th centuries and began to work in small production areas (Shahr, 2001). Women from different ethno-religious communities who participated mostly in textile production by working in their homes n the 17th and 18th centuries became the main part of the cheap labor employed in textile and tabaco industries in the 19th century (Quataert, 1991, 2001). Women who migrated to cities due to dispossession, and female refugees and widows dispossessed by wars and conflicts constituted lower class women of the city in the second half of the 19th century (Özbek, 2010). In this period, prostitution became more widespread among women which also indicates the rise of urban poverty. These dispossessed women who were also free from male control worked mostly as domestic servants in the cities. They were seen as social and moral threatnd criminalized by the state. In line with it, some state policies aimed to control and eliminate their visibility in public spaces by exiling them from the city (ibid:556).

Therefore, the Tanzimat period does not only refer to modernization and secularization of the state-society relations but also to the process of primitive accumulation and transformation of pre-existing social relations by force. Male control on women's bodies through laws and state policies and devaluation of women in the society are the main concerns of this process due to feminization of labor power in production and reproduction. Since gender relations were materialized via mediation of the state and men in this period, the capitalist movement behind these relations remained invisible. For this reason, social oppression on women which increasingly continued during Abdulhamid's reign (1876-1908) (Yalman, 1918), was examined mostly in line with Islamism or legitimacy policies of Abdulhamid rather than the social and economic crisis which emerged with respect to development of capitalist social relations. However, in this period, one can think of the oppression of women in line with the laws for regulating "vagrants" and "beggars" which reflects the aim to control the struggle of the lower classes against devastating impacts of primitive accumulation.

The law on "Vagabonds and Suspected Persons" promulgated in 1909 shows that new the Constitutional regime founded after Abdulhamid's reign (1908-1918) did not reduce social exclusion of the urban poor but rather made it permanent through legislations (Özbek, 2009). Similarly, contrary to assumption taken for granted in historiography, the Constitutional era does not mean a pure liberation process for women. The members of the Committee of Union and Progress which came to power in 1908, did not pursue a program for improving the social position of women, but rather they expressed more clearly the capitalist aims of the state. In parallel with this aim, they handled the question of women not as an issue related to the rights but to the needs of the economics. They did not support women's right to work unquestioningly but turned it into a debate in which a group of members objected to women employment by referring to the vital importance of the reproductive role of women (Toprak, 2016). They were suspicious about the activities of women's societies and for this reason they subject them to high level of surveillance (Maksudyan, 2014, p.109). This tendency seems to be changed during the First World War regarding conscription of men in military service, and in parallel to this, an increase in participation of women in paid workforce Nevertheless, state policies on the one hand encouraged women employment in army and state enterprise, on the other hand promoted the marriages of widow or single women (Karakışla, 2015). In sum, family and labor policies pursued during the war time not only developed the notion of national family, but also capitalist family in which women were identified with reproductive works.

On the other hand, women were not passive receivers of these socioeconomic changes, but active subjects who tried to negotiate and object to them. One can observe that they

struggled with the impacts of the primitive accumulation in different ways During the19[th] century, thousands of woman peasants revolted against hunger and famine in many Anatolian villages (Güzel, 1985). Similarly, they participated in tax revolts which emerged in many provinces in 1906-1907 (Kansu, 1995). In the same period, working class women took part in strikes and machine breaking actions even by leading these events in some cases (Güzel, 1985; Karakışla, 1998; Os, 1997; Quataert, 1991, 2001). In addition to organized struggles, unorganized forms of resistance could be observed as well. Disobedience to clothing regulations with rule-breaking strategies (Zilfi, 2010), conserving traditional birth control methods against state control on fertility (Bahar & Duben, 2013) escaping from male guardians despite criminalization and degradation of single unattended women (Özbek, 2016) were the means used by women in some cases. In this way, womanhood became a contradiction of patriarchal capitalism which leads to a struggle of women that cannot be identified simply with state-feminism. Additionally, Ottoman feminists from educated middle class were not completely indifferent to contradictions and struggles practiced by lower class women. Degradation, dispossession and subordination to men were common experiences for all women although they had different resistance strategies. Therefore, rather than defining as a homogeneous viewpoint of middleclass women, Ottoman feminism can be regarded as a contradictory, open-ended process, an implicit dialogue between different segments of women. In the next section, I will discuss these common experiences expressed and challenged by Ottoman feminists by examining the journal *Kadınlar Dünyası*, which is defined as the first feminist journal in Ottoman history.

3. Signs of Primitive Accumulation, Production and Reproduction in *Kadınlar Dünyası*

The editors of *Kadınlar Dünyası* handled capitalism in a contradictory way. They, either explicitly or implicitly, leaned on two opposing approaches to capitalism. The first approach considered capitalism a source of wealth and a way to escape from misery. For this reason, many articles published in the journal mention the necessity to establish capitalist enterprises and encourage working life in society. On the other hand, the second approach tackled capitalism as a system which harms social relations, and which brings dispossession, degradation and poverty. In this way, the editors of *Kadınlar Dünyası* were, on the one hand, affirming capitalist social relations, while, on the other hand opposing them. In this section I will discuss these contradictory perceptions of women on capitalism. Primarily, the editors of *Kadınlar Dünyası* were aware that all women were subjected to a process of devaluation, degradation and dispossession. The right to private property did not liberate women or change their social position due to male monopoly over the use of property. Therefore, upper and

middle-class women ran into poverty in the absence of men. In an article in the 20th issue of the journal, dispossession and proletarianisation of women is expressed as common experiences among Ottoman women:

> "Ottoman women, surely are in need of freedom to exercise their right-to-work in order to avert the misery in their social lives. This is our legitimate right. The wife of an artisan falls into poverty and misery with her children when her husband dies or even becomes sick. Her life perishes and she is mostly obliged to beg. Even rich families become miserable when they lose their men. Because they do not know how to manage their assets. They were not trained accordingly. If our women had large job opportunities and access to the right-to-work, would these disasters have occurred? Would women have groaned in need as helpless and worthless beings? No, right?" (*Kadınlar Dünyası*. (1913, May 6). Hürriyet İsteriz [We Want Freedom], 20)

In another article, Atiye Şükran speaks of the life story of a Greek woman whom she encountered in a ferry: the story of a rich woman falling into poverty, being obliged to work in several jobs after losing her father and the hospitalization of her husband (Ticaret Ayıp Değildir [Commerce is not a shame], (1913, June 23), 68). While many women from lower classes already entered working life in rural and urban areas, women from middle and upper classes were mostly confined to their houses in which the properties were under the control of a male guardian. Therefore, in the absence of men, women were destitute of the opportunities to transform these properties to means for capitalist investments. Yavuz Selim Karakışla (2015) records a similar story in his work on *Osmanlı Kadınları Çalıştırma Cemiyeti* (Society for the Employment of Ottoman Muslim Women) founded in 1916. A woman from the upper class gradually loses all her properties after her husband's death and she becomes obliged to work in the Women Workers' Battalion founded by the Society. The World War period was indeed critical for creating appropriate conditions for capital accumulation by intensifying dispossession, economic impoverishment, proletarianisation, even though the historiography perceives the war rather as economic devastation and regression. In relation to the impoverishment of women, Karakışla emphasizes the immense number of applications received by the job advertisements of the Society for the Employment of Ottoman Muslim Women. During the war period, due to the military conscription of the male population, women from different ethno-religious communities frequently faced dispossession and separation from their means of production and subsistence (Yavuz Selim Karakışla, 2015; Yiğit Akın, 2014). State officials not only removed male labor power from rural production with the law of conscription but also had a means to seize villagers' means of production like mules, horses, sheep, cattle, depending on the military requirements (Akın,

2014, p.12). As such, women undertook all the burden of production and subsistence in the rural areas of the country during the war times. In the cities, one of the impacts of dispossession and economic impoverishment was the rise of prostitution among women, so much so that this issue appeared in almost every novel published in that period (Toprak, 2016) and the Society for the Employment of Ottoman Muslim Women declared it a mission to protect women from leading a dishonorable life (Karakışla, 2015). This process which began long before the war is expressed in *Kadınlar Dünyası* as follows:

> The need [for subsistence] is above all laws. Neither honor nor religious belief can exist without money… Women in Anatolia are working all day long with chapped cheeks under the burning sun. Despite all efforts and sufferings, majority of them cannot meet their annual subsistence… Unfortunately, I might say that the recent spread of prostitution in spite of the strictness of the veil law derives from the very need [for subsistence]… Economy and austerity is the sole mainstay of the governments, especially the contemporary ones. They sacrifice religion, friendship, and everything for them" (Sacide. (1913, July 25) Kızlarımızın Çeyizi Ne Olmalıdır: Terbiye-i Ahlakiye? [What Should Be the Dowry of Our Daughters: Moral Education?], 99)

Dispossession and devaluation of women that intensified during the war period make clear the relationship between gender and class. Although the editors of *Kadınlar Dünyası* did not associate these experiences directly with the contradictions created by the capitalist accumulation, they were aware of the fact that all women were affected by the disastrous results of dispossession and devaluation in different ways. One of the main common experiences shared by all women was the male control over the mobility of women. Women walking on the streets were frequently subjected to harassment by men due to their clothing. In this sense, as indicated by Medline Zilfi, it is noteworthy to underline the continuity of the social control over, and the punishment of, the mobility of women during this period with that of the 18th and 19th centuries. Many articles of *Kadınlar Dünyası* indeed refer to this issue.[3] Men who were responsible for these harassments were mostly depicted as "vagrant", "bigoted", "jobless" men of the "common people". However, Nesrin Salih's expressions show that this issue cannot be restricted to a certain lower-class tendency but is related to more general degradation policies operated by state officials and opinion leaders. She states that conservative segments of the society that define women as immoral beings object to their rights over education and support their subordination to their husbands.

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3   For example, Ferit, B. (1913, May 10) Mani-i Terakkimiz Nedir? [What are the obstacles to progress], 24; Nihat, P. (1913, May 16).Sanayi-i Nisvan [Women's Industry], 30; Kamuran, N. (1913, May 17) Kıyafetimiz [Our Clothing], 31; Canan, M. (1913, July 15). Zavallı Kadın [Poor Woman], 90.

"Because a woman who is a tiny bit *soignée*, a lady who has a bit of freedom and a girl who knows to speak well and to defend her rights is unchaste and immoral for them. Ironically, these people who do not know the actual meaning of morality, honor, and religion yet pretend to be savants are mostly the ones that rape and assault women. … In ferry ports, subways, train stations, bazaars, in everywhere you will endure not only their invective language and insults, but also the grope of their nasty and vile hands. If you stand up and remind them of their turpitude, their vulgarness, you will end up being the guilty and the faulty. Because you are impudent, worthless and vulgar. Because you are defending your rights. You cannot report them to the police. In that case, the police would do nothing but dispersing the crowd with a verbal warning, because the police too… might run wild enough to forget his duties in a secluded place." (Salih, N. (1913, June 5) Türk Kızları [Turkish Girls], 52)

Degradation, on the one hand, was related to the confinement of women to the private life in the houses and their condemnation to their reproductive roles via domination over their bodies; on the other hand, it resulted in expelling women from many fields of wage labor. For this purpose, discourses on the biological inferiority of women were operated as a way of degradation. In many articles, editors of *Kadınlar Dünyası* refer to examples falsifying these discourses. They emphasize that inequality between men and women is not biologic but rather social, meaning that it could be eliminated through education and participation in working life. They objected to the perception which naturalizes gender division of labor by referring to brave women warriors in world history and successful women working in the historically male-occupied areas as engineering, science sector, police forces.[4]

The use of the conception of advocating the biological and moral inferiority of women can be thought of in the context of Federici's argument about the relationship between the dispossession and degradation of women during the period of transition to capitalism. Federici argues that the feminization of the reproductive labor force on behalf of capital accumulation was the main point leading to an internal relationship between gender and class. However, as Fortunati states, this relationship becomes invisible as it derives from the contradiction between production and reproduction. Although both productive and

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4   For example, Mükerrem Belkıs congratulates a Muslim woman who graduated from a faculty of law in Russia and criticizes the perception that relies on the backwardness of women as compared to men by giving the examples of Marie Curie who won the Nobel prize in 1912 and the recruitment of women police officers in Strasbourg. (Şiddetle Ret Kadınlar Nakısatü'l-akl İmiş! [It is reportedly said that women are weak-minded! I absolutely refuse], (1913, July 10), 85). An article published with the signature of *Kadınlar Dünyası* speaks of the woman warriors as Kara Fatma, a Kurdish woman soldier who took place in the Crimean War, and gives the example of women who fought in the French Revolution and the communards of Paris. (Erkekler! Kadınlık Yalnızca Meyve Değildir [Men! Womanhood is not just a Fruit], (1913, May 24), 38). ament, tears" for women. On the other handr? kadınlar have. ed. ing household consummation, equal citizenship, equal rights ament, tears" for women. On the other handr? kadınlar have. ed. ing household consummation, equal citizenship, equal rights

reproductive labor force are devalued during the accumulation of capital by the degradation of women, the relationship between production and reproduction appears to be a zero-sum relationship. From this perspective, it seems that the more women participate in production, the more liberated they would be from gender relations. This contradiction results in a contradictory perception of freedom among women, as it leads to two different forms of struggle which are presumed to improve their social position. The first is to be liberated from reproductive duties via participating in the productive labor power, while the second is to revalue reproductive labor by defining reproductive work primarily as women's work as mothers and housewives and consenting to it. The articles published in *Kadınlar Dünyası* mainly reflect the debates about these contradictory struggles.

Women demanded participation in the working life firstly to be protected against the disastrous impacts of dispossession. Many women fell into poverty because they could not manage their income after the death of their husbands or when their husbands went bankrupt or lost their occupational prestige. In addition to this, there were cases when the wages of men were not sufficient to maintain the household, and they needed to be supported by women. In an article published in the 31st issue of *Kadınlar Dünyası* it is stated that every family is a small enterprise whose members contribute to the income (Her Aile Bir Şirkettir [Each Family is an Enterprise], (1913, May 17), 31). On the other hand, working was crucial for women to become independent of men. Mükerrem Belkıs explains that male domination derives from the power of men with respect to the powerlessness of women:

> "The cause of the enslavement and the persecution of women is women's deprivation from the power to sustain their lives by themselves, women's inability to maintain their livelihoods outside [home]… A woman needs a man to feed her, to keep her alive. She cannot sustain herself if she stays alone. The situation is like this at present. For this reason, she is afraid of getting a divorce. She says that she dies if she gets divorced. She decides that she must comply with her husband's all kinds of behaviors in order to survive." (Belkıs, M. (1913, July 21) Kadınlıkta Esaretin Müvellidi [The Birth of Woman Enslavement], 96).

Economic powerlessness of women combines with their legal inequality with men. Sharia law gives men a unilateral right to *talaq* (repudiation) which could be exercised unconditionally. Although sharia law awards alimony to women, this is not sufficient for her to maintain a life, or else men could avoid or postpone the payment. An article published in the 142nd issue of the journal describes *talaq* as one of the most important problems that women faced and appeals to state authorities to prepare a divorce law to limit men's right over repudiation. (Cemil, N. (1914, May 9). Talaq [Repudation], 142)

For these reasons, the right to work and women's employment became the most crucial demands of the women's struggle. Women were already working in the agriculture sector, and in low paid industries like textile and service sectors, however, their employment in the public sector was still restricted. From the 23rd to the 36th issues of the journal, we witness that the editors of *Kadınlar Dünyası* struggled for the approval of the job application of a woman named *Bedra Osman Hanım* by a French Phone Company. Her job application was refused because the company stipulated foreign language skills for employment. The editors of *Kadınlar Dünyası* criticized this attitude of the Phone Company, as it meant that all Ottoman Muslim women were excluded from the job opportunity. For this reason, they applied to the ministry of public works and repeatedly published their petition for an explanation in their columns. In the end, Bedra Osman Hanım was employed by the Phone Company[5].

The editors of *Kadınlar Dünyası* believed that working women had more rights in the public sphere than the others. In particular women who worked in factories had more autonomy from men compared to rural women workers engaged in household production. Pakize Sadri, in her article series entitled "Anadolu İhtisasatı" (Impressions from Anatolia) compares the social positions of women in several Anatolian cities. She describes women living in Bursa as the most distinguished, and the most honorable members of the working life who share the public space, bazaars and markets, with men, completely free from male domination. (Sadri, P. (1913, June 19), 64). On the other hand, women who live in Balıkesir are represented to be the most oppressed women suffering under multiple forms of male domination. They are oppressed by both their husbands, and local religious authorities, as well as land-owners (Sadri, P. (1913, June 23), 68). Women's participation in factory production strengthened them against employers and men; thereby, giving them the opportunity to improve both their labor and gender relations, while their reproductive roles remained unchanged. However, this progress was not the natural result of the capitalist development, it was rather achieved through struggles and conflicts. Women were a part of the working-class struggle for a long time. Especially in Bursa, women were highly employed in the silk industry, and they became the main subject of strikes to improve working conditions (Os, 1997). Their struggle not only aspired for the improvement of working conditions but also opposed degradation and unequal gender relations. For example, a petition published in the socialist journal titled *İştiraki* with the signature of "Five Thousand Working Women"

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5   The article published in *Kadınlar Dünyası* expresses the demand for an explanation from the minister of the Public Works and criticizes the popular journals that keeps silent against this discrimination. (İzahat İsteriz Tarziye Bekleriz [We Demand an Explanation We Expect an Apology], (1913, May 12), 26).[We Want Freedom].e-i Ahlakiye?"d not be feminism omen ices. discussed es of the journal rprises and encouraging working relati

included complaints and demands of woman workers about wages and working hours as well as physical violence and insults of employers (Hükümetimizin nazar- Dikkatine [To the Attention of Our Government], (1910, March 5), 2). Therefore, women were not free from gender relations by participating in production since production and reproduction are not two distinct entities but they form a contradictory unity. For this reason, women's struggle against devaluation and unequal working conditions gives rise to the improvement in relations of reproduction as well.

An article published in the 140th issue of the journal shows that the editors were aware of the devaluation of woman workers. The article refers to the wage discrimination against women: "Ottoman women's economic position is based on injustice and worse as much as her social position" (Sanayide de Sefaleti Nisvan, [Misery of Women in Industry], (1914, May 8), 140). According to the article, women would work long hours for lower wages. For this reason, the article calls women not to keep silent against this injustice: "protecting our sisters from the insults of employers is our upmost duty" (ibid). Despite the bad conditions of working women, the editors of *Kadınlar Dünyası* evaluated work as a means to obtain relative autonomy from men and become active agents taking decisions about their lives. An article entitled "Free Love" published in the 142nd issue of the journal emphasizes that many women from the bourgeois class envy working women's life because they could act according to their free will. (Serbest Aşk [Free Love] (1914, May 22), 142). Similarly, the difference between lower and upper class lifestyles is expressed in the literature of Armenian feminists. Sırpuhi Düssap, in her novel, implies that upper class women could not participate in the decision-making process about their own lives, while the lower class women had the right to work, thereby, develop a more equal relationship with their husbands (Bilal & Ekmekçioğlu, 2006, p.59).

In parallel to the participation in the working life, the editors of *Kadınlar Dünyası* attempted to change the inferior social position of women by emphasizing their crucial roles in the reproduction process. They struggled with the degradation of women in the family by referring to the reproductive labor. They were aware of the fact that women were reproducing humankind, being the main source of production, civilization, progress and nation. For this reason, they used their force coming from their reproduction capacities to improve their position in the family and society. In the 32nd issue of the journal, Meliha Canan discusses the question of female slaves. Despite the legal prohibition upon the declaration of the 1908 Constitution, women slavery was still an ongoing practice. In the article, she objects to women being sold like animals by stating that this issue lowers their social position. She goes

further to criticize men for not appreciating women for their fertility and care labor. (Cariye Meselesi [The Question of Slave Woman], (1913, May 18), 32). In addition to enslavement, many articles also condemn marriage customs for reducing women to a commodity. The editors of *Kadınlar Dünyası* object to early and prearranged marriages and demand a family law which regulates the conjugal union. In these objections, they assert that children who are brought up in unhappy marriages cannot serve the country in a healthy manner.

As such, women attempted to participate in the decision-making processes about their lives and improve their social conditions to establish more equal relationships with men by referring to their functions in social reproduction. The majority of articles in the journal do not oppose the basic family structure based on the gendered division of labor. However, they object to work hierarchies between men and women or between productive and reproductive works. Aliye Cevat, in her article series entitled "Family" mentions the ideal age of marriage for men and women and describes their duties based on the gender difference.

> "Duties of wife: The wife, being the spirit of family, has two important duties: supervising the housework and the childcare. In fact, the husband supplies the needs of the household, while the management of the household is woman's duty. But the supervision of husband to these issues is not necessary. Otherwise, his work becomes deficient. Because he is obliged to work for his family all day long". (Cevat, A. (1913, June 10). Aile 6 [Family 6], 55)

Women consent to reproductive works mostly with the aim of revaluating their labor and gaining autonomy from men by having a control over the household consumption, as well as the aim of obtaining equal citizenship and social and economic rights already granted to men. To what extent can these strategies be identified with a family-centered feminism (Os, 2009) or *patriarchal bargains*[6]? Indeed, the editors of *Kadınlar Dünyası* did not unconditionally support the family structure, rather they problematized it. Additionally, not all the women consented to the work of reproduction. Alternative approaches are also present in the journal. For example, Nesrin Salih, in her article published in the 47th issue of the journal, states that the woman is not a machine nor a means for the production of children. She implies that women would be destitute of bargaining power as long as the master-slave relationship remains between men and women (Türk Kızları [Turkish Girls]. (1913, June 2), 47). In this sense, the journal can be seen as a common ground in which editors from different points of view challenge each other. On the other hand, women would bargain with not only the patriarchy, but also each other. Therefore, these strategies can rather be described as part of

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6   Deniz Kandiyoti uses this concept to "indicate the existence of set rules and scripts regulating gender relations, to which both genders accomodate and acquiesce, yet which may nonetheless be contested, redefined, and renegotiated" (Kandiyoti, 1988, p. 286)

the women's struggle against capitalist devaluation in both production and reproduction by means of a contradictory consciousness revealed in practices and dialogues between different tendencies.

4. Contradictory Perception of Modernity and Nationalism in *Kadınlar Dünyası*

Women studies have emphasized the relationship of feminist movement to nationalism and modernism during the late Ottoman and early republic period. The subjects of the Ottoman feminist movement frequently referred to nationalist and modernist discourses and some of them had close relationships with political actors who took place among founders of modern nation state. Nevertheless, have feminists completely been objectified within modernization process of state elites and simply repeated the nationalist discourse of the political actors? Have modernist and nationalist discourses in late Ottoman and early republic eras led to a homogeneous viewpoint among feminists?

It is possible to detect clear traces of Turkish nationalist discourse in *Kadınlar Dünyası*. For example, it particularly promotes bringing up patriotic children that are ready to sacrifice themselves for the country in times of war, to help build the national economy and to defend values of a specific form of family. Some of the articles in *Kadınlar Dünyası* encourage women to consume domestic products, boycott foreign products and start small-scale national enterprises. In line with the nationalist discourse, *Kadınlar Dünyası* also fosters modernist discourses. While the journal uses the concepts of "enlightenment", "awaking of women consciousness", "civilization" and "age of freedom" to implicate a specific sense of contemporaneousness; it delegates the notions of "bigotry", "despotism", "ignorance" to the previous periods. Nevertheless, one cannot totally identify Ottoman feminists' approaches with modernism and nationalism as they also underline the contradictory character of these notions. Although these groups have taken up modernity and nation as the resilient facts of their times, they have problematized these notions from a gender perspective. Consider the following remarks by the editors of *Kadınlar Dünyası* that underscore the failure of modernism despite its promises of universal freedom:

> "[T]he men began to revolt against the institutions which restrict their freedom from 15th century onwards. At first, they strived to regain their liberties from priests for centuries. Wars of religion and inquisitions didn't work. They resisted all in order to exercise the truths manifested by Volter. Finally, the liberty of their sects is obtained. Afterwards, emperors' and kings' turn arrived. The men were more violent against them. They declared their liberty through grand revolutions. In the meantime, there remained a mass, a great mass that was not yet provided with liberty. That is us, poor women.… Yes, although men

apparently seem to be freedom-lovers they are nothing but small despots in reality" (Y. Naciye, "Erkekler Hakikaten Hürriyet-perver midirler? Kadınlar ne İstiyor? [Are men really freedom lovers? What do women want?], *Kadınlar Dünyası*, no. 7, 10 April 1329 [23 April 1913])

In the anniversary of the 1908 revolution, 10th July 1913, the editorial of *Kadınlar Dünyası* expressed gratitude to the leaders of revolution for saving women from "cruelty, despotism, torture, lament, tears" that the previous Abdülhamid rule (1876-1908) inflicted. On the other hand, the mentioned article states that the revolution primarily served men. The enslavement of women, the article notes, still continues. For this reason, the journal calls on women to obtain their freedom by force (10 Temmuz Iyd-I Ekber-I Hürriyettir [Tenth of July is the Great Feast of Freedom], (1913, July 23), 98). In another article in the journal, Nebile Akif questions the promises of French Human Rights Declaration and Ottoman Constitution for women. According to Akif, although these two texts claim that all human beings are born free, women are expelled from the thresholds of the concept of human beings. To her, "this means explicitly oppression, violation, usurpation" (Hikmet-i İctimaiye ve Nisvan [Reason of Society and Women], (1913, July 18), 93).

All these expressions refer to a crisis of modernity rather than its unconditional affirmation, and manifest the differentiation of woman's vision from that of men. In addition to this, the nationalist discourse of women diverges from the state discourse. The editors of *Kadınlar Dünyası* frequently use nationalist discourse for increasing the value of their social position and struggle against degradation. For example, another editorial piece of *Kadınlar Dünyası* adduces the weakness of the military power of Turkish state not to deficiencies in weapons but to human power that prioritizes male bodies. The editorial argues that if women remained uneducated and ignorant, human resources would be materially and morally weak (Taksim Belediye Bahçesi [Taksim Municipal Garden], (1914, May 22), 142).

From the articles published in the journal, it is understood that women do not have a homogeneous viewpoint about the concept of nation. The content of this concept is rather a debate among women. Many articles speak of nation as a social unity rather than a politically constructed entity. Furthermore, some others emphasize that political attitudes of men produce hostility among different communities in Ottoman society and damage the social unity.[7] These articles use the notion of "politics" with a negative sense and identify it as a male vocation. In line with this, some articles criticize the engagement of women organizations

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7   Ali, E.S. (1913, April 26) Anasır-ı Osmaniye [Ottoman Communities], 10; Kadınlar Dünyası (1913, April 30). İhsan-ı Şahane [Great Endowment], 14.

with political parties. For example, in another issue of *Kadınlar Dünyası*, Emine Seher Ali criticizes the relationship between the Committee of Union and Progress, and the Association for the Protection of Ottoman Turkish Women – the latter being founded under the leadership of Nezihe Muhiddin as a charity association for providing poor women and children with vocations after the Balkan Wars. Emine Seher Ali stated that women associations should be independent from all political and social organizations of men (Teşebbüste İttihat [Progress in Entrepreneurship], (1913, April 19), 3). She also criticizes Nezihe Muhiddin's national economy approach that excludes non-muslim entrepreneurs and aims a boycott of the products of these entrepreneurs. The editors of *Kadınlar Dünyası* agree with this approach on prioritizing the consumption of locally produced products and boycotting foreign products. However, the editorial exhorts that the boycott should not be directed to non-muslim entrepreneurs within the country as they are the constituents of Ottoman Society (*Kadınlar Dünyası* (1913, April 29). Vesait-i Tenevvür [The Means of Enlightenment], 13)

Discussion between Emine Seher Ali and Nezihe Muhiddin indicates that Ottoman feminists had different viewpoints about the horizon of nation-state project especially before the First World War. In addition, the editors of *Kadınlar Dünyası* described women as a universal community that suffered from the male domination, and thus had common interests against men. They defined all women from different communities and countries as "sisters" and seemed to be inspired by international movement of women, and particularly by the activities of the Suffragists:

> Today, all civilizations dispatch women to a different way of action. The will to obtain the same rights with the man has awakened. Doubtlessly, whether in Britain or in United States, the excitement of women is going to call for a new life in the domain of womanhood. Necessarily, they will cooperate with men politically and economically. This civilized movement of women is a natural one. Law of nature is irrepressible. Undoubtedly, we, Ottoman women, cannot remain indifferent to the movements and excitements that occur in the universe of womanhood. We are obliged to unite. Otherwise, our national and religious existence will be assimilated (*Kadınlar Dünyası* (1913, July 7), Tenevvür Edelim [We need Enlightenment], 82)

The war period interrupted the publication of the journal. In the post-war writings of *Kadinlar Dünyası*, the relationship between nationalism and feminism appears to be clear as the "Ottoman womanhood" becomes substituted with "Turkish womanhood".[8] This shift accompanies the reinforcement of the alliance of women and men. For example, an article by

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8   For example, Sıdıka Ali Rıza emphasizes improvement of the social position of "Turkish Woman". (Kızlarımızdan Temenniler [Requests of Our Daughters], (1918, April 9), 168).

Ulviye Mevlan published in 1918 emphasizes the activities of women in Hilal-i Ahmer Cemiyeti (Women's Branch of the Ottoman Red Crescent) and in Workers Battalion that serves war economy by providing labor power and health services. Mevlan celebrates women for proving to have the same levels of courage, strength and capability as men. In this way, she reasons the women should obtain their economic and political rights (Düşünüyorum [I am Thinking], (1918, April 9), 168).

5. Conclusion

Reading through these discourses expressed in *Kadınlar Dünyası*, one can see that nationalism and modernism was not the essential character of Ottoman feminism. Rather, the Ottoman feminist horizon unfolded in a dynamic process along with the challenges and struggles of women against the contradictions of modernity and nation. Such a process includes also a heterogeneity among the actors of Ottoman feminism, and contradictions and struggles between these various actors. I argue that we cannot grasp this process without an analysis of World War politics that has remarkably shifted the trajectories of social movements at a global level. Secondly, we cannot completely identify the horizon and aspirations of Ottoman feminists with those of state elites. A notable part of the subjects of Ottoman feminism perceived their struggle not as a supplement of male-dominated political movements but as a problematization and, sometimes, even a negation of them. For this reason, one can argue that Ottoman feminism was more like a social force than a current of thought. That is because the Ottoman feminists aimed to reach out to all women and to understand the conditions of women from different segments of society, and employed the concept of "class" to cover all women. Thirdly, Ottoman women contradicted modernity and nationalism, and permanently struggled with capitalist social relations and its devastating processes such as dispossession and degradation. The unequal position of women in production and their non-valued labor in reproduction comprise the main themes discussed in *Kadınlar Dünyası*.

These points reiterate the need to challenge the main assumptions of Turkish historiography on Ottoman feminism and gender relations. The hegemonic approach in Turkish historiography obtains an optimistic expectation about the impacts of modernity and capitalism on the social position of women. In this way, it neglects the fact that the promises of modernity about the liberty and equality are restricted by the inner contradictions of capitalist social relations that reduce women to being low-paid workers of production as well as unpaid workers of reproduction. A critical approach to the problem demonstrates the contradictions of capitalist modernity regarding gender relations, i.e. disciplining women through controlling the bodies

and the reproductive capacities of women. Yet it does not explain the relationship of such contradictions with capitalism and ignores the possible struggles emerging from these contradictions. In both approaches, modernity is defined as an end in itself and seen as imposing itself on world history to shape all societies in a one-dimensional sense. In this way, the questions of why and through which relationships sexual hierarchies are reproduced in a specific manner in a modern world are left unanswered. And historical connections between patriarchy and capitalism remain ambiguous. A dialectic approach can provide methodological tools for answering these questions and challenging existing historiography. Looking at history from a dialectic perspective, perceiving modernity as a social change in a contradictory and relational process and as an open-ended *movement* directed by social struggles can clarify historical connections of patriarchal capitalism. It can also help us overcome the dualistic approaches in gender theory that deals with gender and class as distinct entities.

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CHAPTER 2

YAKUP KADRI KARAOSMANOĞLU AND THE REPUBLICAN IMAGINATION: THE NOVELS *YABAN* AND *ANKARA*

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Abstract

The paper deals with a particular literary representation of the republican transformation in Turkey that mainly focuses on its first decades. Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu can be defined as one of the most ardent supporters of Turkish Republicanism, however his literary narrative is by no means in clear support for it. For the most part, it gives away the contradictory and self-negating aspects of Turkish (Kemalist) Republican discourse that claims to be a thoroughly modernist one. In the novels that he wrote about the war of independence and the foundation of the new republic, he surprisingly reflects a sense of radical disappointment rather than a sense of glory. It is a narrative of "complaint, frustration and discontent" rather than a celebration of Turkish republicanism and nationalism. As it can be discerned from a careful analysis of his novels, what marks this frustration and discontent is a strong desire for a somewhat transcendental and all-encompassing power, which he could never define or name properly.

Being accepted as an intellectual and political forerunner of the Turkish Republican transformation as well as being a leading figure of the secular western oriented modernizing elite, his elusiveness in articulating a proper and well-defined modern nationalist identity and a clear republican-revolutionary ideology marks Yakup Kadri Karaosmaoğlu as one of the most significant examples in detecting the internal paradoxes and vague points in the making of a modern nationalist identity. Furthermore his narrative constitutes a very good example of how the western oriented intelligentsia at the time of the demise of the Ottoman Empire and the early republican era was haunted by the fantasy of an imperial glory. This may well be related to a transcendental and all-encompassing perception of political power, which can be defined as the most enduring and effective remains of the Imperial imagination that still continues to haunt the Turkish "Republic" in various ways.

Keywords: Kemalism, Turkey, Modernization, Yakup Kadri Karaosmaoğlu, *Yaban*, *Ankara*, Alienation, Negation.

1. Introduction

Analyzing fiction for historical purposes may seem a vain attempt for many, as it is more likely to be a subjective account of the events and impossible to verify by empirical evidence. However a work of fiction may well be an important account for demonstrating how a series of catastrophic events or a huge socio-political transformation is perceived and reflected by a particular imagination. At this point the identity of the author becomes quite significant.

If the author is accepted as an important representative or a vanguard of a specific political group or movement or of a specific worldview, then a fictional representation of an historical event becomes significant in terms of understanding a particular pattern of perceiving historical reality. Moreover, it becomes more important if the author himself experienced that historical event. In that case, fictional narrative appears as not only a reflection of how historical reality is perceived, but also how it was experienced by a particular mindset.

In this sense what the paper tries to achieve is to point out a particular perception and representation of the transformation period from the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic by focusing on two particular novels by Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, *Yaban [Alien[1]] and Ankara*. This particular mode of perception and representation belonged to the western oriented modernist elite of the Ottoman Empire, which was holding both the military and civil bureaucracy under their control during World War One. Even after the great defeat and demise of the empire, the cadres who organized and led the War of Independence and founded the Turkish Republic belonged to the same worldview (or better to say *Weltanschauung*) even if there were serious hostilities amongst them.

Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoglu can be said to be one of the important representatives of this *Weltanschauung*. Even though he is mostly known as a fervent advocate of Kemalist Republicanism, his literary narrative also reflects a certain mourning, but more than that, 'a latent melancholy' regarding the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Surely such a narrative is uncovering a paradoxical socio-political stance that is stuck between a desperate longing for a world empire and a western European oriented modern nation state.

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1   Although in some translations the title of Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu's novel is translated as "Savage", this naming may lead to a dichotomy between "savagery" and "civilization". However the novel goes far beyond this dichotomy and it points out a double-edged alienation, which comprises the intellectual elite of the time (which were mostly the leading figures of the Turkish Republican revolution) on the one hand and the Anatolian people mostly composed of illiterate villagers on the other.

This paradox was certainly not unique to Yakup Kadri's narrative. In fact this was the ordeal of the whole generation who witnessed the loss of the Balkans and subsequently the total collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore that very generation also witnessed the foundation of the Turkish Republic basically on the Anatolian territories, which were once trivialized as the Empire's provinces.

The basis of that paradox lies in the fact that the western oriented elite of the collapsing Empire had to struggle against the western armies during the First World War and the War of Independence. This placed their western oriented worldview on highly problematic ground. In this sense the westernization aspect of both the Committee of Union and Progress in the process of the Empire's collapse and the Kemalist Republicans afterwards appear to be paradoxical from the beginning.

On the other hand this elite's relationship with the Imperial legacy was also very problematic which was particularly manifest in the elusive patriotism of the Committee of Union and Progress just before the demise of the Empire. They perceive the Empire both as a decaying entity, which was something to be improved within a western oriented modernist line while desperately fighting to prevent its total collapse. The Kemalist Republicans on the other hand openly stated their contempt of the Imperial legacy in the name of embracing a homogeneous nation state. However, they were simultaneously alienated in their new homeland - Anatolia - and perceived it as ignorant and even *savage* that it should be radically transformed and integrated into the so-called "civilized" world.

2. Yakup Kadri and The Literary Narrative

Surprisingly, the literary narrative of Yakup Kadri Karaosmaoglu completely fits in this paradoxical emergence of a modern national identity that was extracted from the collapse of a world Empire. In his novels what strikes us is a suffering political mindset that could embrace neither westernization and the emerging nation-state nor the Imperial legacy.

His representations of the 'subject' usually reflect the loss of a certain spirit or character that is directly associated with moral degeneracy. Thus, social degeneracy is always associated with political concerns, in terms of the lack of an efficient political power. In Yakup Kadri's early novels, there is a clear longing for the 'total destruction' of the corrupted and highly 'defiled' socio-political regime of the late Ottoman Empire and its replacement with a 'pure' and 'brand new' one. In his later novels, written approximately ten years later after the Kemalist Republican Revolution (in the 1930s), however, one can observe a certain disappointment and anxiety over the institutionalization of the 'new' Turkish Republic. This

disappointment is accompanied by idealistic and even utopian projections of a future 'Republican Turkish Society' – though they have totalitarian overtones.[2]

Exploring Yakup Kadri's novels in such a fashion is also an attempt to understand and explain the appearance of the notion of 'republic' in Turkey as a unique political imagination and as a unique political mentality. The appearance of Republicanism in Turkey can easily be seen as a specific point in a continuous process of socio-political dislocation. This arises from a gradual and multidimensional shift towards the Western framework, whose perception of the 'social' and the 'political' is also accepted as 'universal'. The point, however, is that the process of dislocation by no means resulted in the establishment of 'universally accepted' new socio-political structures and institutions. As Niyazi Berkes rightly points out, although the process of Turkish political modernization corresponds to a certain perception of universality, 'the attitude towards the problems created by it differs in every case. The acceptance of a secular outlook on religious, political, social, and cultural matters is far from universal' (Berkes 1998, 3). In fact we can say that the Western modernist discourse that was accepted as universal became intermingled with various local elements and created a unique form of modernist transformation, which we can call *Kemalist Republicanism*. However apart from its visible institutional, economic and political aspects, the paper concentrates on its 'immediate' internal paradoxes by referring to the literary narrative of one of the most fervent Kemalist Republicans. The more enthusiasm for and belief in a revolutionary cause, the more vulnerable it is in the face of any deviance from its perfect image. The disappointment and frustration emanating from such a vulnerability enables us to see the true nature of the "belief content" inherent in a modern political transformation which becomes quite visible in Yakup Kadri's literary narrative.

In his novels, he both represents the 'alienation' of the idealist, revolutionary intellectual faced with the ignorance and 'backwardness' of his own people, and the paradox of the perception of "Westernization" by the upper circles of Turkish society, including the Kemalist

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2   In fact we can talk about such a prospective totalitarian yearning only in the last part of his novel *Ankara*. However, most of his novels consisted of a negative representation of the upper classes and elite of Turkish society as corrupted because of an extreme and formalist perception of a Western oriented modernisation. Except for the last part of *Ankara*, where he describes the perfect unity and solidarity of a nation that becomes one with their leader's will, he fails to present an actual alternative for the cynical and corrupted elite. This failure can be observed both in terms of representing the last decades of the Ottoman Empire and the first decades of the young Turkish republic. The reason lies in his representation of the people - which was largely composed, of peasants at that time - as ignorant, indifferent and uncivilised. In fact this desperation becomes the mark of his whole narrative, which also manifests a certain longing for the certainty of an all-encompassing power. However, he refuses to name such a longing, as it conflicts directly with the cause of the Republican revolution, which is supposed to depend on popular sovereignty and the limitation of an all-encompassing, absolute power by means of this popular sovereignty.

elite, within a mood of hopelessness. In fact, except for one of his novels (*Yaban*, [*The Alien*]) he mostly dealt with the social and moral corruption of the modernizing elite, not because of any attachment with the Ottoman past, but because of 'extremely Westernized life styles'. So, what we see in his novels is a double-edged negation that leads nowhere in terms of locating an enthusiasm for building a new nation, because both the Ottoman Past and the West are negated as its references.

As a result, instead of elaborating a fair alternative to this paradox, we see an ongoing frustration in his literary writings. The reason for this mood lies in his negation of his own people as ignorant and backward, on the one hand, and on the other his apparent frustration with, and alienation from, Western life styles and manners. Also, in negating the modernizing elite he cannot take recourse to either Ottoman socio-political practice or the Anatolian people. While he sees the former as the root of the Empire's downfall, he sees the latter as totally irrelevant and indifferent to a modern national revolutionary cause. Within this ultimate paradoxical void, however, we realize a strong belief toward a radically elusive omnipotence, which resides in the form of a powerful political fantasy. That is, a fantasy of an all-encompassing political power, which cannot be named in one way or another and naturally has no tangible existence. In fact, without the belief in such a fantasy there would be no frustration and discontent.

Niyazi Akı, who is the author of one of the very few analyses and commentaries on Yakup Kadri, divides his canon into 'early' and 'late' Yakup Kadri. Yakup Kadri's interest in socio-political issues had begun by the early 1920s (Akı, 2001, 30-46).[3] In his works published before the 1920s, he deals mostly with personal issues and stories. The early Yakup Kadri shares a lot of features with his contemporaries, in terms of their pessimism, nihilism, and the hopeless search for a social and even a 'religious' spirit. His pessimism and hopelessness had been influenced by the works of Guy de Mauppasant, Gustave Flaubert, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Henrik Ibsen and finally Bergsonism. As can be seen both in Hasan Ali Yücel's analysis of Yakup Kadri[4] and in his own memoir of his youth, *Anamın Kitabı*, [*My Mother's*

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3   Birsen Talay also makes the same distinction within Yakup Kadri's works by claiming that in his early novels there is a certain pessimism, residing in a vague form of mysticism and in a desperate search for messianic salvation. However, in his later works, he suddenly finds the concrete reflection of his mystical longing in 'building a new regime and a nation' which would soon fall into the same mood of a mystical mourning with a very pathological disavowal of the exact source of this mourning. Birsen Talay, 'Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu' in Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil (eds.) op.cit. vol II, Kemalism, pp.430-32

4   Hasan Ali Yücel was one of the most important Ministers of Education throughout the history of the Turkish Republic. He was in office during the single party era under the presidency of İnönü and was one of the forerunners of the 'village institutes', which was a specific education programme for enlightening the large peasant population of Turkey. The institutes were closed because of the pressures coming both from the opposition and from some of the inner circles of the Republican People's Party, amidst claims of partisanship

Book], he always felt alienated from his times. He longed for a fantasmatic, magical place, which can be associated with a certain form of 'escapism' rather than a socio-political imaginary perfectionism or any projection in such a sense. (Akı, 2001, 42-43). However, the reason for this nihilism and pessimism lay neither in his intellectual influences nor his personal conditions and affiliations. As with most of the intellectuals of his time, his earlier writings were influenced by living in a collapsing Empire and being trapped between the agony of its passing and his ambivalence over his own attraction toward the West. (Ayvazoğlu, 292). Certainly, this pathology took the form of a hopeless longing for a new spirit, which could be found neither in the rubble of a fallen Empire or simply in the ascendant vision of the West. The characteristic mood of most of the intellectuals in the pre-republican period can be best defined in the words of Claude Lefort, when he defines the mood of the French intellectuals in the French Revolution;

> They still lived in the gap between a world that was disappearing and a world that was appearing, and their thought was still haunted by questions which knew no limits - by which I mean that it was not yet restricted by any presuppositions as to how to define objects of knowledge or as to how to define politics, religion, law, economics or culture. (Lefort, 1988, 215)

The distinction between the early and later works of Yakup Kadri is not limited to his shifting toward socio-political themes.[5] It also relates to the appearance of a political enthusiasm for the prospect of establishing a new society, a new 'nation', and a new state, which is embedded in the search for the certainty of an absolute power. However, as we will see in detail below, this enthusiasm faded towards a new pessimism and discontent. In that sense the selected narrative of Yakup Kadri constitutes a certain 'moment' in the political imaginary of the founding elite of the Turkish republic that stands 'in between' the rise of a socio-political hope, cynicism and melancholia.

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and the institutes' leaning towards a Soviet style communism. He also translated many Western and Russian classics into Turkish during the 1930s and 40s. Being one of his closer friends, he wrote a book on Yakup Kadri, which mostly analyses his early works. Yücel did not mention Yakup Kadri's novels written mostly after the foundation of the Republic. The reason may be that, as the Minister of Education of the time, he might not have wanted to dwell on the controversial political position reflected in these novels. See Yücel, (1989). In this work, with a certain sense of sympathy, Yücel claims that Yakup Kadri has always been far from reality with an inclination towards certain utopias both on the personal and social levels. However, Yücel misses the fact that the intellectual support for the Republican Revolution resides in that kind of utopian potential, although it was always kept at a safe distance by the main ruling elite of Kemalist Republicans.

5   According to Akı, 'late Yakup Kadri' can be defined by his novels and it is his novels that make him a political writer because his early works are mostly composed of short stories. (Akı, 1988, 97)

3. The Novels

3.1. Yaban [Alien] (1932)

> ''Yaban' is a heartrending scream of a malaise of the soul, of a consciousness, of a conscience which suddenly confronts painful and horrible reality'
>
> Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu (1998, 11)

Yaban can be seen as the self-deconstruction of Yakup Kadri's utopian space, the precise utopian object of his political imaginary; 'the people', specified as the naïve and ignorant peasant masses of Anatolia, who live, in the novel, in a specific village. The self-destruction and ultimate disenchantment depicted in the novel parallels the same disenchantment experienced by the idealist Kemalist Republican intellectuals when they confronted the precise object of their political desire – the founding of a new nation.

Actually, rather than the story presented in *Yaban*, it is the mode of representation of the story which is full of constant observations and judgments, in the form of a monologue, metaphors, and allegories which contribute to a description of a 'nowhere' that is completely out of time or space. In other words, the location where the story takes place (which is in fact a village in central Anatolia) depicts a hell of disenchantment in which we cannot see any positive description of a subject. Except for the protagonist, all the villagers are presented as awkward symbols of a hellish space.

Yaban is a story of an Ottoman reserve officer who is raised in a wealthy family (as he is the son of a high-ranking military officer [*pasha*])[6] in a comfortable mansion in İstanbul. As we understand from the novel, this is an idealist and highly intellectual officer. As Atilla Özkırımlı rightly points out, rather than being a protagonist of a fiction, Ahmet Celal is a prototypical Turkish intellectual of the first decades of the twentieth century. (Özkırımlı, 1998, 4) According to Özkırımlı, Ahmet Celal also carries 'the typical socio-psychological characteristics of 19th century Ottoman modernist intellectuals.' (Karaosmanoglu, 1998, 21)

The protagonist loses one of his arms in the First World War. After the war ends, he decides to go to his orderly's (Mehmet Ali) village instead of İstanbul, because İstanbul is occupied by the enemy forces and he has nobody there with whom he can live. So he decides to wait for the developments in a secure place, which is a remote village in central Anatolia. However, after learning of the War of Independence against the occupying forces he becomes distressed, as he cannot join the war. Contrary to most of the other novels, which idealise the

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6   *Pasha* was the Ottoman equivalent of a 'General'

self-sacrificing intellectual who voluntarily goes to the remote villages of Anatolia, here the protagonist is there mostly through necessity. (Kaplan, 1997, 101)

Throughout the novel we see a double-edged alienation: the peasants' fear and mistrust of Ahmet Celal and his feelings of disgust, despair, distress, and hatred toward them. Although Ahmet Celal stays in the village for a long time, (a couple of years) the gap between him and the villagers remains.

The only character who evokes pity and compassion in him, however, is Emine, with whom he falls in love. The girls' family, however, opposes such an affair because Ahmet Celal is a total 'alien' to them. Instead, her family allow her to marry a man from the village. In the end, the village is occupied by enemy forces and Ahmet Celal decides to escape, taking Emine with him. However, while they are escaping, the girl is wounded and Ahmet Celal leaves her, alone and in pain, as he runs away.

The important point in his description of the village and the villagers is the lack of any sense of time and space. According to the protagonist's description, both the village and the villagers appear motionless, as if they are 'frozen' in time. (Karaosmanoğlu, 1998, 48-49) Another point is Ahmet Celal's confusion about the peasant's lack of respect or concern for him. To his mind, he is due respect from them because he lost an arm in their defence, however, the peasants show no regard for such things. They are only concerned with their own business – specifically their crops – and show no sense of solidarity. Throughout the novel, Yakup Kadri uses animal references to describe the behaviour and the physical appearance of the villagers, as if they are creatures that behave only according to their instincts. (Moran, 1983, 161) Yakup Kadri expresses his discontent thus:

> How can I prove that I am not an alien but from the same blood, same language, same history and territory with them…With time, I understand better that the Turkish intellectual is a strange and lonely creature in this infinite and deserted world that is called Turkey… Imagine a person…who feels more and more separated from his own roots as he moves along to the depths of his own country. Even if it does not happen, *this emptiness, this cold and repulsive atmosphere* makes him feel that he is *a savage and strange plant unravelled from his own soil*…The gap between an educated person of İstanbul and an Anatolian villager is greater than the difference between a British man from London and a Punjabi Indian. (Karaosmanoğlu, 1998, 53)

Ahmet Celal is also disappointed and angered by the villagers' disregard for the Independence War going on at that time. He is even frustrated with their suspicion of Mustafa Kemal and his army as, according to the villagers, Mustafa Kemal and his army are very

dangerous and oppose the Sultan's will. The Sultan had made peace with the enemy but Kemal had not recognised the Sultan and his peace. There was a Queen called Europe and she had promised the Turkish people to sort out the problem.

In fact the anger and hatred that Ahmet Celal feels toward the villagers also turns out to be guilt because of his alienation and lack of any communication with them. This self-hatred appears in the form of a narrative that swings between sublimation and disgust. At some points he compares the villagers with 'mythological creatures' and at the same time he expresses his hatred and disgust toward them in various ways. Each attempt at sublimation brings a sense of incompleteness and disappointment and he once again goes back to the narrative of contempt. (Karaosmanoğlu, 1998, 94-121) Emine becomes the metaphor of the ultimate manifestation of Yakup Kadri's orientalist gaze, but it is not a successful orientalist fantasy, as he cannot even fix upon his object of desire consistently.

His paradoxical stance reaches its climax when Ahmet Celal begins to identify himself with Robinson Crusoe and waits to be saved by a ship that he calls 'the Anatolian army' (Karaosmanoglu, 1998, 128). Berna Moran points out that, just like *Sodom and Gomorrah*, we can see the influence of the Old and New Testament on his narrative in *Yaban*, especially when his alienation and contempt reaches its peak. The protagonist is always in expectation of the messiah, whom he personifies as Mustafa Kemal, who, just like Jesus, is a shepherd who tries to gather the herd together (Karaosmanoğlu, 128-129)[7]. According to Berna Moran, Yakup Kadri represents the peasants' loyalty to the Sultan and the Caliphate as infidelity and even as betrayal. He describes the peasants as the ones who are denying their own natural existence. On the other hand, he presents Mustafa Kemal as the messiah, as a rising sun over Ankara who will lead the herd on the true path.[8]

What he is not so sure of is whether there is such a 'herd' to be led on the 'true path'. Ahmet Celal cannot see any potential around him for a national consciousness, only the deep ignorance, constant betrayal, and evil of the peasants. Thus, he blames the Turkish intellectual for the situation.

> The reason for this is you, Turkish intellectual! What have you done for this miserable country and for the poor masses? After exploiting them for years, for centuries, how can

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7   Zeki Coşkun, who is a journalist and literary critic, also criticises Yakup Kadri for his excessive references to Greek and Latin mythology and to Jewish and Christian religious figures. According to Coşkun, it is quite contradictory for a novelist who is criticising excessive Westernisation to use so many symbolic references to such sources. (Coşkun, 2003,109-113).

8   Berna Moran also takes some quotations from the New Testament and compares some similar points in the narrative in *Yaban*. (Moran, 1983,157)

you dare to feel disgust for them? There was a spirit of the Anatolian people. You could not penetrate it. They had a mind. You could not enlighten it. They had a body. You could not feed it…. So, what do you expect now…? What gives you pain is the result of your own achievement (Karaosmanoglu, 1998, 130).

One of the most significant points in the novel is the radical rejection of difference. The protagonist does not accept the presence of the village nor does he try to understand the peasant's point of view. Once each and every attempt of mythification dissolves into discontent, the village begins to be represented as if it is out of our symbolic world, like a nightmarish planet, a negative metaphor to express the radical longing for both a mystical and mythical glory. In fact, this glory resides in a certain 'logic of the one'. This glory emanates radically from a fantasmatic monolithic structure that is the herd, unified by the shepherd.

However, the ultimate disenchantment and the sense of guilt that Ahmet Celal feels toward the peasants emanates from the reflection of himself that he sees in their faces. It is not their gaze on him, with which they perceive him as a totally strange creature belonging to an alien place, but the similarity between him and the peasants. The actual monolithic structure, the social unity is, in fact, there. It resides in the heart of the peasants' existence. Their utter loyalty towards and belief in the Sultan and the Caliphate is both the source of envy and hatred that Ahmet Celal feels towards the villagers because, in the last instance, he was a soldier of the Ottoman army fighting against the 'infidels' and as an idealistic soldier he felt a certain loyalty toward an entity called the 'Ottoman Empire' which was once the most powerful empire of the world. This is valid for all the former soldier officers of the Ottoman army who founded the modern Turkish Republic. This loyalty made them the furious and idealistic fighters of the empire to save its last remnants. However the same loyalty also led them to establish the modern Turkish Republic which appears more as a necessity than a revolutionary-idealistic appeal toward the idea of "Republic". It is this paradoxical loyalty that unites Ahmet Celal and the peasants which is quite a disturbing situation for him because apparently nobody feels comfortable when facing his/her paradoxes in such a way. Moreover, it can also be claimed that this is one of the main paradoxes of the founding elite of the Republic, of which most of them were formerly military officers both in World War One and the Balkan War in 1912, fighting to save the "Empire".

Yaban is generally defined as one of the first literary narratives that problematizes the issue of peasantry in modern Turkey. Generally peasantry has been presented as one of the precious bases of Kemalist republican discourse, especially in the literary narratives appearing

by the 1950s, and continued to be one of the basic themes of the Turkish novel up to the 1970s. In these narratives, the peasantry is either romanticised or located as the victims of landowners which was also the part of the socialist discourse which began to be widespread by the 1960s.

However, the Kemalist republican themes and references have always been present in these narratives. According to Asım Karaömerlioğlu, 'the cult of peasantry' plays an important role in the Kemalist Republicans' endeavours to provide a certain mobilisation for the intellectuals who began to lose their enthusiasm for the Republican Revolution in the early 1930s (Karaömerlioğlu, 1999, 69). In furtherance of this, in 1932, 'The People's Houses' were founded 'as places where intellectuals and ordinary people should meet and bridge the gap that had widened between them, and between the urban and rural population'. (Çeçen, 1990, 123 cited in Karaömerlioğlu, 1999, 70). However, Karaömerlioğlu points to the rise, by the mid-30s, of a certain abstention, for a couple of reasons, among the Kemalist Republican rulers in their attempts at transforming the rural structure and 'enlightening' the peasants. This abstention was not only motivated by some structural and technical difficulties, but was a deliberate choice. In describing the official journal of the People's Houses, called *Ülkü*, Karaömerlioğlu emphasises that it was not an ideologically strict and theoretically monolithic journal and that this is because Kemalism as an ideology was not monolithic, nor had any intention of being so. However, the peasantist romanticism of some intellectuals began to disturb a regime that showed a deliberate abstention from becoming a monolithic ideology. The aims of the Kemalist Republicans were limited to 'administrative purposes', that is to sustain a certain control by keeping the peasantry as a constant unit of control.[9] What Kemalist republicans tried to avoid, in fact, was a genuine enlightenment of the peasants, which would lead to a massive migration to the cities and the possibility of an emancipatory uprising against the regime. The Kemalists did not want the peasantry to appear as a class or a particular political group.

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9   We should also mention the importance of the, "Village Institutes", which had an important role in the discussions of the 'single-party regime' in Turkey. The 'Village Institutes', which were an extension of the 'peasantist ideology' of the 1930s, were active – especially between 1940-46 – in most of the provinces of Turkey. Contrary to most of the literature written in the 1960s and 70s, which romanticises and mythifies the experience of the 'Village Institutes' they were formed by the Kemalists to 'control' the countryside (and raise agricultural productivity) rather than to transform the socio-political structure of it. However, the 'village institutes' began to conflict with the aims of the Kemalist Republican elite and threatened the traditional socio-political structure of the countryside, by increasing the social mobility of peasants and the rise of a collectivist mentality amongst the peasants. On the other hand, those institutions led the accusations of raising 'socialist and communist oriented generations' voiced by some of the groups within the Kemalist Republican elite. So, by the second half of the 1940s, their scope was reduced by the Kemalist Republicans and, after the Democratic Party came to power in 1950, 'the village institutions' were closed completely. See Karaömerlioğlu, (2001b).

Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu's *Yaban* manifests the Kemalist approach to peasantry. It is something alien and even an *uncanny* entity in relation to the Kemalist conceptualization of Republic. It is something that is either to be transformed according to the Kemalist republican ideals or to be contained as it is. The Kemalist Republican elite feared the rise of an independent peasantist intellectual movement, with close ties to the peasant masses, separate from the will of the state and the Party (i.e. Republican People's Party). On the other hand, they also wanted to maintain a partly peasantist approach, as they also feared the horrible consequences of all-encompassing industrialisation. They wanted to maintain an image of the peasant as belonging only to the village as part of the idealization of a loyal and uncorrupted citizen.

Thus, the Kemalist Republican elite took an ambiguous and eclectic approach to most of the important issues of the time, in order not to cause any serious polarisation. Through this ambiguity and eclecticism they succeeded in maintaining the traditional fabric of the country, by preserving the traditional perceptions of political power. (Karaömerlioğlu, 1999, 84-85) This policy directly coincides with the mood or the logic that is presented in the novel *Yaban,* which keeps the double-edged alienation, contempt and dissatisfaction intact. On the side of the idealism inherent in the Kemalist Republicans, the very mood and logic characterised in *Yaban* functions by keeping the village and the peasant as an ongoing object of desire.

However, its actuality, its historical and particular presence, should be denied in order to sustain the fantasmatic conceptualisation of the peasant, as something 'to come' that should never actually be realised. In that sense, the Kemalist Republican logic of political legitimacy neither totally repressed a certain potential drive toward an 'enlightened despotism' that involves an ongoing tendency toward totalitarianism nor paved the way for its realisation. The Kemalist republican ultra-elite control and manipulate the jacobinist tendencies within the ruling elite by a deliberate or unintentional reflex of continuously keeping their 'object of desire', i.e. 'the people', 'the peasant'[10] *away* from the elite.

3.2. Ankara (1934)

After a frustrating disappointment depicted in *Yaban*, arising from the painful experience of confronting the very object of the idealist Revolutionary dream – 'the people' – Yakup

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10 Karaömerlioğlu points out that the Kemalist Republican conceptualisation of the people is influenced by the Rousseauist understanding of political democracy and *solidarism* which makes such concepts as 'the people', 'the nation' and 'the peasant' interchangable. It contributes to a tendency for defining an ambiguous group of people that is the 'unit of governance and control' as abstractly as possible and as deprived of its concrete historical dynamics and practices. The aim is simply to construct a sense of unity, that can be sustained ironically only through ambiguity. See, Karaömerlioğlu, (2001a).

Kadri closes the scene in *Yaban* by affirming that 'the people' have to be emancipated from themselves. To achieve this, the people had to be created anew. Certainly, such a totalitarian appeal from Yakup Kadri drags him to a specific centre, from which all the necessary arrangements for the radical re-construction, even the creation of a nation and a people, can be accomplished. Towards the end of *Yaban*, he points toward such a centre, which he describes as 'a new soul', 'a new beginning', immune from attack. It would be a symbol of ultimate sublimation and the 'name' of it would create fear and defeat both in the hearts of the enemy and of those who do not believe in the national, revolutionary cause (Karaosmanoğlu, 1998, 185). This is definitely 'Ankara'.

However, contrary to the messianic sublimation of it in the end of *Yaban*, we see disappointment and discontent with the rising Republican intelligentsia in *Ankara*, whose characters are quite cynical about the revolutionary cause and only pursue their own privileges. The novel is composed of three separate chapters. In the first chapter we see a family in Ankara in 1920, just moved from İstanbul, for the idealist purpose of helping found a new Republic with a new capital, as well as to help the War of Independence, which was directed from Ankara. Towards the end of the chapter, news is heard of enemy forces approaching Ankara. The husband decides to escape eastward but his wife tries to prevent him. Disgusted with her husband's cowardice and lack of strength, his wife, Selma (who becomes the protagonist of the novel) loses all her faith in her husband and falls in love with a young lieutenant who firmly believes in the victory of the Turkish forces. In this first chapter, Ankara is represented as an ultimate purity and as the name of a new beginning where there is no trace of any tendency toward 'personal interest and selfish pleasures'. (Karaosmanoğlu, 1983, 36). However, the lower classes and/or the local people of Anatolia are again represented as a 'threat' to the national cause (Karaosmanoğlu, 1983, 38, 51-52). The new inhabitants of *Ankara* are defined once again as *yaban* (alien) by the local people of Ankara because they are seriously disturbed by the lifestyles of the İstanbul-oriented people who have an utter disregard for the reasons why they are in Ankara. Yet, paradoxically, Yakup Kadri continues the romantic and mythical representation of the peasant figures around Ankara at various points in the novel (Karaosmanoğlu, 1983, 87).

The second chapter picks up in 1926, three years after the first one ends. The Turks have won the war, Kemal Atatürk has taken power and Ankara is the official capital, following the abolition of the Sultanate and the Caliphate. Now we see *Selma* as the wife of the young lieutenant. However, the young lieutenant has lost all his enthusiasm towards the 'national goal' and has become (in Yakup Kadri's words) a clownish imitation of an elegant and modern

Western saloon gentleman, while losing his idealistic stance towards the Kemalist Republican Revolution. In this chapter, we see the corruption of all the former high-ranking soldiers and politicians (including some of the religious leaders), as they are involved mostly in taking back-handers from shady business contracts and earning enormous sums from speculative real estate deals. Here we see the flourishing of a highly modern and rich neighbourhood on the outskirts of Ankara, while the old city is still in misery. Here Yakup Kadri emphasises one of the main paradoxes of the Republican revolution, from which he could not save himself either: 'mimicking the enemy' after defeating it. However the internal distress emanating from this situation amongst the Kemalist republican elite is represented by the internal conflicts of the female protagonist *Selma*. Although she gets a strange pleasure from the tea parties, evening balls, and the life-style redolent of West European 'high society', she feels a constant disturbance and a sense of guilt, which can be seen in her feelings for her husband. Once the lieutenant was the symbol of national heroism and power to her, now he has become a clownish dandy (Karaosmanoğlu, 1983, 146-148). In Yakup Kadri's representation, the lieutenant, Hakkı, becomes an awkward embodiment of the 'enemy' and 'Ankara' is 'colonised' by those awkward and degenerate people.

In this chapter we see a young, romantic and idealist writer figure, Neşet Sabit (such a figure is present in almost all the novels of Yakup Kadri), who befriends Selma. However, he always stands at a distance from the other friends of Selma, whom he openly dislikes; while Selma becomes an object of desire, for him as if she is something/someone to be emancipated from a meaningless life. He constantly complains about Selma's and her friend's corrupted and extremely luxurious life style by reminding her of the ideals of the Kemalist Revolution and the misery of the country at that time. By losing the ideal of Revolution and being constantly involved in tea parties and evening balls Selma feels that her life lacks purpose. She begins to be swayed by the criticisms of Neşet Sabit and feels an accompanying disappointment in her new husband; thinking that he has lost all his strength since the end of the war. In this chapter Yakup Kadri's critical representation of the corrupted lives of the Kemalist Republican elite directly resembles his representation of the life of the upper class of İstanbul in *Mansion for Rent* and *Sodom and Gomorrah*. The same resemblance can be found in *Nur Baba* (*Father Nur*), where he intends to demonstrate the corruption of the Islamic sects at that time.

The third chapter describes an imaginary future time, ten years after the second chapter ends. If we consider the date that the novel was written, this episode is related to a near future that is about five years ahead of the time of writing. This chapter is the one and only 'positive

fantasy' (in fact the only 'utopia' within his whole 'dystopian' narrative) throughout Yakup Kadri's narrative where the 'true and ideal' Republican revolution is finally realised under the ultimate leadership of the 'national chief' Kemal Atatürk. Here we see Selma as the wife of the young, romantic writer, Neşet Sabit. In the second chapter, Neşet Sabit is depicted as a poor and unknown intellectual writer. However, in the last chapter he has become one of the most prominent propagandist-writers of the ideal Kemalist Republic. The last chapter opens with a scene in a stadium where the 'National Chief' is giving a speech while Selma is listening in tears and her enthusiasm brings her to the point of passing out. In that scene Yakup Kadri describes the 'leader' in terms resembling the statues of ancient Greek gods. He also describes a socio-political atmosphere where each and every citizen of the nation is motivated by a great enthusiasm for creating a new nation, so everyone is very busy with their work as a part of a great 'becoming'. Here we once again see a reference to the 'Old Testament' as Yakup Kadri describes the situation as 'the second creation' in the Old Testament (Karaosmanoğlu, 1983, 178).

In this chapter, Selma is represented as if she is a repentant nun, devoting her existence to the creation of the new nation, to the new 'becoming' but she is also a faithful and loving wife to her new husband Neşet Sabit. Although not very crowded, Ankara is turning out to be a modern metropolis with large avenues and glorious buildings. Its industry is beginning to rival the output of Europe. At this point Yakup Kadri also makes a distinction between İstanbul and Ankara. While İstanbul remains as a city of mere pleasure, cosmopolitanism and the centre of Western music and culture, Ankara is rising as a centre of a new art of culture, which harmonises Turkish folk culture with the 'universalistic' form of art and culture. Additionally, Ankara is the ultimate representation of 'work', 'reason' and the 'revolutionary will' of the new Republic.

There is a perfect harmony in all aspects of life. The country begins to industrialise and agricultural goods are produced to serve this process. Additionally, there are no distinctions along the lines of 'worker', 'boss', 'blue collar' or 'white collar' Everyone has the ultimate national awareness that they are the proud servants of their state. The poorer neighbourhoods of the city become clean, tidy and well-organised wards. The gap between the cities and villages reduces to a greater degree by a perfect system of transformation and by a systematic deployment of education and health services in the villages, as well as through the establishment of co-operatives.

Here, the 'new men' of the revolution are created; who have control over their weaknesses, such as egoist passions and uncontrollable desires. They are able to work for great ideals;

everything depends on the power of man's will and reason, he creates his own fate (Karaosmanoğlu, 1983, 194). However, this will and reason of Yakup Kadri's 'new men' depends completely on the mythical figure of the 'leader', 'the national chief' who is described as if he has something that mortal people lack and transcends the bonds of time and space (Karaosmanoğlu, 1983, 200).

Toward the end of the novel Yakup Kadri describes a girl who is supposed to be a perfect exemplification of the modern republican new generation. She is an actress in Neşet Sabit's play in the State Theatre and also an athlete – representing the dynamism of the republic's new generation. The description of the girl can also be interpreted as the 'New Woman' of the republic, who is completely desexualised, so that, with her athletic physique and short hair, one cannot even tell whether she is girl or a boy from a certain distance. Yakup Kadri describes her by comparing her with the hermaphroditic figures in the ancient Greek frescoes (Karaosmanoğlu, 1983, 215). Also, in her daily life she never uses any make-up. In the words of Neşet Sabit, Yakup Kadri praises her as a perfect example of the Republican, new generation, as she remembers nothing about the humble times of the Ottoman Empire. For her, names such as 'Sultan' or 'Caliphate' are figures from some fairy tales that belong to a totally alien time and place (Karaosmanoğlu, 1983, 223).

In this last Chapter, Anatolia has finally ceased to be an object of ignorance and disgust. Neşet Sabit and Selma like to tour the Anatolian villages and are pleased to see the civilised villagers who are enjoying the advantages of developed agricultural techniques in a countryside no different from that of France (Karaosmanoğlu, 1983, 230).

The novel ends in 1943, with the ceremonies of the twentieth anniversary of the Republican revolution. Thousands of people march along the large streets of the capital toward *Çankaya* – where the great leader resides – with chants and slogans praising the Republic and the nation. Neşet Sabit takes great pleasure from being a small part within the large crowd. In front of the leader's palace the crowd stops and waits for the appearance of the leader at the palace balcony. Finally he appears and hails the crowd. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk stands there with his closest company, İsmet İnönü, who Neşet Sabit describes in poetic fashion. While returning from the ceremony Neşet Sabit and his wife Selma feel tired and old and they watch, with pride, honour and great spiritual satisfaction, the cheering and singing groups of young people.

Most literary critics accept that the last episode of *Ankara* in particular is a manifestation of Yakup Kadri's *Kadroist* outlook (Naci, 1980). In fact, the internal conflicts in the narrative

also reflect the internal conflicts and utopian stance of the *Kadro* movement. However, in 1964, in the foreword of the third edition of the novel, Yakup Kadri confesses that while writing the novel he thought that the country he described in the third episode could be realised in twenty years. However, he says that another twenty years has passed but Ankara is still the Ankara he described in the second episode, with the corruption and disregard of the principles and proposals of the republican revolution. Thus, in *Panorama* (which he wrote in the 1950s) he would describe his discontent with the Republican revolution and, even more completely, with the political regime of the time, in an ultimately pessimistic sense.

At this point, it is better to point out the two important nodal points in Yakup Kadri's narrative, which contribute to the political logic and practice of the modern Republic, especially in terms of the strict relation of the 'political imagination/projection' and 'subjectivity'. One nodal point is the 'peasant' (especially in his novel *Yaban*); the political signifier whose controversial points were pointed out above. The second is certainly 'the woman', which permeates his whole narrative as the main symptom of the entire Turkish socio-political modernisation process. As we see in all of his novels 'the woman' is associated closely with all kinds of otherness that Yakup Kadri draws together in order to demarcate a Republican and national spirit and uniqueness, which has no relation to the historical social and political practice of the Turkish people.

In fact the appearance of 'woman' in Yakup Kadri's narrative can be defined as the 'negation of the desire' that always contaminates a supposedly revolutionary and truly nationalist will. This 'desire' is the concealed and even disavowed desire toward the West (*Mansion for Rent, Sodom and Gomorrah, Ankara*) and toward the Ottoman Sultanate (*Nur Baba*), which overlap; as they are both perceived as the negated source of the desire for an imaginary absolute and omnipotent power.

Thus the metaphor of woman lifts the barrier between the supposedly different socio-political conceptualisations, i.e. the West and the Sultan (the Ottoman Past). In that sense, 'the woman' as an object of desire becomes the object of negation. It appears as a sign of both 'excessive/formal westernisation' as the cause of social corruption, and a sign of 'Oriental Despotism', which contributes to the orientalist imagination of an all-powerful, lustful Dark Sultan possessing 'all' – including the 'sexual joy' that the woman represents. In both case 'woman's femininity/sexuality' is presented as something related to the 'other's' realm, which is penetrated with pure and perverse pleasure, egoism and indecency, that is of 'the West' and 'the - supposed - Orient: the Ottoman Sultanate.

On the other hand, as the utopian representation of a future Ankara in the last episode shows; the 'perfect Republican woman-subject' is totally desexualised and her reason for existence revolves around the sublime socio-political cause of creating a 'new' nation. The sexuality of the woman is totally sacrificed to the cause of the Republican nation. The interesting point is that, in terms of representing sexuality, Yakup Kadri is in accord with some novelists of the time who are quite critical about the mode of Westernisation which the Kemalist republicanism entails, and propose a certain socio-political mysticism that overcomes the priority of 'body' and 'bodily pleasures'.[11] In fact, what resides in the ambiguity of sexual identification or in the total desexualisation of woman is the disavowal of the 'desire content' that is parallel with the disawoved desire for an *absolute and omnipotent political power*, which he relates to 'the West' and to the 'Ottoman Past'. However he betrays himself through his own literary representation. In '*Mansion for Rent*' what led the idealist, romantic writer to join the First World War is in fact the (sexual) desire he felt for the excessively westernised, 'corrupted' and seductive female protagonist who constantly ignored him. In *Sodom and Gomorrah* the enthusiasm that the male protagonist (again an idealist and romantic writer) felt toward the Independence Movement in Anatolia overlaps with the frustration he felt because of his Western-oriented and supremely feminine fiancée's disregard for him. Also, in the novel *Ankara*, we should question why the idealist and enthusiastic Republican play-writer Neşet Sabit desires Selma when, in the second episode, she becomes the centre of attraction amongst the Western-oriented, 'corrupted' new elite of Ankara.

At this point we can define the last episode of the novel *Ankara* as the narrative/fantasy of pure disavowal, the negation and repression of the 'true source of political motivation' that gives itself away in the paradoxical literary representation of Yakup Kadri. In fact it is the ultimate indication of the concealed 'desire content' inherent in the Kemalist Republican imaginary, which demarcates the very *cynicism* toward the positive and visible socio-political features that it praises such as the separation of powers, popular will etc.

So far, it is with this *cynicism* that the modern Republic constructs its socio-political legitimacy. It is only through this cynical stance that the Kemalist Republic sustains a certain

11   The most important example of those writers who are critical about the Kemalist Republican Revolution is Peyami Safa, who claims that Westernisation, which reached its climax during the Revolution, seriously dislocated the moral fabric of Turkish society, by encouraging Turkish woman towards indecency in the name of modernisation. His whole literary narrative depends on the binary opposition between the indecent, abominable, diabolical women who reject their traditional roles and become unhappy and frustrated in the end, and the compassionate, self-sacrificing mothers and wives who are the basis of the nation. In his last novels he tended toward spiritualism and metaphysics which depends on the idea of overcoming the 'material body'. See Berktay (2002).

socio-political stability and a certain attachment to modern political practice, which fosters an ongoing sense of dissatisfaction and incompleteness.

4. Conclusion

There is no doubt that Turkish Republican transformation was a multi-layered process which cannot be explained by referring to a couple of novels. Not even the whole literary works of that era would be able to reflect the multi-layered and complicated aspects of the Turkish Republican transformation. However, one should note that the notion of "Republic" that both the Anatolian people and the Kemalist founders experienced and perceived was quite different from the one it was experienced and perceived in western Europe. As mentioned before, Yakup Kadri's particular literary representation can be accepted as one of the good examples of the paradoxical perception of the notion of Republic that the Kemalist founding elite had especially in the first couple of decades of the modern Republic. It may be difficult to relate the paradoxes that is apparent in his narrative with the socio-political practice. However the paradoxes his narrative contains may well constitute a basis to think about why the Kemalist founders of the Republic abstained from formulating a well-structured doctrine that could outline the unique features of Kemalist republicanism that made it distinct from its European practices. Although there was a well-defined and clear institutional and legal structure, it is quite difficult to claim that this institutional and legal structure has been consistent with political understandings, beliefs and practices. There has always been a disregard and cynical approach toward legal and institutional procedures, not only on the side of politicians or state elites but also on the side of people.

In dealing with such a problem, literature may seem a marginal field. However, in some particular cases, literature may provide quite important material to think about, conceive and evaluate some complicated socio-political issues that are not visible at the first glance.

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CHAPTER 3

BUILDING THE MEMORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLICAN PERIOD: *LA TURQUIE KEMALISTE*

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Abstract

There has been a considerable amount of studies on the quality and construction of social memory lately. The relationship between social memory and memory spaces and the construction of the nation and national identity is searched with respect to various countries, historical contexts and spaces. Social memory is accepted as a social production and construction but we must take into account the differences in historical contexts, specific conditions and places. In the Turkish case, most of the latest research on this area are concentrated on the early Republican period. In the 1920s and 30s, while trying to heal the wounds of the Balkan Wars, the Great War and the War of Independence the political cadres of the Republican period tried to improve the economic, political and social needs of the society, while working on the construction of the Turkish nation in domestic and foreign grounds. They tried to visualize and propagate the efforts of the new Republic and the developments of the period. Publications of those times were interesting in this sense. They published books and periodicals in foreign languages, joined in international fairs and exhibitions, especially in western countries. In this paper I would like to depict those efforts in a periodical published over 49 issues between 1933 and 1949, *La Turquie Kemaliste* that includes a catalogue of visual materials and illustrations representing modern Turkey.[1]

Keywords: Social memory, Memory construction, Early republican period, *La Turquie Kemaliste*.

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1   *La Turquie Kemaliste* (LTK), Magasine published twice a year by the Directorate General of the Press, Ministry of Interior, BÜ Library, Periodicals: DR401T78.

1. Introduction

Construction of social and collective memory is not only a historical process but it is also done according to the needs of every political and social context. Memory construction is a part of the political processes in the formation of both identity and propaganda. It is also a part of politics reflecting the orientations, cultural necessities and atmosphere of the given era. Social memory is constructed with respect to various needs and aspirations emerging from current social relations and political needs, which is done with the help of archives, museums, and historical narratives, publications that constitute a creation, construction and lineage possible as it is discussed that the historical reality, politics of remembering and forgetting in Paul Ricoeur's text in detail (Ricoeur, 2009). In cases of discontinuity, as in the example of the Great War, or when empires collapse, the necessity arises for the construction of a new memory. To create a new legacy for a new state and modern society, we are in need of various political and cultural tools such as the heritage of the past, construction of the desired present, and a utopia for the future of the society, for legitimization and mobilization.

In the case of the Republic of Turkey, after 1923 the new cadres had great problems as to get away from the Ottoman past in politics, institutions and culture. As a symbolic act, they moved the capital from Istanbul to Ankara and tried to create and construct a new city, a monument for the Republic of Turkey. They also needed to construct a legacy stemming from the national land, namely Anatolia. A new task was defined: a modern city which was to be newly constructed in the middle of Anatolian land and an image of modern Turkish nation with an urban and rural, agricultural landscape with modern human portraits. It was during the unsettled years of the inter-war period, a period effected by the 1929 economic crisis that shook especially the western, capitalist economies.

Ottoman modernization movements in general stood aside from class analysis, however they accepted the postulate of an organic society; that society is a homogeneous and harmonious structure without class divisions. Kemalist ideology, especially in its full form in the 1930s, denied the existence of class differences in society. However, it accepted the organic society model and applied this model in its populist principles where parts of the society are integrated in the whole structure (Örnek, 2015, p. 60). Trying to build the economic structure and foreign relations in the turbulent interwar years - despite the experiences of the Great War and following the War of Independence - Ottoman intellectuals and bureaucratic elites believed in general in the necessity of modernization and westernization, the two for them having the same meaning. Kemalist cadres of the early republican period opted for a

pragmatic stance and tried to benefit from the conflicts between Britain and the Soviet Union. In the historical background of these pragmatic positions, there were political instincts and undercurrents of once to save the Ottoman Empire and then after its collapse to maintain the continuity of the Republic.

For this purpose we are discussing the intentional image making of the Republic in the 1930s and 40s. These efforts were period-specific, aiming at settling her political, economic and cultural existence in a changing political and economic environment. The context was set first by Mustafa Kemal, in his six-day speech, called Nutuk in the 2ⁿᵈ National Congress in October 15-20, 1927. It is a "comprehensive account of one of the most remarkable events in the many centuries of Turkish history", a personal account and a special reading of recent history by the leader himself.[1] It was an official narrative of the fall of the Ottoman State, the Great War, the War of Independence and the formative years of the Republic of Turkey (Ataöv, 1981). These efforts were elaborated during the celebrations of the 10ᵗʰ anniversary of the Republic, in the speech of Mustafa Kemal in Ankara. It discussed Ankara and modern Turkey taking back the lost Anatolian hard soil inch by inch and they expressed that "this is our new life". The Republic claimed to lean on the western world and presented its ultimate aim to be a part of it and to reach the level of contemporary civilization, i.e. the western capitalist world, and moreover to catch up and outrun it.[2] They wanted to make a comparison not with the past ages but with the pace of the new age. It was the time of empowerment, deepening and settling of Kemalist ideology in the 1930s.

Although the radical left was suppressed in the 1920s, the Kemalist regime benefited from the leftist intellectuals who belonged to leftist organizations of the time, who published a magazine called *Kadro* in the beginnings of the 1930s.[3] To this aim the government tried hard

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1 Nutuk, one of the most popular texts in Turkish history was first published in 1927 in Arabic alphabet and appeared in Latin alphabet in 1934.

2 In Turkish: "Muasır medeniyetler seviyesine yükselmek."

3 *Kadro*, was published monthly in Ankara between January 1932 and December 1934 (36 issues) by Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, Vedat Nedim Tör, İsmail Hüsrev Tökin and Burhan Asaf Belge. They all had the traumatic experiences of the Balkan wars, the Great War and the fall of the Ottoman Empire; most of them had their education in Germany and in Moscow, and were influenced by Marxist ideals. Then they supported the Anatolian movement, War of Independence and Mustafa Kemal; and as a result moved to Ankara. *Kadro* had the pretention to make a radical but repudiated interpretation of Kemalism.
Kadro meant the intellectual and pioneering cadre of a political party. In various articles they defended a planned state economy, which is defined not as an alternative to private capital accumulation but as a supplement to it. They defended that the Turkish intellectuals, like the ones in similar developing countries, don't need to emulate the western model which was defined as colonialist and imperialist. Another path should be tried to be found and built. a third way for development. They also conceived the Turkish society without class differences, in accordance with the Kemalist ideology; a society that is homogeneous, harmonious; a "classless, unprivileged, coherent body".

to build a set of initiatives to strengthen the information and propaganda activities promoting the Kemalist new regime. Vedat Nedim Tör was assigned as the chief editor of *la Turquie Kemaliste* and government authorities used all kinds of intellectual sources, prominent Turkish writers and intellectuals, German professors, diplomats, artists, and professionals.

In this paper, I would like to discuss the content of an exceptional publication during the early Republican period, titled *La Turquie Kemaliste.* It was published by the Ministry of the Interior, the Directorate General of the Press (DGP) (*Matbuat Umum Müdürlüğü*). The aim of this journal was to propagate the achievements of the Republic of Turkey mainly to the western audience. They tried to construct the image and the memory of the Republic with respect to the old, the Ottoman Empire. The first 20 issues were named *La Turquie Kamaliste*; whereas after this, in the special issues Nos: 21-22, December 1937, the name changed to *La Turquie Kemaliste*. This special edition was devoted to the II. Turkish History Congress organized by the Turkish Historical Society.

2. The Project

The political propaganda activities during the Single Party Regime of the Republic of Turkey were divided into two periods: The Revolution and the War Era Propaganda. While "Revolution Propaganda" was mainly based on the Six Arrows,[4] "War Era Propaganda" exploited the features of patriotism and nationalism. In both periods, DGP, one of the first institutions in the history of the Republic, was the official state institution, which was responsible for the works of propaganda (Akçalı-Uzunhasan, 2016).

Image building was not a newly created area in the 1930s, since the 19th century empires tried to remake and create popular images and invent traditions to restore and improve their legitimacy in the last quarter of the century in response to the fact that their imperial power had fallen into danger. Nonetheless image building efforts of nation states as intertwined with the nationalist projects are different from the image building efforts of empires. The Ottoman-Turkish case had individual and distinctive characteristics. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the new construction had historical and political specific conditions. The crisis situation took a relatively long time and the disengagement from the past created certain problems in various spheres such as religious issues, the separation between state and religion, the closure of dervish lodges, and the abolition of the caliphate. It encompassed traumatic experiences such as the deportation in 1915 and the population exchange starting

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4   The Six arrows of the Republican People's Party (CHF) represented the principle cannons of Kemalist ideology, Republicanism, Populism, Nationalism, Laicism, Statism and Reformism. These principles were accepted and propagated for the first time in 1927, in the congress of CHF.

before 1923 and continuing long afterwards, religious and ethnic uprisings and the events of 1934 in Thrace. As a matter of fact, the radicalism of the revolutions and construction of the new faltered at the end of the 1930s. Disengagement from the past, reforms and actual political disputes created certain problems in the Turkish case, in both material and ideological/political areas. What is interesting is that in the pages of *La Turquie Kemaliste,* there are no traces of those disputed issues (Elçin Aykaç, 2003, p.135). In the meantime, the revolutionary mood faded away while the new regime reconciled with the old and the new interest groups.

In the 1930s and 40s, the past, the present and the future view of society were exemplified and shown in the images and texts in *La Turquie Kemaliste*. The project is well studied and actualized by a group of intellectuals influenced by the leftist ideals of the period, having in mind the model of socialist construction and central planning efforts well-tried in Soviet Russia in the 1930s. Turkish governments in Ankara started planning in 1932 with the help of a group of Soviet experts, and then they prepared a five year industrial plan that was successfully applied until 1939 (Boratav, 1982, p.111). This magazine shows that the lives of ordinary people, peasants and urban middle classes, men and women changed a lot with the help of the Republican reforms and statist policies of the Kemalist regime.

La Turquie Kemaliste was a search for an international legitimacy for the new regime. As a matter of fact, Turkish intellectuals of the time identified with the powerful western powers instead of the socialist trials and experiences of the third world. So, they accepted and supported the westernization efforts of the existing government and Turkish nationalism. As a result, Kemalist cadres moved smoothly from Soviet friendship and support to cold war policies, as an early example of a cold war position. After the Soviet-friendly atmosphere in 1933, anti-Sovietism, even Nazi sympathy became a prominent political preference among official and civil circles, especially in the beginning of the 1940s (Örnek, *ibid.*, p.30). Anti-Sovietism reigned in the second part of the 1930s as a result of preferences of the emerging business circles and interest groups who developed close relations with state officials. Nazi advocacy and hostility towards Soviet Russia came to a climax in between 1941-43, while the German army gained ground in Soviet land.

In this backdrop, the Turkish elites felt the need to address the western audience. The editorial board of *La Turquie Kemaliste* consisted of intellectuals such as Vedat Nedim Tör and Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, who were the main figures of the *Kadro* movement and the publication that tried to systematize the principles of the Turkish Revolution. The need for such an initiative was first mentioned by Şevket Süreyya in 1931 and was elaborated in

Revolution and Cadre (İnkılap ve Kadro) and in the issues of the monthly *Kadro* journal. There were others who contributed to the *La Turquie Kemaliste* issues; they were the modern examples coming from the old system but well, western educated and engaged to the formation of the Republic, the Kemalist reforms in Ankara. The editorial staff of the journal consisted of foreign and Turkish writers: permanent writers like Falih Rıfkı Atay, Burhan Asaf Belge, Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu and Vedat Nedim Tör, and prominent Turkish or foreign figures like Sadri Ertem, R.O.Arık, Ercüment Ekrem Talu, H.E.Eldem, S.Batı, İ.H.Oygar, İ.H.Baltacıoğlu, Arif Dino, H.Z.Koşay or Friedrich Falke (the founding rector of Ankara higher institute for agriculture), Paolo Vietti-Violi (architect of İnönü Stadium at Dolmabahçe, Istanbul), agriculturalist Nihat İyiboz, Austrian diplomat Norbert-Von-Bischoff (Von-Bischoff, 2014)[5], market economy specialist Charles Gruére, Pierre Devambez or famous architects and archaeologists like Ernst Egli, Albert Gabriel or Helmut Theodore Bossert; Thomas Wittemore, the founder of the American Byzantium Institute or Othmar Pferschy, the famous photographer himself published an article namely Ein Marcheland-Cappadocia.

It was a bimonthly prestige journal published by the DGP that acted as important material for the propaganda department of the Ministry of the Interior (Akçalı-Uzunhasan, 2016).[6] *La Turquie Kemaliste* was published for 49 issues between June 1934 and 1948. From June 1939 onwards, because of the deteriorating conditions of the Second World War, it was published once a year; twice in 1941, was not published in 1942 and only once in 1943 and 1947.The last issue was published in March 1948 under a totally different intellectual climax.

It was mainly in the French language, especially in the first five years. It included German and English articles mostly during the Second World War years. The French language was chosen as the diplomatic language in the Mediterranean basin and in the Balkans at that time (İnal-Kaya, 2007). All articles were written by prominent intellectuals of the period. The aim was defined as to introduce the Kemalist revolutions in the Republic of Turkey to the world public opinion. The publication was made by the state printing office with the best quality equipment and technology of the time, with the help of the well-trained staff under the direction of Vedat Nedim Tör as the editor-in-chief. In the book published in 1938 by the state

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5   He later wrote a book on the developments in Turkey and in Ankara.

6   The DGP undertook many activities with regard to the press, publications, radio, photography, and cinema. *Turkey in Pictures, La Turquie Kémaliste* and *Radio* magazine were the assertive products of the DGP. Othmar Pferschy worked at the DGP for five years and traveled throughout Turkey taking some 16,000 photos. Besides Pferschy, the DGP's photography and film department employed such prominent people as Osman Darcan and Şinasi Barutçu.

authorities dedicated to the 15th anniversary of the Republic of Turkey, it is written that in five years, the DGP distributed 119,690 issues of *La Turquie Kemaliste;* which is a great number for those years (Akçura, 1999).

This publication lost its importance with the changing conditions in Turkish and world politics. Vedat Nedim Tör left the job in 1937, because of a discussion on the process of publication of a special issue related to the 2nd congress and exposition of Turkish history.[7] With the death of Mustafa Kemal and the effect of worsening conditions due to the coming war and during the Second World War years, it gradually lost its importance but continued in an irregular fashion until 1949.

Within this important period for the newly found Republic of Turkey, the authorities tried other means of information and propaganda to promote and illustrate, to consolidate the public recognition and gain acceptance especially in the Western audience. In this respect, they published books, joined exhibitions in western countries along with this long lasting publication. Reflecting the political and cultural atmosphere of those years, there is a propaganda film produced by Soviet cinematographers for the 10th anniversary of the Republic of Turkey in 1933. The film starts with the speech made by the Prime Minister İsmet İnönü, where he talks about the achievements of the Republic in ten years. He also mentions foreign relations, claiming that the Republic of Turkey is more powerful than she was ten years ago, that her relations with her neighbors are peaceful, and that the basis of foreign policy is friendship with the Soviet Union (Yutkevich, 1933).[8] A very interesting

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7   LTK, No: 20-21, December 1937, pp.1-5. The congress was organized in Dolmabahçe Palace, Istanbul; and an exhibition was held presenting the findings of Alacahöyük and Boğazköy archeological excavations. In this issue, there is information related to explorations in Pazarlı (Phrygia), Thrace (by Arif Nüfid Mansel) and Ankara (by Remzi Oğuz Arık). M.Eugene Pittard's speech in this event was presented. In many other issues in later years there are articles and photographs from different excavations, consisting of Anatolian cultures or sometimes from Central Europe, Hungary (Archeological findings from Huns and Avars). LTK, No: 42, April 1942.

8   In this documentary film produced for the 10th anniversary of the foundation of Republic of Turkey, they set the major formative propaganda elements copied and reproduced in *La Turquie Kemaliste*, both content and artistic qualities. Holding the major themes of the first ten years in foreign relations, friendship with the Soviet Union, it underlined the peaceful existence of the Republic while comparing contemporary material achievements with those of 1918, i.e. conditions of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire during the First World War and Moudros Armistice Agreement. In this documentary Ankara is defined as the heart of Anatolia; poor people leave their villages and go to Ankara to join celebrations with ox carts and horses. Turkish people are happy welcoming the Soviet delegation led by General Voroshilov in Istanbul. Then the delegation is welcomed in Ankara, the new capital city of Turkey, by boy scouts, İnönü and other high state officials, with the International and Turkish national anthem being played. A new memorial is opened emphasizing the friendship of both states, saluting the Soviet representatives. Then we read the Ankara entry in Encyclopedia Britannica: Ankara is an old city with Greek, Roman and Byzantium remnants, the new capital of Republic of Turkey. Before and after conditions of Ankara are shown; from a poor and dusty Anatolian village a new, modern capital is created with schools, universities, museums, conservatories, exercising ballet students in open air, new modern houses and modern ways of life. The newly constructed capital is shown in the film with banks,

welcoming party was organized for the Soviet diplomats in Istanbul, Dolmabahçe Palace. It is narrated in the memories of Fritz Neumark, who had just arrived at Istanbul as a German academician; after a couple of months of their arrival, they were invited to the party in the honor of General Voroshilov in Dolmabahçe Palace by Tevfik Rüştü Aras, the foreign secretary of the Turkish government, along with other invited professors. He was a little shocked to see Turkish flags with Soviet flags and listening to the International after the Turkish national anthem (Neumark, 2006, pp.33-34).

For another example on this, we can glance at a book named *La Turquie Contemporaine*, also published by the DGP in 1935. In this specific book published in French, there is a wider description of the country, starting with its geographical conditions, situation, geological structure and land (*La Turquie Contemporaine*, 1935). We can also find some of the content of *La Turquie Kemaliste* issues such as the historical conditions and transformations which took place in the turn of the century, from the Ottoman Empire to the Republic of Turkey, the birth of a new Turkey, economic conditions, resources and economic activities, agriculture and emerging industries, sources of energy, mining, communication, roads and developments in traffic, motorways, domestic and foreign financial activities, credits and commerce, social and cultural transformations, changes in the moral principles of the society, developments in public health and the social security system, and in the end, creation and construction of new Ankara as a capital city. As an appendix, they give a comparison between the 1927 and 1935 population censuses, claiming that the population in new Turkey had reached 16,188,767 after a long period of wars (*La Turquie Contemporaine, Table des matières*, pp.303-304)

3. Pattern of the Issues

"Images and photographs of La Turquie Kemaliste in the 1930s, the propaganda films of the 1950s, and countless other representations of the official history of modernization still offer the most powerful visual tropes of this ethos of the making of a thoroughly modern nation out of the ruins of an old empire. Unveiled women working next to clean-shaven men in educational and professional settings, healthy children and young people in school uniforms, the modern architecture of public buildings in republican Ankara and other major cities, the spectacular performances of the national theatre, the symphony orchestra, opera,

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scientific institutions, and schools with boys and girls, hospitals, pools, parks, happy mothers and children waving in İnönü's arms. In this film, we follow the official ceremonies of the 10th year of the Republic, where Mustafa Kemal makes his famous speech for this special occasion.

These are all filmed for this special occasion by a Soviet director and film crew, because in those years there were no such specialized professionals of this capacity in Turkey.

and ballet, and proud scenes of agriculture, railroads, factories, and dams are among the most familiar images." (Bozdoğan-Kasaba, "Introduction", 1997, p.8).

The publication of *La Turquie Kemaliste* bared certain characteristics such as the form and the content that continued for more than ten years. The whole series until the last couple of issues of *La Turquie Kemaliste* followed more or the less the same pattern: In the first page which was not numbered, there is a high-quality photograph of a miniature or objects, clothes, carpets, hand woven textiles mainly from the Ottoman art, claiming to be Turkish, taken from the Topkapı Palace archive. Then there is an editorial article, mostly written by a prominent politician or a literary figure such as Burhan Asaf Belge, Ahmet Haşim and many others, related with then current subjects, political or literal.

There is another dossier in each issue: Turkey: Country of sun, beauty and history (*La Turquie: Pays de soleil, de beaute et d'Histoire*), mainly presenting images from the old city Istanbul and many other parts of Turkey. These are mostly historical and touristic snapshots having a special style, which set the trend in this field for the following years. There are articles discussing the publications from the foreign press, in which Turkey is mentioned and reviewed without visiting the country and seeing the realities with their own eyes.[9] There are also dossiers on various issues related to the achievements of the Republic of Turkey in industry, in education, in archaeology etc., such as the İsmet İnönü School for young girls or the horse husbandry in Karacabey, art and growing industrial efforts and buildings in every part of the country.[10] There are articles and photographs reflecting the increasing and modernizing production in agriculture, the countryside and developments in urban areas.

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9   Ercümend Ekrem Talu, "Oculos Habent, Sed.." (They have eyes, but …), LTK, No: 5, Fevrier, 1935.

10   LTK, No: 6, Avril, 1935.

Cheminées de la
verrerie de Paaşabce
(Istanbul)

Toutefois la fondation de la fabrique de vitres a été soigneusement prise en considération, étudiée sous toutes ses faces; c'est pourquoi nous pouvons, dès maintenant, exposer la nature et le nombre des types que cet établissement se propose de fabriquer:

Vitres :

Epaisseur	Caisses (de 10 m²)	Tonnes (poids net)
1.5 - 1.7 mm.	22.500	900
1.8 - 2.2 „	47.000	2.350
2.8 - 3.2 „	7.200	504

3.8 - 4.2 „		450	45
5 „		550	69
6 „		270	40
7 „		540	95
		78.510	4.003

La fondation de la fabrique de vitres servira non seulement à parachever l'œuvre de la création d'une industrie du verre, mais encore contribuera à garder à l'intérieur du pays une somme de 1 ¹/₂ - 2 millions de Ltqs. et à ouvrir, à un grand nombre de nos concitoyens, l'accès d'une nouvelle et fructueuse sphère d'activité.

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In the illustrated pages of *La Turquie Kemaliste* the objective was the self-representation of new Turkey and visual and textual representation of the achievements of the Republic. Photographs were very important and played a significant role in these volumes when the Republic was involved in a total social, economic and political transformation. All the visual material was produced by an Austrian photographer, Othmar Pferschy (1898-1984). Between 1935 and 1940, he was employed by the General Press Administration, by Vedat Nedim Tör. He worked as a professional photographer of the Kemalist Turkey. He later wrote on this

extraordinary experience saying that "*This duty was an honour for me. You cannot know Turkey of those times. There was another atmosphere; embracing all of us ... those were the golden years.*" (Ak, 2001, pp.223-224) With his technique and special talent he photographed mainly Ankara, Istanbul and many other Anatolian cities as well as rural landscapes and portraits.[11] As Vedat Nedim Tör narrates in his memories, he decided to publish a testing issue to prove the importance and possibility of such a publication for the Prime Minister and other prominent statesmen. They asked to gather photographs from all over Turkey using the official network. However, as a result, many worthless and amateur photographs were sent. But there was a series of artistic and beautiful photographs, sent from Istanbul, by Othmar Pferschy. Then he called for the Governor of Istanbul, Muhittin Üstündağ, to buy a first class train ticket and send Pferschy to Ankara (Tör, 2010). They organized for him to stay in Ankara and work as a professional photographer for the General Press Administration.

In the visual art of Pferschy, who photographed Turkey from the 1930s to the 1960s, there is a kind of specific "modern orientalism." Pfercshy's art is a continuation of the orientalist artists, reflecting the far and mystified; but he also reflected the modern view of the city and the country of the republican time. He was affected from modernist traditions of western art. In his photographs he doesn't have a realistic point of view; on the contrary, he created the image of the country that the new government wanted to show to the western audience. Most of his photographs were published in *La Turquie Kemaliste* in the 1930s and 1940s. In this journal, which is a Doomsday Book of Turkey, they wanted to show the new, modern image of Turkey, of urban and rural parts, to the western elites and foreign eyes. In one of the selected photographs of Pfercshy published in *La Turquie Kemaliste* were the chimneys of Paşabahçe Glass Factory reaching the sky representing the development, productivity, industry, modernity and the riches of the new regime in the 1930s (Tör, 1980, pp30-34). In the caption there are yearly production statistics and information about production.

4. Ankara Construit: Ankara as the Monument to Mustafa Kemal (Le Corbusier, 1925)

Ankara is the political space in the formation and construction of Turkish national identity. Ankara is constructed and framed by the powerful rivalry of Istanbul. At one point in the early Republican period, after 1927, Istanbul inevitably became the focal point of interest once again, but under different historical and political conditions.

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11   Photographs of Othmar Pferschy were used to expose the new era mainly to the western audience. A special publication, "Turkey with Photographs" was made in Munich in Turkish, French, English and German in 1936. Another exhibition was held in Bucharest, Belgrade, Athens and Montreux named "Touristic Turkey". His photographs were used in stamps, postcards, banknotes, books and booklets, calendars and many other publications. A list of publications during Vedat Nedim Tör's time is given in Ak, *ibid.,* p.226.

Ankara was declared as the capital city 16 days before the declaration of the Republic of Turkey in 29 October 1923. At the end of the 1920s, Ankara was getting expanded with new construction projects and a growing population. The government decided to build Ankara with a city plan and opened a contest. German city planner Prof. Hermann Jansen's project was selected (Tekeli, 1982, pp62-63). Construction began in 1932, giving priority to building facilities for the workers and middle class families and followed modern urban planning principles with wide roads and boulevards for motored vehicles as well as city walkers. It also created green areas and housing districts with gardens following the garden city model. It was built as a new capital out of nothing or a small Anatolian town with 25 thousand inhabitants in contrast to Istanbul from many aspects, as Istanbul was the old capital of the Ottoman Empire. Constructing in almost empty space from scratch, created a free space for planners and made planning easier (İkiz, nd.).[12] There is a dualism in the representations of Ankara and Istanbul, between the old and the new, the old capital and the new, the old images of the empire and the new; with the old, dusty towns of Anatolia and newly constructed Ankara, its buildings and its symbolism as a city. This represented and underlined the emergence of a new, modern life with a new way of living, with the roads, wide boulevards, modern buildings, squares with statues, avenues with a capacity to parade…

In the pages of *La Turquie Kemaliste* Ankara was shown with schools, university buildings, research laboratories where women as well as men were working, joining the production efforts to catch up with the modern developed western countries.

In the related literature, it is discussed that the reflections of Turkey and Ankara were the main lines of Kemalist utopia. On the other hand, when we follow the decisions, efforts and even the issues of *La Turquie Kemaliste,* we can conclude that the concrete needs, realities, struggles and limitations shaped the form and presentation of this "utopia". This set of visual and textual representations were used as a tool for propaganda and consolidation of power of Kemalist leadership of the Republican Turkey, a justification of changing system and a search for legitimacy for the new regime (Elçin Aykaç, 2003, p.3).

In the first issue of *La Turquie Kemaliste,* Falih Rıfkı wrote the editorial article: "You have to come to Ankara", which is a political invitation. He claims that despite the cultural richness and background, and the heritage in Istanbul, people should come to Ankara as it represents the future and the rebirth of a nation. He says that Ankara is an attractive touristic destination.[13] 1934 was too early to claim this, but still the idea is consistent with the general purpose of this publication.

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12   Jansen stayed and worked in Ankara and many other Anatolian cities between 1932 and 1939.

13   LTK, No: 1, "Il faut venir a Ankara", 1934, pp.10-15.

The newly constructed capital city of Ankara was thought of and designed to be a modern capital, a utopian place, as a "*no place*" and a "good place" in the middle of the Anatolian landscape. Ankara was a modest town when the founders of Republic of Turkey came and decided to form the new political and administrative centre. They constituted the first assembly in 1920 and declared the Republic in 1923. Ankara was constructed as a showcase of modernism, representing the philosophy of the Republic, planned by modern Turkish and European architects, scaled relatively to the greatness of the revolutions; so, constructed with a kind of "grandiose". It was in the centre of Anatolia, a safe haven for the birth of the Turkish nation and nationalism in the 1930s. Meanwhile, Istanbul was thought to be the centre of a fallen and surrendered Ottoman Empire; a port city of the empire including many "foreign" inhabitants who were not seen as trustworthy. Traitors and collaborators of the occupying powers were seen as the cause of the decline during the armistice years and war of independence.

We can see such examples of relocating capital cities in the process of fundamental change from empires to nation states, into the inner parts of the country, to the centre, to the heart of the nation where they define the nation; and start the foundation and progress, as a part of a new beginning, an effort to invent new traditions. Moving from Istanbul to Ankara is such an example. While Istanbul was defined as a dirty, cosmopolitan, messy and confused port city; the defeated and surrendered old capital of the Ottoman Empire, Ankara represented the new and clean beginning of the Turkish nation. In pages of *La Turquie Kemaliste,* Istanbul is not forgotten, as it is great and beautiful enough to remind itself. On the other hand, this is done by another strategy, as to remember it with its historical and touristic wonders, through the oriental visor of Othmar Pferschy.

During the first years of the Republican period, the old architectural forms, called the national architectural style were maintained. In the 1920s, the national style adopted stemmed from the late Ottoman period, neo-Ottoman style. And the first national architectural movement started in 1908 with the second constitutional period and continued during the war. This style lost its weight from 1927 onwards, with the opening towards western culture and politics. This style was considered as a copy of the Muslim religious architecture which belonged to the past. Writers such as Yakup Kadri and Ahmet Haşim wrote on this issue, claiming that it was the continuation of the old Ottoman style (Aslanoğlu, nd.).

As Bozdoğan discussed, in the 1930s, architectural preferences went parallel with the efforts of constructing the nation. It was consented with the modernism and the official ideology of the state that shaped the foundations and representations of Ankara (Bozdoğan,

2001). Ankara was important as a capital city where huge construction projects were started in public and private domains such as ministries, the parliamentary building, Ankara Stadium and the Hippodrome in 1934-36. In the end of the 1930s Ankara was presented as a heaven in summer; it was claimed that most beautiful and modern spots of Istanbul existed in Ankara.[14] In the same issue there is a dossier concerning the construction of Atatürk Forest Farm that Mustafa Kemal set up with a group of agriculturalists in the spring of 1925 and found a suitable place in a wetland area. Over the years they created a modern agricultural and industrial institution which spanned 102,000 hectares. Ernst Reuter, one of the prominent German specialists on urban planning, who worked as an alderman and mayor in cities in Berlin and Magdeburg, and was a social democrat member of the Reichstag, stayed in Turkey in 1939-1945 while fleeing from the Nazis. He gave lectures on urban planning and municipal/local government at Ankara University. He wrote an article on the garden city experience of Ankara in the pages of *La Turquie Kemaliste*.[15]

There is a discussion in academic writing on the construction and presentation of Ankara: Ankara was symbolically taken as an empty space, a tabula rasa (Bozdoğan-Kasaba, 1997, p.68)[16]; and used as a means to get rid of the burden of the old, the cultural and political heritage of the Ottoman Empire. In this context the texts and illustrations used the means of forgetting such as clearing out and 'othering' as an image of an empty capital. Istanbul is the "other" of Ankara in this sense (Gür, 2011, pp.10-18). By all means the place of Ankara in this whole collection was seen as a sacred place in the Turkish nation's history.[17]

In all issues of *La Turquie Kemaliste* reflecting the political/ideological mood of the period Ankara became a prominent figure presented to the foreign audience as a utopia of architecture and urbanism as well as the powerful construction of the capital city of the Republic and a symbol of Kemalism as a formative nationalist ideology in 1930s. In the same period the construction of public places spread all over Turkey: planning efforts, schools and public buildings in various cities, public parks in Ankara, İzmir, Antalya, Adana and Gaziantep to provide healthy living for the citizens of the Republic of Turkey (Aslanoğlu, nd.). Those development plans and projects were also mentioned in various articles in *La Turquie Kemaliste* issues. On the other hand, there is only a small note and one photograph on the Prost plan applied in Istanbul.

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14   LTK, No: 32-40 August 1939.

15   LTK, No: 47, 1943.

16   Ankara was symbolized as a pride and glory of construction of the capital out of nothing, a "tabula rasa" expressing the pride and hard work of nation building.

17   "The Place of Ankara", M.Kemal, LTK, December 1937.

5. Issues and Themes: Constructing a Memory for Foreign Audiences

5.1. Progress...

Şevket Süreyya, who was the director of the business and commerce high school in Ankara, wrote the introductory article in the first issue of *La Turquie Kemaliste* the subject of which is the development of state public education that should be secular, obligatory and free of charge. The second article of the first issue is about Ankara, written by the French Secretary of the Interior after he paid a visit to the capital city of Turkey. And there are lots of photographs showing the construction of new Ankara.

Then we have another article written by Édouard Herriot "From the old to the new Turkey" (*De la Vieille à la Nouvelle Turquie*) who was a radical French politician who came to visit İzmir, Istanbul and Ankara. Then he met Mustafa Kemal in Istanbul, at the Dolmabahçe Palace. He also visited the Bergama and Troy ruins and also mentions his visits from 25 years before where he makes a comparison between the old and new Turkey. He also mentions the modernization efforts of the new Turkey, in reality a country in Asia.[18]

In an article written by Vedat Nedim Tör himself on intellectuals in the Orient (*Qu'attendons-nous de l'intellectuel Oriental?*), he summarizes the purpose of this publication. He addresses the western intellectuals and audience in general. He claims that he makes modest suggestions and asks them to consider Turkey as equally independent; asks them to come to visit Turkey and see what is going on with their own eyes to keep the ideas of foreign investors' and Levantines' ideas in mind, to liberate their minds from the prejudgments and damaging and unhealthy microbes of romantic feelings and avoid having scenic and sensational attitudes towards what we are doing in Turkey. And as a last point Tör advises not to compare the Republic of Turkey with the ruins of the old Ottoman Empire but value the manifested efforts of development since 1923.[19]

This is a question of positioning oneself in a newly built Republic and a nation in the turbulent years after the world economic crisis of 1929 as the world was entering a new war. There are other articles especially in the formative years of Kemalist ideology and the impending disaster of war, such as an article written by Falih Rıfkı in Fabruary 1936. This article entitled "Who wants to understand" (*Ceux qui veulent savoir*) claimed that we have made a revolution with the Turkish people and we are trying to rebuild the country that has a strategic depth in Anatolia. He said that we have the power to react to any kind of movement

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18 LTK, No: 1, 1 June 1934.

19 LTK, No: 11, February 1936.

against our unity and progress; Anatolia as a block has the power to react to all kinds of aggression no matter from where or from whom it comes.[20] He also wrote an article "The basis of the reform" (*la base de la réforme*) discussing the principles of the Turkish revolution and reforms in education, laws and principle of laicism.[21]

5.2. Orient-Occident

Peyami Sefa, a famous Turkish writer wrote an article on orientalism and Othmer Pferschy's photographs in the album called *Turkey in Photographs*. Sefa claimed that Pferschy has another point of view that is different to orientalist lenses. While they were reflecting the old, broken-down wooden houses of the old neighborhoods, Pferschy was showing the new cement and steel Turkey. He claimed that those two worlds were different and it was time to reflect the new picture of Turkey: shaken, developed, a fresh and lively spring all over the country: the beautiful country Turkey (Ak, 2001, p.228). Seyit Ali Ak claimed that Pferschy's photographs were the powerful examples of his belief in the Republic with a power of the youth, friendship and Atatürk's principles and revolutions; not the official visual history of modernization (Ak, 2001, p.229).

There are differences in reflecting Ankara and Istanbul in the pages of *La Turquie Kemaliste*. Ankara, the new capital was shown as the newborn and modern; Istanbul was shown as the old, romantic and orientalist. Othmar Pferschy grasped one of the well-known images of Istanbul, a classical view of Sarayburnu and the Maiden's Tower, under which there is a note by the famous orientalist Lamartine: "*When I saw Istanbul, I cried involuntarily and cleared the magic of Naples bay forever in my mind. It would be insulting to compare anything with this delicate and spectacular whole. If it was possible to watch the earth only once, I would come and watch it right from this point of view*" (Istanbul, 1950). Lamartine also divides the world into two, east and west and mystifies life, people and the geography of the city as other orientalists do.

There are many discussions related to orientalism in this publication. To give an example, we can mention an article written by Vedat Nedim Tör. He proposes that foreign visitors should photograph our lorries instead of our donkeys. They are valuable for peasant life or used in the war of independence, but as we are a modern nation, we like to be seen by realist lenses, he says.[22] In another article by Ercümend Ekrem Talu, "*Oculos Habent, Sed..*" (They have eyes, but…) he discusses that a foreign journalist came to Turkey but only stayed in Istanbul and was

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20   LTK, No: 12, February 1936

21   LTK, No: 16, December 1936.

22   LTK, No: 15, October 1936.

not able to grasp the realities in new Turkey.[23]In fact, this is also a discussion on orientalism. The Turkish government and writers of *La Turquie Kemaliste* wanted others to see the achievements of the Republic, avoiding the oriental view of the western journalists and visitors of the time.

On this same subject we can present the comments of M.Şürkü Hanioğlu, a prominent Turkish historian, mentioning Kemalist Orientalism with regard to the *La Turquie Kemaliste* collection (Hanioğlu, 2012). He mentions the work of Emmanuel Szurek who discusses the efforts to construct a conception of the East by the local elites in Japan, China, Egypt and Turkey (Pouillon-Vatin, 2011). He talks about Falih Rıfkı and other writers and intellectuals of the publication who moved from leftist ideals to Kemalism and created an image of the "East". He claims that this image is the foundation of the Kemalist modernization project where westernization and orientalism mingled together. In this paper he discusses the Kemalist nationalism while refusing the East image of orientalism as idle, lazy, primitive and illiterate; whereas constructing another image of the modern "East", the society and nation as a part of Western civilization with its institutions, education and production, women visible in the public space. And he calls this Kemalist orientalism. This aim is well illustrated by one of the articles written by Falih Rıfkı Atay, on linguistic reform where the aim of this reform is summarized as to free Turkish culture and mentality from the obstacles that link it to the Oriental and Islamic civilization, so that new Turkey can as rapidly as possible catch up with western culture to which they belonged.[24]

5.3. Political Issues

In the whole collection of *La Turquie Kemaliste* there are no traces of the military power of the Turkish state. This absence can be interpreted as to stay in the civil side of the events or the unprepared conditions while a new war was approaching. Also the motto "peace on earth" was emphasized in various political statements, a determination to stay outside the political and military conflicts reflected in editorial articles. We can give an example from Burhan Belge's article on world peace, written in August 1936, which was a very important year when the traces of the Second World War were felt.[25] In some other issues there are subjects related to foreign policy. For example, because of the official visit of the Romanian foreign minister, Mustafa Kemal made a long speech. The journal published the full text of this speech, three pages long, with pictures.[26]

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23   LTK, No: 5, February 1935.

24   LTK, No: 7, June 1935, p.5, Falih Rıfkı Atay, "Notre Reforme Linguistique"

25   LTK, No: 14, August 1936.

26   LTK, No: 18, April 1937.

At the time the December 1938 issue was out, Mustafa Kemal had died and Burhan Belge wrote an article entitled "d'Atatürk à İnönü" (From Atatürk to İnönü).[27] In 1939 Falih Rıfkı wrote an editorial article on the foundations of the unity of Turkey.[28] It was the year when the Second World War started, so in the next issue İsmet İnönü's speech was published as the editorial article.[29]

Between April and August 1939 (No: 32-40) the publication had a long break. In 1941 Selim Sarper, an important figure in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs wrote an article "Cancan" (whisper) as an editorial in the middle of the turbulent years of war. In that article he warns the journalists and public listening and reading the world news on their radios and in their newspapers, not to believe everything they hear.[30] In 1942 Selim Sarper wrote another article on foreign journalists in Turkey.[31]

We should mention another important editorial article, written by Vedat Nedim Tör. In that article he argues that foreigners do not understand that, since the Lausanne Agreement, they have been founding a new and powerful basis for a new order. In their critical geopolitics they are living at the crossroads of the three orders: the communist, proletarian order represented by Soviet Russia; the racist, totalitarian order of the Axis states and the capitalist and democratic order of other states. Turkey does not accept any of them, accepting the motto of peace at home, peace in the world. "Turkey does not accept or perform any kind of aggression" he wrote, while underlining the neutral position of the country during the hard days of the war.[32]

5.4. Constructing New Industries All over Turkey

The 1930s and 40s are critical years when we think about the development of the Turkish economy, as the crisis in 1929 effected especially the western capitalist economies. The crisis caused certain problems in developing economies, and Turkey in the formative years. Boratav divides Turkish history into three sub-categories with respect to economic policies. In his categorization, 1923-39 is considered as reconstruction under open economic conditions, under which 1930-39 is protected-statist industrialization. The war years, 1940-45, are considered as an interim (Boratav, 2005). Between 1929 and 1931 they took the first steps for protective-interventionist policies and then between 1933 and 1939 they narrowed the foreign

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27   LTK, No: 28, December 1938.

28   LTK, No: 30, April 1939.

29   LTK, No: 31, June 1939.

30   LTK, No: 42, April 1941. "Cancan"

31   LTK, No: 42, April 1942. "Les Journalistes étrangers en Turquie"

32   LTK, No: 44, August 1941. "L'Ordre Turc, au Carrefour de trois ordres"

trade deficit. As a result, they could manage a meaningful first capital accumulation, industrialization, development and gained speed in growth of economy. They decided to put into effect the statist policies during the nationwide tour of Mustafa Kemal that took three months in Anatolia (Boratav, 1982, pp.100-101). In this tour they noticed the internal tensions in the country, a great despair, and poverty of peasantry and working classes, largely inherited from the years of war and being ignored afterwards, and complaint from the self-interested and beneficiary upper middle classes in Anatolia.

With the effects of the world economic crisis that started in 1929, the Republican People's Party (CHF) took new precautions. It accepted six foundational principles in 1931, namely republicanism, nationalism, statism, populism, laicism, and reformism. Planned economy, industrialization, foundation of financial and public economic enterprises and urban planning were critical issues taken into consideration in the 1930s to ensure self-sufficiency in turbulent years. While doing that, they wrote articles on making economies (waste not!) and the formations of new economic and financial institutions such as İş Bankası (Isbank), which was founded in 1924 for facilitating financial activities and to solve the state's economic problems, helping the formation of a national economy and banking system, backing up the newly founded industries after the First Economic Congress in Izmir.[33]

In 1932, the adoption of various resolutions in statism in the economy began. Throughout the 1930s, the state was the main investor and took over the main productive functions in non-agricultural industries. In 1934 the first five-year plan in industry was put into practice, which included not all economic life but mainly textile, metallurgy, ceramics, cellulose and chemistry. The state initiated and financed the 20 main factories in those sectors. As a result, Turkey realized the first real accumulation in industry between 1930 and 1939 (Boratav, 1982, p.70).

Turkey got over the great economic crisis that hit the western world in 1929 with the help of a closed economy. In this first period, the annual growth rate of the economy was 10.3 percent, which was an impressive amount for the whole history of Republic of Turkey and especially for contemporary economies. Just before the Second World War, with the fixed prices of 1938, the share of industry in national income increased from 11 percent to 18 percent from 1929 to 1939. This year, the flour, sugar and weaving needs began to be met with largely domestic production; with the help of the first modern iron and steel factories, the paper and chemical industry, and big leaps in construction material and cement production. Between 1930 and 1939, the annual growth rate of the economy was 5.8 percent, which is

33   LTK, No: 10, December 1935.

also a great success compared to the world economy and other capitalist economies in crisis. Agriculture followed these industries from behind with 5.1 percent (Boratav, 1982, pp.70-72). These protective and statist industrialization policies were interrupted with the great effects of the Second World War.

In most issues of *La Turquie Kemaliste,* there are articles and dossiers related to new industries all over Turkey. For example roads, health, textile, tobacco, glass industries in Beykoz, Nazilli, Kayseri (textiles), Bursa, and Gemlik.[34] In 1937 there is an article on the ten years of sugar industry in Turkey. There are articles concerning metallurgy in Karabük, mining industries, glass industry in Paşabahçe, Beykoz, paper industry in İzmit, Seka. In 1938 the Izmir International fair found a place in *La Turquie Kemaliste*.

5.5. Education and Education of Girls

Education and the opening of new schools at different levels (especially the education of girls and public education) are popular issues in *La Turquie Kemaliste*. For example, there are articles on the physical education of girls[35] or dramatic and lyric arts school, written by Prof. Carl Ebert, who is one of the founders of the State Conservatory in Ankara.[36] There are articles on childhood in Turkey, for example written by the famous German medical professor Albert Eckstein in 1937. There are dossiers on various schools and topics and content on developments in education.

In the 1930s, the education and well-being of villages became important issues. In the presentation of the Museum of Painting and Sculpture we can see lots of representations of village life, still lives chosen from village context and peasantry.[37] In 1938 the pages of *La Turquie Kemaliste* reflect the changes of cultural orientation from modernism to Turkish cultural foundations: Ceilings of Turkish houses in Ankara, Turkish fountains and religious water fountains, or Bursa Gardens, mosques and museums found a place in the pages. They show typical Turkish houses from Anatolia, Kula, Safranbolu or Birgi. In the 1941 issue the village in revolutionary Turkey is described as a rich and prosperous place to live with a high level of production and a place to live happily.[38]

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34   LTK, No: 3, October 1934, LTK, No: 20, August 1937.

35   LTK, No: 7, June 1935.

36   After the Nazi Party seized power in Germany and after they took hold of Austria, mainly after 1933, a group of German speaking scientists, professors and researchers moved to Turkey; with proper contracts found posts in universities in Ankara and Istanbul. They both added to the modernization of education, cultural life of the new Turkey in various areas and wrote articles in pages of *La Turquie Kemaliste* (Neumark, 2006).

37   LTK, No: 23-24, April 1938.

38   LTK, No: 41, February 1941.

5.6. Turkish Literature and Famous Writers

In almost all issues of *La Turquie Kemaliste* there is a section of literature, where a short story or a summary was given. For example we can read an extract of Yakup Kadri's Sodome and Gomorra translated into French, and Leila, Fille de Gomorra in the first issue.[39] Or there are articles on new novels by the famous Turkish writers: Sadri Ertem's short stories, Falih Rıfkı's new novel *Tuna Kıyıları* (Les Bords de la Tamise (sic Danube).[40] There is a Sabahattin Ali story in French, *Le Camion,* in the February 1937 issue. Ruşen Eşref Ünaydın and Sait Faik (Man who forgets the city, le baluchon, the samovar), Necip Fazıl Kısakürek (*Les Hallucinations d'un Nuit de Solitude*), extracts from Ahmet Haşim (Quelques essais d'Ahmed Haşim), and some other famous writers of the time.

5.7. Le visage Turque (sic.)

In most of the issues there are pages called "*Le visage Turque*" (Turkish faces) that reflect portraits of ordinary people, especially young women and girls: As an example, the pages of the 1938 issue showed portraits of Turkish men and women.[41] Turkish faces include faces of children, young girls, village dwellers, and the new Turkish people. The characteristic of those photographs is that there are always smiling, hopeful, cheerful faces whether they live in the city or in the countryside; and they are looking at the future with hope. In some issues under this title, there are photographs of women working in various workshops and factories, in fields such as the modern sciences, laboratories, agriculture, education etc. The concept is the same as the propaganda film of Yutkevich made for the 10th anniversary of the foundation of the Republic of Turkey: happy faces of Turkish people whether young or old, living in the city or in the countryside looking at the future with great hope. These are the happy faces of the Turkish people without class, ethnic or religious differences having equal opportunities, just as in the liberal ideal. They are the citizens of the Republic of Turkey accepted as equals with equal rights as in the nationalist framework, reflected in the famous motto of Turkish nationalism: "Happy is who says I'm a Turk" (*Ne mutlu Türküm diyene*).

For many reasons, the Turkish authorities tried to define and redefine the Turkishness of the Republic of Turkey. They tried to move away from the Ottoman past while defining the Turkish people in the context of Turkish nationalism. We can see traces of these efforts in the pages of *La Turquie Kemaliste*. One important example is an article published in 1943. This political position is emphasized once again in an "Ankara-Istanbul" article where the writer

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39   LTK, No: 1, 1 June 1934.

40   LTK, No: 2, August 1934, pp.6-8.

41   LTK, No: 28, December 1938.

claims that the average visitor who came to Turkey and went to Istanbul would rush from the Haghia Sophia to the walls and quickly round the old Hippodrome; when he goes back he would talk about the Sultans and the old Ottoman stories; he would probably have eaten Russian food and heard news about the government from a Greek porter and his guide would be an Armenian courier. He would concentrate on the relics of the past now intentionally forgotten by the average Turk, who looked ahead to better days.[42]

6. Towards the End… Sensations of the Roots

In various issues of *La Turquie Kemaliste* collection there are subjects derived from old Ankara and other parts of Anatolia. For example there are articles on old Ankara houses, ceilings, places like Tarsus, Urfa, Mersin, Bolu, Hatay (Defne), Ağrıdağı.[43] In 1938 for the first time we see boy scouts, while the threat of war was perceived. We can see traces of a kind of 'tour de force'. Or we have small articles and photographs on Karagöz or sports in Anatolia such as hunting, shooting, horse breeding and skiing; or the Kozak highlands.

In the final issue of the journal published in March 1948 the page layout and font type has changed drastically. Hasan Refik Ertuğ wrote an article entitled "Turkey: The Citadel of Civilizations and Freedom East of Mediterranean". He is claiming that Turkey has always supported the democratic front during the war. He mentions the communist threat towards Turkish, Asian, African and even American peoples; and Eastern Mediterranean countries and claims that Turkey was and will be a part of Western civilization, supporting allies of the democratic world.[44] The article represents Turkey's orientation towards the western world and the United States at the beginning of the Cold War politics.

As a final assessment it can be said that this publication aimed to represent the foundation and progress of the Republic of Turkey in the turbulent years of the 1930s and 40s, presenting Anatolia as a tabula rasa on which they could build a nation, a modern life and culture with all facilities of production and industrialization, education, health and culture. It also aimed to include all cultural heritages starting from ancient civilizations, Hittites, Trojans to Byzantium then to the Ottoman period and a modern resurrection of the Republic of Turkey. It acts as a Domesday Book of the new regime to show the modern face of new Turkey to the western audience.[45] While doing this they presented the modernization, construction,

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42   LTK, No: 47, 1943.

43   LTK, No: 27, October 1938, 15th anniversary of Republic of Turkey.

44   LTK, No: 49, March 1948.

45   Domesday Book is an inventory record ordered by William the Conqueror in 1086 to count everything, men and cattle in cities, villages and countryside in England.

industrialization efforts in cities and in the countryside, in education, health, and science. In this collection we find modern, happy and healthy faces of men and women and happy robust children, happy mothers in cities and in small villages all over Turkey. We see the arts, crafts and historical richness of Anatolia and its natural beauties and resources. Across Turkey we are happily living in a country without having any problems or contradictions of class, ethnic origin or religion in the east and the west.

These are obviously not the representative images of the daily life in Turkey, but they were chosen as selected symbols and images for western contemporaries (Aykaç, 2003, p.10). As it is claimed in Kemalist ideology, "we are a coherent body without classes or privileges."[46]

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46   "Sınıfsız, imtiyazsız, kaynaşmış bir kitleyiz.."

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CHAPTER 4

DEVELOPMENTALISM AND RURAL SOCIOLOGY: THE IDEOLOGICAL RECONSTRUCTION OF ACADEMIC KNOWLEDGE IN THE EARLY COLD WAR PERIOD IN TURKEY

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Abstract

The focus of this study is on the "making" of the ultra-conservative intellectual dominance in Turkish rural sociology discipline. Discussions among intellectuals, the anti-communist "nature" of this academic field, the foundation of a new developmentalist perspective and how these sociology studies re-defined peasantry and the rural structure of the country in general will be discussed in this study. The change from the previously dominant Kemalist "peasantist" approach to a "new-peasantism", which was transcribed for the changing Cold War conditions, will also be examined in this article. The ideological framework of defining developmentalism in the 1960s would be influenced from the dominance that had been created during the post-war period of intellectual discussions.

Keywords: Rural Sociology, Developmentalism, Le Play School, *Science Sociale*, *Prens* [Prince] Sabahaddin.

1. Introduction

Aziz Nesin, an important writer of humorous stories in Turkey, describes in his story *Üniversite Heyetinin Bir Köyde Sosyolojik İncelemesi* [The Sociological Investigation of the University Committee in a Village] the "funny" reaction that the villagers give to the sociologists who came to "investigate" them (Nesin, 1997). The peasants see the act of getting informed about them as the harbinger of imminent danger, whether it comes from the state or the university. The villagers, who are being targeted as the research object, are in doubt about the intentions of the researchers. At the end of the story, funny dialogues occur between the villagers that are trying to avoid the bad results they may encounter and those who research themselves. In terms of sociological research, the most important issue that this story reveals is the nature of the relationship between the process of "producing knowledge" and the subject of that "knowledge produced". As Aynur İlyaoğlu stated, the distinctive feature of sociology lays in the theoretical existence of "mutual subjective relationship" between the researcher and the researched, from which the knowledge is gathered (İlyasoğlu, 2001, p. 84). The researcher is not independent of his/her reality in the process of reaching the reality of the subject of the research. The intention of the research, or the "intention of the researcher", becomes important in this case. This study will examine the early "developmentalism" debates with a special emphasis on the development of the Rural Sociology discipline in Turkey by focusing mostly not on the reality revealed by the sociological knowledge gathered through the research during that period but through analyzing the changing reality of the researchers. In this way, it will be possible to emphasize the effect of the transformation of the sociological perspective on how the peasantry was defined in this period as both an academic and a political subject.

The intention of this study is to create a discussion on the origin of a concept, which became popular in the 1960s among intellectuals and sociologists in Turkey. "Developmentalism", which became a symbolic discourse of the progressive and socialist understandings of the 1960s, actually found its place in a struggle within the discipline of sociology just after the Second World War. Although there can be divergent sources in the making of a developmentalist approach, the Turkish example has been shaped by the ultra-conservative ideological hegemony of the post-war period.

The focus of this study is on the "making" of this intellectual dominance in Turkey. Discussions among intellectuals, the anti-communist "nature" of this academic field, the making of a developmentalist perspective and how these sociology studies re-defined peasantry and the rural structure of the country in general will be discussed in this study. The

change from the previously dominant Kemalist "peasantist" approach to a "new-peasantism", which was transcribed for the changing Cold War conditions, will also be examined in this article.

The development of the field of rural sociology in the world will first be explained. Secondly, the dominant hegemonic position of the Le Play sociology school in the area of rural sociology worldwide and its influence on the struggle of sociology schools in Turkey will be defined. In the last section, with the analysis of the *Prens* [Prince] Sabahaddin school as the followers of the Le Play school in Turkey, how this discipline of sociology met with developmentalism will be defined through the discussions made in the pages of *Forum* magazine. In this way, this article intends to answer the question of how this version of developmentalism became a dominant perspective in Turkey.

2. The "Profundity" of Rural Sociology

The definition of Rural Sociology in the early periods of its development as an institutional identity is as follows:

> Rural sociology is concerned with the relations of rural people to each other, the relations of rural people to other sections of national and world populations, with rural institutions, with the rural standard of living and with the social problems attaching themselves to life and labor on the farm and in farm communities (Taylor, 1923, p. 592).

At the beginning of the 20th century, more than a third of the US population lived in the countryside, which was considered an important element in the elections and social mobility (Lobao, 2007, p. 465). The political rise of William Jenning Bryan from the Populist Party, who received great support from the countryside in the 1896 presidential election, led to an interest in the problems of the rural sections of society. City-centered industrialists initiated *The Country Life Movement* at the turn of the century with the concern that turmoil in the countryside could create a barrier to the production of a cheap food supply for the working class in the cities. This movement, which was created as a result of the concern of making a city-centered alternative to the radical economic proposals of the populist movement, proposed a social, cultural and moral reform program with the claim that the rural society lagged behind the evolution of the developed urban society. The reasons for the backwardness of the peasant groups were stated as the failure of organizational and the technological infrastructure and the failure of education and social institutions in the countryside, as opposed to the populists' claims that base their assumptions mainly on the destructive effects of capitalism (Summers & Buttle, 2000, p. 2426). Towards the First World War, the intense population movement from

villages to cities also ended up with a crisis in food production, which ideally should flow at a stable pace especially in times of war. This rural to urban migration consequently caused problems in urban lifestyle and American society faced an increasing "peasant problem" in the pre-war period. In 1908, Theodore Roosevelt established an interventionist institution to carry out studies to solve the problems of the rural areas called the *Commission on Country Life*. The studies that were prepared in this commission paved the way for the implementation of two legal arrangements: *Smith-Lever Act* (1914) and *Purnel Act* (1925). These arrangements would provide institutional support for those who were willing to conduct sociological research on the rural structure to solve the probable and current problems of agricultural production. After this support, research departments specialized in this field grew rapidly. In 1936, the scholars working in the field related to the countryside published their research journal, *Rural Sociology*, and immediately left the *American Sociological Society* to develop their organization, which is the *Rural Sociological Society* (Summers & Buttle, 2000, p. 2426-27). The most important feature of the Commission and the subsequent organizations could be investigated in their sociological perspective to the problems of the rural structure. This new perspective and its followers particularly avoided focusing on the structural problems of agricultural producers and instead, they centered their attention on the individual characteristics of the peasants, their perception of cultural values, and the incompetence of village schools and religious institutions. The studies only consist of a compilation of results based on surveys and monographs focused on the "peasant family" (Lobao, 2007, p. 466).

Instead of regulating the rural relations of the country in the post-war period, these studies try to focus on the world where restructuring takes place. Village Sociology, which would be reshaped under the influence of the USA, has led to the acquisition of social knowledge and the collection of information that forms the basis of the projects to be realized all around the world in the future.

Carle C. Zimmerman and Pitirim Sorokin two important precursors of rural sociology studies also had an important effect on the development of this academic field in Turkey (Zimmerman & Sorokin, 1929). Ziyaeddin Fahri Fındıkoğlu invited Zimmerman to Turkey to give a series of lectures and their studies were translated into Turkish simultaneously (Baloğlu, 2008, p. 555-79).

As the disciples of Ferdinand Tönnies, Zimmerman and Sorokin praised the romanticized moral existence of peasantry against the destructive and unethical penetration of capitalism to modern urban life. Tönnies' social analysis that built on the *Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft* distinction, becomes one of the most popular forms of analysis in the period following the

Second World War. The separation of social structures into "traditional" and "modern" is directly related to the politics that are thought to be carried out as a result of this separation. Durkheim's dissociation of society based on mechanical and organic solidarity, or the separation of Edmond Demolins -also one of Le Play's followers- into *formations communautaires* and *formations particularistes*, is similar to that of Tönnies. But the differences between their perceptions are related to the social imagination each one creates as a result of this distinction. According to Tönnies "the triumph of *Gesellschaft* over *Gemeinschaft* must sooner or later destroy modern civilization in the same way as the civilization of Rome was destroyed in the early centuries of the Christian era" (Ranulf, 1939, p. 16). This perspective also inspired *fin-de-siècle* anti-Enlightenment ideas that glorified the preservation of *Gesellschaft*-like structures (Ranulf, 1939, p. 17). Even if he distanced himself from these anti-enlightenment ideas towards the end of his life, the distinction he created about social structures would become one of the sources of anti-modernist conservatism in the following decades. These views of Tönnies would be incorporated into the conceptualization used in the post-World War II period to define "developed" and "underdeveloped" countries at different levels. The hierarchy between these countries created by the modernization theory coincides with the post-war aims of village sociology. In this way, rural structures in *Gemeinschaft*-like countries can be controlled by social projects to be carried out after the researches framed by village sociology methods.

3. Le Play Sociology and Social Reform

Auguste Comte, who named sociology as a "scientific" discipline, considered social science research as the science of transforming society. Like most intellectuals of the Enlightenment, Comte saw social sciences as a means to create mechanisms that would produce and render knowledge that would enable society to exist in a better and "healthier" structure. In this sense, Comte regarded social scientists as the highest priests of the "religion of humanism" he created (Coleman, 1997, p. 672). To establish the society of the future, a knowledge of existing society is needed, and the science of sociology becomes the functional "supplier" of this knowledge. The most important event that set Comte on the path of obtaining and organizing such information would be the destruction and social upheaval caused by the French Revolution. Shaped by the understanding of the motto "*Ordre et Progrés*", he would offer to carry out the work of "ordering" the post-revolutionary France through sociology (İlyasoğlu, 1985, p. 2165).

Durkheim, following Comte's footsteps, adds *solidarité* as a new principle that brings order to the themes of "freedom, equality and fraternity" to solve the social catastrophe

brought about by the continual revolutionary wave of the 19th century. Durkheim also develops his plan -*sociologie reformiste*- for the reorganization of communal existence (İlyasoğlu, 1985, p. 2164).

In addition to the Comte-Durkheim school, Pierre Guilliaume Frédéric Le Play develops a different school of sociology. Le Play witnesses all the revolutions of 1830, 1848 and 1870/71 and would be most influenced by these developments while developing its own understanding of sociology. Le Play tries to perceive and become a reformer of the turbulent revolutionary period in which the working class and peasantry are more active than the bourgeoisie. Therefore, his studies were carried out mainly on working-class families and he would be called the founder of the school of empirical sociology. His research would mostly focus on developing the field and survey studies and a new applicable classification system (Wernick, 2006, p. 331). Le Play had very close relations with the state authorities and worked as the executive of various reform projects. His major work, *Les Ouvriers Européens* (The European Workers), becomes a source of data for the *La Réforme Sociale en France* (Social Reform in France) project which he prepared in 1864 (Philippe, 1998, p. 344). He conducted his work for this reform program using the monograph technique, which is said to have been used for the first time by Le Play in the field of sociology. He conducted an operational work throughout the region through his organization, *Unions Pour la Paix Sociale* (Union for Social Peace), by implementing the monograph method (Cuin, 2004, p. 591).

Le Play is described by his followers as one of the two founders of sociology with Comte (Kösemihal, 1958, p. 8). Doğan Ergun says that Le Play is "an extreme Catholic thinker who does not act for any universal and decisive motives", so that he cannot be regarded as the founder of sociology (Ergun, 1990, p. 53). Apart from all these comments, it would be more meaningful to say that Le Play is an important sociologist and social reformer whose influence is also felt outside of France.

In forming his methodology, Le Play placed himself particularly in opposition to the sociology of Comte-Durkheim. Against the Comte-Durkheim school's so-called "theoretical" approach, he tried to establish a new understanding shaped by the monograph technique. So he called his sociological approach *science sociale* instead of Comte's concept of *sociologie*. By differentiating himself with the "monograph technique", he claimed that the "real science of society" can only be achieved in this way. To reach the general monographic map of society through monographic research requires a long time and financial support, and this could be gained only by the sponsorship of those who find themselves close to the logic of social reform. For this reason, Le Play was first supported by the emperor Napoleon III and

various aristocratic statesmen. The reform program which he prepared in 1864 was commissioned by the emperor himself and consequently, he would be awarded by various state posts. After the fall of the empire, Le Play did not receive much support from the Republican government, but this time he would get the support of the Catholic Church. Through these sponsorships, he managed to patronize a circle of researchers to undertake the monographs under his institution, *Unions de la Paix Sociale* (Clark, 1973, p. 105-06).

The family is chosen as the unit of analysis in Le Play's methodology. The reason for taking the family as a basis is generally stated as its being the smallest observable form of social organization. This "smallest form" enables the micro-survey of the society through the budget analysis of the family, in which the expenses and income are evaluated (Boyacıoğlu & Boyacıoğlu, 2008, p. 301). Le Play tries to understand the general *habitus* (although not defined in terms of Bourdieu) and living conditions of families by evaluating the general income expenditures. Le Play thought that in this way, it would be possible to get information about the "basic moral rules" of the society (Coleman, 1997, p. 673). The information collected through this method also provides a basis for social reform. Le Play's choice of the family as the unit of analysis is not only due to its acceptance as the basic unit of society, but also because he commissions the family a pivotal role in the model society he had desired. He believed that "social peace" could only be restored through an understanding of this "social reality". This reality was based on the protection of the social hierarchy in the existing society (Elwitt, 1988, 212). Nurettin Şazi Kösemihal lists Le Play's principles for social peace as follows:

> According to Le Play, to ensure peace, stability, prosperity, and in short, happiness in societies, it is necessary to obey the following principles: a) Commitment to God (Decalogue) and paternal authority, b) Transfer of property from generation to generation without fragmentation. With the first one, resistance to the evil tendency that exists in human creation is gained; thus solidarity, honesty, and mutual assistance prevail in the relations of individuals and classes. With the second one, the stability of the material means of living, that is, welfare, one of the main conditions of bliss, is obtained (Kösemihal, 1958, p. 12).

According to Robert Nisbet, these views of Le Play stem from his being "an extreme monarchist, a Roman Catholic and entirely traditionalist in moral philosophy" (Nisbet, 1997, p. 122). Within the methodological view that consisted of the combination of these features, Le Play evaluates the family institution in three different types. These are the patriarchal family (*famille patriarcale*), the stem family (*famille souche*) and the unstable family (*famille instable*). The patriarchal family is a non-dispersed type of father, son, and brothers living

together. The stem family consists of the father and the son who is chosen as the heir. In the unstable family, the property of the family is distributed equally among all members. Therefore, it is the type of family that is defined as the worst (Boyacıoğlu & Boyacıoğlu, 2008, p. 301). For Le Play, who thinks with a feudal mentality, it is the stem family that ensures the progress and order of society.

Followers of the Le Play school, H. de Tourville and Edmond Demolins, developed this sociological and social reformist perspective and created a more institutional structure. In 1904, the *Société Internationale de Science Sociale* was established and new publications occurred in which new products of the Le Play school was presented (Philippe, 1998, p. 343). Tourville, one of the most important representatives of the school, conducted a methodological study for sociological research and systematized the technique of the monograph works. With this technique, developed under the name of *la nomenclature de la science sociale*, they endeavored to understand not only the family institution but the whole of social life (Boyacıoğlu & Boyacıoğlu, 2008, p. 302).

Demolins, another prominent name of the Le Play school, developed a perspective targeting not only the inspection of social structures but also the improvement of existing structures. Education has a very important place in the "action plan" of Le Play school's social reform mentality. Demolins opened a school called *Ecole des Roches* in 1899 to create a community of more elite individuals to serve the development of the most appropriate family type (Zengin, 1997, p. 1976; Kösemihal, 1950, p. 122).

Finally, another conceptualization introduced by Le Play school representatives, intends to classify countries according to their social structure characteristics. Demolins separated social structures into *formations communautaires* (community formations) and *formations particularistes* (individualist formations). According to Niyazi Berkes, "in the first type of society, it is not the individual but family, tribe, clan, or state are superior. The best representative of this type is Eastern societies. In the second type, the individual is the important person in society; social clusters gather around the individual. A good example of this type is the Anglo-Saxon society" (Berkes, 1973, p. 350).

4. Prince Sabahaddin and the Politics of Sociology in Turkey

The 19th century can also be described as the most widely accepted period of positivist approaches. Positivism also entered into an approach to eliminate religious forms of thought in every field. The reinterpretation of the world with advances in natural sciences made it typical to consider "scientific" thinking as the most valid way. Comte's "religion of

humanism" also included the questioning of religious knowledge based on holy books. Even though there was a transition from religious to scientific thought, it may be asserted that treating scientific knowledge as a religious belief was also one of the most important aspects of this approach. In this context, intellectuals, the producers of scientific knowledge, were perceived as the creator or representative of a kind of new religion. We can say that this approach is dominant in the development of sociology. During the 19th century, intellectuals who were active in the field of sociology were described by their followers as the "prophets" of this new science religion.

The emergence of sociology in a period of social upheavals in the modern age brought a sense of commitment and exaltation to those who developed these sociological systems that address salvation from the current problems. These "modern-day prophets" would be defined as "exemplary people" not only by their thoughts but also by their personality and lives. For example, Tahsin Demiray says the following about Le Play:

> As is customary, even the dogs walking on his left and right have difficulty in following him. He travels 80 kilometers a day. It takes about 1 and 8 minutes to complete a kilometer under the intense sun and without complaining about the high and sharp cold of the mountains. At the end of a long and arduous day's journey, he doesn't think about resting upon arrival, but he immediately starts research and investigation (Demiray, 1958a, p. 4).

Adopting a school of sociology also meant being a "disciple" of that school. The main reason for this lies in the understanding of sociology in this period as an "ideology of salvation". In the later periods of the Ottoman Empire during which disintegration and losses in wars could not be stopped, political unrest prevailed. The social/political reform proposals of 19th century sociologists were defined as methods to "liberate" the country from its desperate situation. The positivist understanding that each society has a "common/universal social nature" led to the spread of the idea of a universalist order. In this direction, the wide acceptance of this "positivist belief" that leads to the formation of social transformation projects through a "social engineering" mentality also became widely popular among the Ottoman intellectuals of Turkey (Özlem, 2001, p. 458-59).

During the Ottoman-Turkish modernization process, on the basis of politics and sociology, there were three dominant sociological views. These were, Prince Sabahaddin and later on *Ilm-i İçtima* school (The Ottoman-Turkish version of the *science sociale*) who was influenced by Le Play; the followers of Spencer's organisationist views of which the first representatives were Ahmet Şuayıp, Bedi Nuri and Satı Bey; and last but which remained dominant for some time, the Comte and Durkheimian school represented by Ahmet Rıza and Ziya Gökalp (Sezer,

1989, p. 31-32). One of the common features of all of these followers is that none of them adopted their sociological understanding directly from their initial representatives but through versions developed by their followers. Ahmet Rıza was influenced by Pierre Lafitte, the follower of Comte, whom he met in France, and Prince Sabahaddin was influenced by Edmond Desmolins, who was the follower of Le Play (Türkdoğan et al., 1976, p. 264-65).

The sociological conception developed during the Constitutional Monarchy period and transferred to the Republic was largely based on Ziya Gökalp and the Durkheimian solidarism he represented. As Zafer Toprak says, the principles Gökalp formulated according to his solidarism, such as "there is no individual but community", "there is no class but occupation (*meslek*), and "there is no empire but national states", would be a dominant understanding in both politics and sociology for a long time (Toprak, 2001, p. 326).

The struggle between the Durkheim and Le Play schools also reflects a political fight over his followers in Turkey. For example, Nureddin Şazi Kösemihal described the similarities between France and Ottoman-Turkish sociological developments as follows:

> There are many similarities between our sociological movements and the sociological movements in France. a) Sociology was born with practical imperatives in both countries, and in both the major agent was the social crisis. (…) b) Just as two sociological currents based on scientific understanding emerged in France, two sociology based on scientific understanding emerged in the correspondingly sickening Ottoman Empire c) In contrast to the Comte-Durkheim school, the Le Play school in France has neither taken place in universities or high schools nor has it received any state aid. Likewise, the Le Play school represented by Prince Sabahattin, in contrast to the Comte-Durkheim school represented by Gökalp, has not taken place in our university desks, in high schools and received any state aid -except for the last twelve years- (Kösemihal, 1950, p. 122).

As seen in the above example, almost all the common views of the representatives of the Le Play school in Turkey, Le Play and his representative Prince Sabahaddin were excluded or ignored as a result of taking a political stance in Turkey. The main reason for that is the defeat of the Le Play school and its representative through Prince Sabahaddin in Turkey in the struggle with the Committee of Union and Progress in the political arena in which the Comte-Durkheim school became dominant. After the foundation of the modern Turkish Republic, this sociological struggle was inherited and the Comte-Durkheim school became the core principle of establishment in the Republican Turkey. It is through the developments after the Second World War that Le Play-Sabahaddin approach became more popular and dominated sociological understanding. Besides, it should be stated that this separation and

conflict was not a definite separation. Although Kurtuluş Kayalı states that this separation was important and contributed to the development of sociology in Turkey as a result of these debates, he argues that not all issues should be considered within this framework. In Kayalı's words, at the last instance, "it is possible to determine that in addition to the hegemony of Ziya Gökalp, the influence of Prince Sabahaddin is inclusive" (Kayalı, 2001, p. 61).

The Le Play school was first known in the Ottoman Empire through Ali Suavi (Sezer, 1989, p. 48). Ali Suavi met the Le Play school during his years in France and when he returned to the country he advised Mithat Pasha to follow and learn from Le Play by mentioning that there was an issue of "maintenance of the establishment of the sovereignty" in the Le Play school of sociology. Although the later Le Play followers in Turkey accused Ali Suavi of misinterpreting the school, it can be said that Suavi understood the real political essence of Le Play (Fındıkoğlu, 1962, p. 66-67). One of those who thinks Ali Suavi misunderstood Le Play is Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar. Tanpınar says the following about Suavi's misinterpretation:

> Surprisingly, he relies on the famous French economist Le Play, who tries to solve the economic and social crisis of Europe with the ideas of *Religion*, *Family,* and *Property*, while attacking our ideas of constitutionalism with an implicit loquacity. This was nothing more than a search for a western *imam* in support for the struggle that Suavî was afraid to lay the essence of (Tanpınar, 1942, p. 176).

Another suggested source of Le Play's initial impact on Turkey came from Tevfik Nevzat, a journalist who migrated to Europe for political reasons. Nevzat came into contact with this school in Europe and, more importantly, when he returned home, he prepared one of the first village monographs using Le Play's nomenclature (Fındıkoğlu, 1962, p. 68). But it would be Prince Sabahaddin who established and settled this school.

Prince Sabahaddin, who should be seen as a product of the efforts of liberation and re-establishment in the last period of the Ottoman Empire, was more likely to propose a reformist solution. In the words of Tahsin Demiray, Sabahaddin advocated the idea of "merging to make" instead of "merging to destroy" (Demiray, 1958b, p. 22). To define the importance of Sabahaddin in the making of rural sociology in Turkey it is essential to understand the ideological impact not in the late Ottoman period but during the post-Second World War period. The followers of Sabahaddin in this period tried to validate his thoughts to "cure the illness" that Turkish society was struggling into. To project their perspective in a "scientific" way they did not hesitate to use terms from "medicine". They asserted that to cure the illness, diagnosis was first required; and that should be achieved only by applying scientific methods

to sociology, by which they meant the *science social*. The sociological method of one of the disciples of Le Play, Paul Descamps, which is called "experimental sociology", was strongly asserted by Turkish Le Playists (Descamps, 1965).

Prince Sabahaddin, in general, asserts that Turkey does not have a management problem; rather, the core of the problem is structural. He believes that these structural problems should be examined through sociological tools and consequently reforms should be made especially in the field of agriculture and education (İlyasoğlu, 1985, p. 2168). He thinks that this result can be achieved only by reshaping an underdeveloped communitarian structure with an individualistic understanding. To accomplish this, he uses the method of *Science Sociale*, which he calls *İlm-i İçtima*. While acknowledging the determining effect of the geographical factors, he states that "*istihale*" (metamorphosis, or the transition from one social structure to another), could be achieved only as follows: "Until now these two institutions have born instinctively due to their natural essentiality. However, from now on, it will be possible to achieve this metamorphosis by human will after it is known how they were born thanks to the 'science of society'" (Kösemihal, 1950 p. 131). As can be understood, Sabahaddin sees the intervention of human will as a necessary factor of societal transformation. The most important role in this intervention is given to education.

According to Sabahaddin, the Ottoman social structure shows the characteristics of a communitarian peasant society. Such a social structure needs to be educated to protect the members of society in the face of the destruction that will arise with industrialization and to create a structure that will adapt to the new conditions. The young people to be educated would be discouraged from the idea of becoming civil servants, undergoing a special education and being raised to form the "individualist family" and sent to Anatolia to be the master of the villagers (Kansu, 2001, p. 161). In this context, Sabahaddin's design of ideal society aims to create a capitalist peasant class which is directed to industrialization under the leadership of these educated "gentlemen" (Durukan, 2001, p. 155) For this purpose, it is seen that the followers of Prince Sabahaddin opened educational institutions similar to the *Ecole des Roches* established by Demolins in France. Twenty years after the first schools opened in France, the Turkish version of these types of institutions were established in Istanbul by Satı Bey in the name of "*Yuva*" (Nest), which were visited and inspected also by Prince Sabahaddin himself (Zengin, 1997, p. 176; Kösemihal, 1958, p. 17). Founded by Nezahet Nureddin Ege, the "*Güneş*" (Sun) college was established for similar purposes (Zengin, 1997, p. 176). The Village Institutes, which were founded as a state initiative in the early 1940s, were considered by the followers of Sabahaddin to have a similar purpose. Cavit Orhan Tütengil said that it is

important to concentrate on village research by turning Village Institutes into "social observatories" (Tütengil, 1950, p. 67). He says the following for the Institutes, where he thinks that experimental sociology offers one of the most important opportunities for village research:

> After our visit to *Kayalar* School in 1951, we believe that it is possible to find many similarities between our Village Institutes and this school. The pedagogical views on which they are based, the way they are established and functioning, are similar with some differences arising from the purpose. Although no documents show the extent to which the founders of the Village Institutes were influenced by the education thoughts of Sabahattin, there are indications that the previously published publications affected them (Tütengil, 1954, p. 64).

Prince Sabahattin's ideas were maintained by his followers in an institutional structure during the Republican period. Le Play's followers in Turkey, which continued in the footsteps of France, also expressed the importance of institutionalization to achieve success. The first institutionalization attempt would be realized by Mehmet Ali Şevki (Avcı, 2008). In 1919, Şevki established a society called *Meslek-i İçtimaî* to examine the villages of Anatolia and Rumelia and, for a short time, to publish a magazine with the same name (Ülken, 1951, p. 22). This magazine can be described as the first of the areas where Sabahaddin's ideas are most materialized. Before that, *Say-ü Tetebbü Mecmuası* (Work and Investigation Journal) published in Edirne in 1910 and *Müşahede* (Observation) magazine published in 1919 also included Sabahaddin's ideas (Tütengil, 1954, p. 63). But only the most systematic ones and those which acted as the representative of *Science Sociale* in Turkey would be in Mehmet Ali Sevki Bey's journal and society.

With the activity of Mehmet Ali Şevki in the *Muallimler Birliği* (Teachers Union), the publications of Mehmet Ali Şevki would appear in the *Muallimler Birliği Mecmuası* (Journal of Teachers Union) and in the *Mülkiye Mecmuası* (Civil Service Journal) in the 1930s. The *İnsan* (Human) journal of Ziyaeddin Fahri Fındıkoğlu and *İş* (Work) journal published by Hilmi Ziya Ülken, can be said to have influenced the next period in terms of expressing similar ideas. These journals did not only represent the thoughts of Prince Sabahaddin but should be considered important in terms of "Le Playist knowledge" to be transferred to the next period. The *Sosyoloji Dergisi* (Journal of Sociology), published under the chairmanship of Hilmi Ziya Ülken in 1942, would become the place where the most common and effective products of the Sabahaddin School were given. With the *Türk Sosyoloji Cemiyeti* (Turkish Sociological Society) to be established in 1949, it can be asserted that sociological researchers gathered and institutionalized within the framework of Prince Sabahaddin's understanding (Türk Sosyoloji Cemiyeti, 1950, p. 137-38).

Both national and international developments played an important role in the prominence of the Le Play-Sabahaddin school in the post-World War II era. After the one-party period, together with the DP (Democrat Party) government, not only were the RPP's (Republican People's Party) past practices criticized but also those of the Durkheim-Gökalp school as the dominant sociological understanding of the single-party period. At the same time, the new proposals of the developmental modernization approach to the underdeveloped countries under the leadership of the United States coincided with Prince Sabahaddin's "liberalism" and sociological perspective. The US development program on Turkey "Turkey: An Economic Appraisal", prepared by Max Weston Thornburg and translated to Turkish as "*Türkiye Nasıl Yükselir?*" (How Turkey Arises?), resembled the title of the Sabahaddin's work, "*Türkiye Nasıl Kurtarılabilir?*" (How Turkey Can Be Saved?). The analogy between these two books was emphasized even in that period (Tütengil, 1954, p. 4).

The "modernization theory", which would emerge in the post-war period all over the world, tends to address the common "village problem" in underdeveloped countries where capitalist development is delayed. The way of solving this problem by gaining widespread and "real" knowledge of the village would be achieved through the "rural sociology" studies, which were developed by Le Play methodology.

5. The Making of Rural Sociology in Turkey

Populism, one of the six basic principles of Kemalism, attaches special importance to the peasantry in the creation of national identity. In Turkey, the conceptualization of the peasantry, fed from a theoretical content of 19th century romantic nationalism, made to glorify the "pure" and "unchanged" nature of the national essence against the urban identity. For this view, urban identity was often identified as the center of capitalism and cosmopolitanism. In dialogue with this perspective, monographic studies were handled in the "Peasantism" (*Köycülük*) branches of the People's Houses (*Halkevleri*) to define the "imagined" national essence of the peasantry before the development of a rural sociology field in Turkey. These studies, which emphasize how a peasantry, which was left out of the Ottoman past, developed with the republic and became the basis of national existence, led to the creation of an "imaginary" image of the peasantry instead of a "real" one (See, Karaömerlioğlu, 2006).

In the period after the Second World War, in correlation with rural studies developed around the world, two basic approaches of sociology in Turkey became dominant. The first of these was the Le Play-Sabahaddin school aiming to form a unique synthesis with Ziya Gokalp's thought established under the umbrella of the *Sosyoloji Dergisi* (Journal of

Sociology) of which Hilmi Ziya Ülken was the chairman. The other one would be created by the younger generation of sociologists who returned to Turkey from abroad after studying modern sociological methods. In this second group, Niyazi Berkes, Behice Boran, Mediha Berkes and later İbrahim Yasa replaced an economic-based analysis rather than a culturalist approach at the center of their sociological views (See, Yıldırmaz, 2017).

After the expulsion of Berkes and Boran from the university under the pretext of making communist propaganda at the beginning of the period, the Le Play-Sabahaddin School develops its understanding of sociology as the only method in village studies. The most important element of this school is the effort to define sociology studies from a so-called "non-political" perspective. This understanding, which is also mentioned in the editorial introduction article titled "*Maksad*" (Intention) in the first issue of *Sosyoloji Dünyası* (World of Sociology), is defined as not to "confuse politics with science " (1951). This critique intended to make an "anti-communist" confrontation with Marxist sociology.

This so-called "non-political sociology method" discourse, which becomes hegemonic in the field of rural studies in Turkey, has also adopted the method of Georges Gurvitch to get strong intellectual support for itself. Gurvitch's sociology, which opposes Durkheim's sociology, provides a layered and in-depth theory of sociology. But as Vahap Sağ states, Gurvitch's sociology has been understood quite incorrectly due to using the terms "method" and "technique" interchangeably (Sağ, 1982, p. 307-08). The attempt of sociologists in Turkey to identify Gurvitch's methodology from an anti-communist perspective ended with glorifying Gurvitch's objections on explications based on "singular-causality" perspective. In this way, by integrating "in-depth sociology" perspective of Gurvitch to Le Play's monograph "technique", they aimed to praise this "mixture" as the only acceptable "method" in sociological studies.

After the Second World War, the widespread development of rural sociology studies on Turkey would not only be practiced by native researchers but also by foreign scholars who were mostly using the modernization theory paradigm in their studies. Leading researchers in this period such as Paul Stirling, Barbara and George Helling, Daniel Lerner, Richard Robinson would also analyze the relationship of modernization and rural structures in Turkey (See, Kolars, 1962). As Cangül Örnek mentions in detail, in this period sociological studies in Turkey were mostly constructed under the effect of this US-based scientific understanding (Örnek, 2015, p. 194-255). To put it in another way, the Le Play-Sabahaddin school in Turkey, which was overshadowed under the one-party rule for many years, coincided with the modernization theory paradigm and determined each other directly.

All these studies have led to the definition of a different peasantry through sociological studies, unlike the one-party Kemalist Peasantist approach. The "imagined" peasantry of the single-party period as a descriptor of the romanticized national identity began to be replaced with the "real" and "underdeveloped" peasantry during this period. This leads to the definition of the relationship between village development and sociology in a complementary interaction, and rural sociology also "politicizes" at a level that assumes the key role of development. This "new" knowledge on the peasantry, which constitutes the basic scientific background of the developmentalist third world analyses of the period, would have a direct impact on the formation of political and academic knowledge, especially in the 1960s.

6. Rural Development and Sociology

When Cahit Tanyol concluded his study "*Peşke Binamlısı* Village", he needed to express his views on the development of the villages as follows:

> At the time of this investigation, the village problem for the party in power was at the forefront of its propaganda. However, their aim in assisting the villages was only a vote-hunting, deprived of any plans and programs. (…) We explained how the assistance to the village and the villagers should be made in a plan and program, in a way that would be done in the conditions of those times and system. Unfortunately, although some American universities were interested in our study as a social report, those who held the social and economic fate of the country insisted on the same erroneous understanding of rural development and continued to impose a deadlock (Tanyol, 1961, p. 55-56).

The fact that Tanyol complained of this indifference in his "social report" on the villages represents a clear differentiation from the previous period. It reveals a different understanding in an "open letter" written by Hilmi Ziya Ülken to the Ministry of National Education, in the early stages when village sociology did not develop (Ülken, 1954, p. 61, 64-65). In this letter, Ülken stated that monographs needed to be prepared to understand the "realities" of the village and that this should be considered as part of a state-supported social reform within a centralized administration. Tanyol is no longer talking about the pursuit of "reality" but the implementation of "social reform". It can be asserted that, by the end of the period, the re-definition of the peasantry through sociological research was completed with a certain perception of reality and now it was the time of the implementation of reforms through using the knowledge of that reality.

The problem of rural development has also been discussed in the single-party period. But at that time, development was meant to improve the means of agricultural production and technical infrastructure. For example, in an article in *Cumhuriyet* newspaper at the beginning of the period in question, the factors affecting development were listed as follows:

Nine moral agents influence the peasant development. 1-To eliminate the conflicts between the peasants and neighboring villagers, 2-To remove the difference of honor and influence and privilege between a village population, 3-To awaken trust and affection towards the gendarmerie and district officers who are in close contact with the villagers on behalf of the state, 4-To make publications that will be read by the peasant with interest and enjoyment, 5-To teach the peasants the laws and regulations that are related to them in a proper way, 6-To save the villagers from the kinds of scriveners in the cities, who are benefiting from the purity of the villagers and diverge them to wrong paths and unfair cases, 7-To make ways of collecting taxes from the villagers most suitable form, 8-By reviewing the village law to reform the authority of the village headmen (*muhtar*) without giving the chance of abuse, 9-To make a detailed inspection of the village budgetary by taking its evaluation out from the rogue formal way as it is today (Aren, 20 November 1946).

As can be seen above, rural development was perceived as an educational, cultural and technical problem. However, an article by Nadir Nadi again in *Cumhuriyet* newspaper soon states that this problem should be solved with another perspective in this period.

The situation of our villagers, who do not have any clothes other than the shirts they are wearing, is embarrassing in the name of Republican Turkey. This situation cannot be corrected with brilliant speeches or great ideas. It is necessary to get into the village, to understand the social structure of the Turkish villagers and to learn their private problems well. There is no other way to find a cure (Nadi, 28 November 1946).

Nadi wants us to learn the "realities" of the village for the development of the rural areas. This call exactly resembles the call made by the rural sociology protagonists. But this call does not last long. During the period when village sociology studies increase their practices, the idea of seeing and understanding the reality of the villagers becomes more dominant than the problem of rural development. The main reason for this would be the fact that the DP government has made the villagers strong both politically and economically due to the economic development in the early years of its rule.

The resumption of the rural development discourse would begin again in 1956-1957, when the DP entered the crisis both politically and economically, and would continue even more intensively until the end of the period. It would be meaningful to follow this development on the pages of the *Forum* magazine, which is widely followed by the intellectuals of the period.

Forum magazine was functioning as a platform in which the economic and political-administrative policies that are going to be installed after the May 27, 1960 military intervention in Turkey, were discussed. The intellectuals who wrote in *Forum* had an

especially active role in the formation of the basic institutions of the new state structure to be established in the period after the coup. The concepts of development and planning are first discussed in the *Forum* magazine and a state-oriented planning alternative to socialist planning is proposed following the new developmental perspective that has become hegemonic in the international academic and political fields (Somel, 2009, p. 325).

The discussions in *Forum* first began with an article by Aydın Yalçın on how urban and peasant culture can be transformed. Yalçın, who calls the old type of culturalist understanding "village romanticism", points out that it is necessary to remove the obstacles to the development of the village from a similar culturalist perspective (Yalçın, 1 May 1955). From this point of view, Yalçın repeats the thoughts of the dominant developmental approach of the period. His assertion bases on the "reformation" of the old "*Gemeinschaft*" structures, which stands as an obstacle on the way to the development to ease the transition to "*Gesselschaft*" structures. In the next issue on the "Forum of the Readers" section of the magazine, there was an article supporting the perspective of Yalçın (Çetintürk, 15 May 1955). In the same issue, Metin And says that a prominent village novel writer of the period, Mahmut Makal, depicts the reality of the villagers in his stories, but this needs to be done by rural sociology studies (And, 15 May 1955). In two different articles by And, it is stated that studies of rural sociology have developed and they have come a long way in determining the peasant reality. Mehmet Kaya, who claims that Makal's efforts in this direction were formed by both ideological and non-scientific methods, offers a more "scientific" perspective than Makal's (Üstünök, 1 June 1955; Kaya, 15 June 1955). Here the similarities with Prince Sabahaddin's followers in their search for "non-political scientific" methodology became very apparent.

After these discussions, Aydın Yalçın agrees with the other commentaries and writers that the development business should be based on scientific foundations (Yalçın, 1 January 1956). From that time on, there appear long comments and suggestions for rural development, especially on the pages reserved for readers' comments of *Forum* during 1957. Two or three different articles in each issue give opinions on rural development. What is interesting here is that the discussion has come to an agreement at a certain common point. The issue of rural development, especially discussed at the level of cultural barriers to development, has been moved to a different dimension based on the criticism of this idea. Opinions on development meet in a common understanding, which is shaped by Kemal Karpat's articles. He says that development is a holistic issue and that there should be a holistic understanding of "country development" instead of putting rural development as a separate category. Karpat also presents the roadmap for the developmental understanding that would be transferred to the

next period by stating the institutional principles of the development plan that can be accepted and supported internationally (Karpat, 1 August 1957). The importance of the Karpat's article lies not in the fact that it is the first time to address these issues as such, but in the acceptance of the formula on the rural development for all discussants in *Forum*. Ultimately, Karpat argues that rural development should be based on a "real" peasantry based on scientific and sociological principles:

> Although rural development programs vary according to the specific conditions of each country, they all have a common aspect. It is to see the peasant as a fully qualified, respectful person in all respects and to admit that the word "village" refers to a community of people, not underdevelopment. Thus, the "sacrificial" intellectual who will be the custodian of the peasants and bring the so-called "civilization" to them is replaced by the expert sociologist, who closely analyzes the village and knows the peasantry. The peasant is given real possibilities of development instead of emotional speeches which do not rely on sound principles (Karpat, 15 June 1957).

In the same article, Karpat points to another author who has been writing on the pages of *Forum* for a long time, saying that we can derive the information necessary for rural development from such studies. The writer that Karpat mentions is Halil Aytekin, who writes under the pen name *Harmandalıoğlu* and who has regularly presented the "income" and "expenditure" reports of the peasant families, meaning the "family budgets", since the 64th issue of *Forum*. Halil Aytekin is a village teacher who also published the magazine *Yağmur ve Toprak* (Rain and Soil). He writes under the name *Harmandalıoğlu* because he claims that he was threatened by the Minister of National Education at the time, Tevfik İleri, to be dismissed from teaching. He says that he will not leave this name anymore even if he declares his identity from the *Forum* pages after the coup of 27 May 1960 and as he says the articles continues with the name of *Harmandalıoğlu* (Aytekin, 15 June 1960). *Harmandalıoğlu* combines the peasant family budgets and his peasant views with Le Play sociology's budget analysis. In this sense, we can say that he was a follower of the rural sociology understanding devoted to the Le Play/Sabahaddin school.

The discussions in *Forum* started over the rural development project, the critique of village novel, and the developmental approach of classical peasantism. But then, through discussions, a common point has been reached on the basis of a scientific sociological understanding of the real peasantry and the formation of a development plan through it. In this sense, it is possible to say that after the critique of old village romanticism, a new discourse of peasantism has been reached in the pages of *Forum* under the influence of developmentalism and the prevailing understanding of rural sociology.

7. Conclusion

During this period, it is observable that the Le Play-Sabahaddin sociology approach is a process of academic knowledge production, which is shared with the understanding of the US rural sociology and developmentalism. As a result of all these developments, peasantry in Turkey is redefined sociologically through academic interaction and struggles. Peasantry was not regarded only as an ideological entity as it was before, but as "real" beings revealed by these sociological researches. With the transformation of the rural structure, peasantry has become a "reality" such that its existence needs to be noticed by everyone. The main reason for this, unlike in the previous period, is that the peasantry, which can be isolated from the market and kept under state control through ideological mechanisms, is replaced by the peasantry formed by market relations. This new form of peasantry necessitates larger and more comprehensive projects. To realize these projects, real, scientific knowledge of the peasantry, which was not needed before, must be obtained. The task of obtaining this information was undertaken by representatives of the Le Play-Sabahaddin school, which had long been waiting to emerge in a sense. Revealing the reality of the peasants, the object of a sociological research also reshaped the perception of how a program can be implemented with this reality. Returning to the words at the beginning of this article, the research object whose knowledge is produced, also transformed the perception of the producer of knowledge. This necessitated new theoretical expansion in the light of new knowledge acquired in theoretical and practical fields. The peasantry has become "more real" in this sense and consequently has become more recognized.

The transformation of social structure in Turkey after the Second World War changed self-sufficient small scale agricultural production to cash-crop production and this paved the way for the rural-to-urban migration. These changes and developments necessitated the control of social transformation in order not to cause any probable social problems in the country. The Rural Sociology discipline flourished during this period in Turkey and its main goal was to find a solution to the "social problem" that occurred after this transformation. The previously dominant Durkheimian solidarist sociological approach lost its hegemony and the Le Play sociological method became the main academic discipline. With the help and the support of the American experts the followers of this sociological approach carried out numerous village surveys to maintain the effects of the transformation of the countryside in Turkey.

This sociological method, integrated with the developmentalist approach, dominated the main intellectual framework in Turkey in the post-war period. The developmentalist

approach, defines under-developed countries through the "modern" Western perspective. During the Cold War period, the developmentalist perspective was used as a tool to define the "social problems" of the peripheral countries and control their problems through social reform programs. In order to apply a program general information of a society is needed. The Rural Sociology studies created this knowledge. Consequently, the cooperation of developmentalism with the Rural Sociology field intellectually "re-defined" the Turkish peasantry. This new definition of social structure through the hegemony of the above mentioned intellectual background would also effect the developmentalist discourse of the 1960s, which is for the most part defined wrongly as having a "socialist perspective". It was not a socialist, but a more conservative anti-communist Cold War sociological perspective, defined here as the Le Play-Sabahaddin School, that inherited the next decade of Turkish politics.

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CHAPTER 5

ANTI-COMMUNISM IN TURKISH EDUCATION AND CHILDHOOD IN THE 1950S

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Abstract

The roots of anti-communism and conservative family ideology are well-founded aspects of national education in Turkey as a reflection of the country's joining the U.S-led Western bloc during the Cold War and the ideological as well as educational policies of the bloc at the end of the 1940s. When the Democrat Party (DP) came to power in Turkey in 1950, it pursued a program that synthesizes capitalist development, liberal economic rights and conservative values. In a context where anti-Communism became the state's official policy, the increasing role of religion in education and the tightening control in schools appeased the political and ideological concerns of the DP government. Looking at these measures was crucial not only to understand the major changes that took place in the Turkish education system but also to analyze the social and political dynamics of the entire period. This article aims to find answers to the following questions: "How did Turkey's childhood policy evolve in the 1950s? Which ideological values and tools were used effectively in this process?" What were the differences and similarities between the U.S educational policies and the practices of the Turkish government with regards to education? In order to answer these questions, we will ponder the role of anti-Communism in education together with the role of experts from America in designing the education system in Turkey. Subjects such as religious education, schooling, educational institutions, and anti-Communism that played a role in the political construction of childhood will be analyzed. Debates in the Turkish parliament, comments in newspapers, and journals such as *Yeni Okul*, *Forum*, and *İlk Öğretim* (New School, Forum and Primary Education), published for educators, are the main sources used in this research.

Keywords: Education, Childhood, Anti-Communism, Turkey, Democrat Party.

1. Introduction

From the second constitutionalist period to the early years of the Turkish republic, all political debates, including the definition of what is *national* as well as the legal and the political framing of citizenship, shaped the political envision of childhood. In the first two decades of the republic, the solidarist and corporatist approach met with a secular and nationalist line, and together they established the keystones of political socialization. Despite childhood experiences and the variety of pedagogical approaches of the time, the policies of the new regime prioritized the regime's survival by putting secular *citizenship merits* before regional/traditional relations. Between the years 1946 and 1950, the direction of the Republican People's Party's (CHP) policies towards the United States of America (U.S) and the idea of liberalization did not change the *ethos of citizenship* or the basic dynamics of political socialization. After 1950, however, when the CHP rule came to an end, it became debatable whether one could talk about a major change on the scale of a revolution regarding state policies towards education and childhood.

The political atmosphere of the Cold War, which had started in the last years of the CHP rule came to the forefront during the rule of the Democrat Party (DP) as it affected not only economic but also socio-political aspects of life including issues of childhood and education. In this period, children received American aid (in the form of milk powder and biscuits) at school and as a part of this aid, American culture started to have a greater impact, especially in cities of Turkey. The spread of American comics, Hollywood movies, and the American cuisine were the first signs of the cultural influence. On the one hand, Turkish bureaucracy was content with the improving relations, both politically and economically, with the U.S, while, on the other hand, it was afraid of the possible harm of the cultural influence, which, they believed, might spoil the "*national* ones".[1] This dilemma was more tangible when education and other processes of childhood construction were concerned.

As the leading country of Western Bloc—of which Turkey has been a part—the U.S anti-Communism, which was based on conservative education and family ideology, also found a place in Turkey in the 1950s. During the period of DP governments, when anti-Communism was deemed crucial for national survival, the extension of religious education and implementing stricter inspection mechanisms in schools appear as important factors not only to understand the changes in education but also to analyze the political dynamics of the whole

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1   In 1953, this dilemma was also reflected by H. Hüsnü Ciritli in journal named *Yeni Okul,* which published informative articles about the education system in the USA: "I fell disappointed seeing our children shouting and walking around like cowboys or native Americans in street of our big cities, and also I feel like there is a massive treat coming slowly from the unexpected one" (Ciritli, 1953).

period. In this study, we will briefly go over the effects of anti-Communism on education and childhood in the U.S given that American experts played a major part in re-organizing Turkey's system of education. We will also analyze the dynamics that affected the political construction of childhood, particularly in relation to religious education, schooling, and anti-Communism in educational institutions. Our study will draw on material from parliamentary debates, news items, and certain magazines (*Yeni Okul, Forum*, and *İlk Öğretim*) which were issued for educators of that period.

2. Anti-Communism and Education in the 1950s: The U.S and Turkey

During the Second World War and the post-war period, educational materials for children were mostly inspired by the anti-fascist approaches of the time. Among these, left wing and socialist writers took the lion's share. During this period, because anti-communism had not totally taken root in the U.S and Europe, a libertarian point of view continued to dominate the texts written for children. Children's literature of this period consisted of themes such as the struggle of ordinary people as well as the daily hardships of oppressed groups including peasants and the proletariat. However, this democratic environment started to change in the late 1940s as the Cold War took off and President Truman directly used children's education and literature as a tool to manufacture consent from the U.S public to accept his foreign policy preferences.[2] On the one hand, the curriculum was redesigned, while, on the other, the decision-makers extended their propagandist activities and aimed at parents and educators.

In Turkey, Nihal Atsız thought that the education system was dominated by socialist values and directly targeted the Minister of Education Hasan Ali Yücel and other left wing intellectuals as those who were responsible. Writing an open letter to the then prime minister Şükrü Saraçoğlu, Atsız claimed that communists in the Ministry of Education and the related institutions intoxicated children and he called for Yücel's resignation (Atabay, 2005). As one of his targets, the writer Sabahattin Ali sued Atsız for violating his right to live. Atsız received a sentence for six months but later it was reduced and eventually suspended on the account of provocation. Following the end of the Second World War, in the context of Truman doctrine and Marshall Aid, CHP considered education and anti-Communism together but it was the DP that took the real steps. In the struggle against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), American leaders also focused on economic productivity, scientific and technological advances, for they believed that achievements in these fields would provide American people

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2   Fearing that left-wing and socialist parties would gain power in post-war Europe as well as Greece and Turkey would be affected by Soviet, Truman had to convince Americans about the aid to be sent to Europe. Therefore, he exaggerated the treat of Communism by appointing a special duty to the schools (Hartman, 2008).

with supremacy and security during the Cold War. Against this background, investments in education increased significantly. An effective strategy to surpass Europe's success in education was attempted giving priority to natural sciences. Those tactics of the Cold War improved the quality of educational policy which had given priority to competitive individuality. However, anti-Communist propaganda surrounded children at home and in schools. The main claim was that communism wanted to corrupt the American family and children by infiltrating into education in the late 1940s. During the Korean War, militarist factors also added to the anti-Communist propaganda in the U.S.

In the 1950s, during the height of McCarthyism, fear, anxiety, and doubt became inseparable aspects of the hegemonic discourse at the center of which were children. Policies associated with Senator Joseph McCarthy showed that anti-Communism was not only influential in the U.S foreign politics but also in intellectual and cultural life. We can talk about a comprehensive process of inspection and control ranging from Hollywood to radio programs, from newspapers to publishers and libraries. This process, which was nothing but a "witch-hunt," also infiltrated children's publishing as well as school curriculums. The content and distribution of children's books as well as the terms of admission to public libraries were shaped in accordance with the tenets of McCarthyism. On the one hand, the author's of children's books , who were known or thought to be leftist, were banned; editors and publishers were stigmatized; and so-called "inconvenient" books were removed from school libraries (Mickenberg, 2006). On the other hand, new propagandist arguments were added to course books that were intended to influence readers against Communism. The Federal Civil Defense Administration[3] and related departments of the U.S army sponsored and prepared these course books. Movies ranging from documentary to sci-fi became a part of the propaganda regime, which targeted both adults and children.

The political wave dominating the New World puts compulsory education and family at the center of anti-Communist propaganda regarding children and childhood. The white, Protestant, middle class American family in the post-war era was conceived of as the "first front line of the war" against Communism. The unprecedently high birth rates, the change in traditional gender roles, the diminishing control of parents on their children made anti-Communist politicians uncomfortable. It was claimed that Communism is the primary enemy of family and that any alienation among family members would be exploited by Communism. This is why McCarthyism advocated raising children strictly in line with family and national

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3   Federal Defense Administration was formed in 1950 by order from Truman and became an official governmental body in 1951. It was publishing posters and papers emphasizing "treat of communism" under propaganda and being an important institution in American domestic affairs.

values with the object of preventing Communism and juvenile crime, which were the two main sources of anxiety for conservative groups at that time (Mickenberg, 2006).

School education, which was intended to be in coordination with the prioritization of family, was also regarded as *front line*. Bureaucrats and politicians, who worried about Communist infiltration, wanted to control all school activities. Accordingly, not only Communism but all collectivist views such as socialism and New Deal were also condemned and excluded from school curriculums. Therefore, uncritical patriotism and economic liberalism became the backbone of the education system, which was deprived of philosophical debates and critical thinking, with the help of civil society.

Another pillar of anti-Communist policies in education concerned educators. According to Mickenberg, in the first half of 1950s, the oath of allegiance was compulsory for teachers in several states in the U.S. Teachers were required to explicitly state that they were anti-Communists in order to prove their patriotism in front of directors, colleagues, and parents. Hartman points out that there were uncertain number of teachers who changed their pedagogical approach as a result of anti-Communist oppression. In addition, self-censoring was common among teachers due to the fear of losing their jobs (Hartman, 2008). In the 1950s, teachers were supervised by "informer" parents and students, who were "authorized" to monitor and inspect teachers and course books. Moreover, the "unwelcomed institutions" were listed in many states, and teachers who were members of them were ostracized from the profession on a legal basis.[4] Starting from the first days of the 1950s, guiding materials were created for teachers on the duty to fight against collectivist messages and arguments. Those materials would later be distributed to countries engaged with anti-Communism such as Turkey.

2.1. From Single Party Regime to DP: Discussions on Education

In the 1950s, Turkey's economic relations with capitalist countries intensified and comprador bourgeoisie flourished. Becoming a NATO member by sending its own troops to the Korean War, Turkey wanted to have the communism threat alive with the aim of maximizing the economic, technical, and military support it received from U.S. During its ten years of rule, the DP turned anti-Communism into a government policy and part of a strategy to oppress the opposition parties.[5] The DP governments repeatedly resorted to anti-Communism discourse whenever there was a deadlock in domestic and foreign policy.

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4   As a result, many teachers were ostracized from profession while others were forced to leave union activism (Mickenberg, 2006).

5   The arrests targeted Turkish Communist Party and were made mostly in the heyday of Korean War. Increasing the 141st and 142nd articles of Turkish Penal Code was in the agenda. In the second half of the 1950s, the CHP took a tougher stance and in response the DP accused it of being Communist.

Turkey's attempts to be a part of the Western culture reached its peak when the country's membership process of NATO came to the table because NATO was not only important for political and military purposes but also for the sense of belonging to the liberal democrat culture of the West. This way, it became easier for Turkey to draw the ideological line between the liberal democratic world and Communism as the "other." The peril of Communism overlapped with USSR that targeted Turkey's territorial unity (Yılmaz&Bilgin, 2005-2006).[6]

During this period, Turkey's desire to be a part of the West's fight against Communism was visible on every level, that is, not limited to politics but also extended to the realm of economy. For instance, it is not surprising that in the Izmir Fair (Between 1950s-1960s) Eastern Bloc countries were blamed for communism propaganda but the U.S received favorable attention to its popular culture products such as coke and television (Durgun, 2013).The process of engaging in the capitalist system was reinforced by mechanization in agriculture, urbanization, and extending highways as the DP's "Little America" dream started to penetrate into daily life in the form of movies, advertisements, and consumer products (Örnek&Güngör, 2013). Meanwhile, education took its share of these changes and it became the domain in which anti-Communist propaganda was felt the most, perhaps with the exception of the Turkish army.[7]

The DP was prone to follow Western experts' suggestions and reports, particularly those from the U.S, in the realms of economy and military as well as education. Its close ties with the U.S made the DP shape its education strategies in line with the views of American experts. Especially in the first four years, U.S experts on education poured into Turkey together with American aid fund. Those experts prepared reports about primary school, secondary school, technical education, and teacher training. During this process, the experts committee collaborated with the National Education Directorate and the League of Teachers.[8] Education, like the army, was also under the influence of American culture as Turkish children started to be indoctrinated with national ethos and "Love for America" integrated with anti-communism.[9]

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6   When Marshall Aid from USA decreased and economic imbalances appeared at the end of the 1950s, Turkey started to build close relations with Soviets, especially in the field of economy.

7   In this matter, we can say that the activities in Teachers College of Columbia University were important. Updated texts "against collectivism" were prepared for teachers under Citizenship Education Project.

8   Within this respect, American experts coming to Turkey were welcomed by provincial directors of national education. In the spring of 1951, American Culture Council and Council of Teachers together hosted an expedition about American technical books. It was decided that 6000 informative films would be shown at schools with partnership of Directorate of National Education and American News Bureau.

9   American effect combined with liberalism was occasionally seen in child raising. This dates back to pre-DP period during and after the Second World War but reached its height at the end of the 1940s, especially with the introduction of multi-party system and elections in 1946..

The U.S experts' reports were widely consulted in the process of forming and revising school curriculums and teachers' training,[10] and especially in areas like public training and improvements in rural schools, which were issues of top priority for American experts. For instance, in his trip to countryside, Dickerman emphasized the role of teachers in public education and the importance of women's education. He also emphasized how proliferation of technological devices like radio channels affected daily life and underlined the importance of the leading role of village institutes in agricultural activities (Özgür, 1952). Kate Wofford, who was considered "a friend of Turkish nation" due to her contributions to post-WWII Turkish education, also underscored the significance of rural schools and exalted Turkish people with respect to their "modernity" in her home country (Karagöz, 1954a). During her period of duty in Turkey, she specialized in topics such as experience and leadership in education, the democratic view, development of necessary teaching and pedagogical skills, construction of an inclusive and comprehensive education system, ways to bring in girls to school, relation between girls' education and economic development, merging rural schools, accommodation for students, teachers self-questioning and self-improvement, educational infrastructure and staff (Durmaz, 1954). These examples show the critical role played by American experts in the establishment of the Turkish educational system in the 1950s.

It would not be wrong to argue that the main aim was to introduce radical changes in teacher training, public education, rural education, and village institutes, which were shaped in the single party period (Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Faaliyet Raporu, 1951). Education was considered essential for welfare, citizenship, public health awareness, which improved productivity and labor force in various vocations. As a result, public education was one of the leading topics on the agenda of the National Education Council Meeting VI [VI. Milli Eğitim Şurası] (Tuncor,1957).[11]

Other topics discussed before the council included teacher training, determining the reasons teachers quit, holiday schools and the activities for students to spend their free time, creating new schools for special children called "problem child", the inequality between the public and private schools, problems in public education, and the need to handle these problems as soon as possible (Tütengil, 1957a). The agenda of council was based on the relationship between vocational/technical education and economy/industry as well as ways

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10   These reports include the primary objectives, stages, and outcomes of education. It was Kate Wofford, who suggested to combine teachers training schools with village institutes.

11   In the same article, aims of public education is described as follows: eliminating illiteracy, enforcing national unity, social development, improving ideal of service, ethics training, giving love nature and history, giving domestic and foreign tourism knowledge.

to spread public education. The agenda had other topics including the orientation of general education to specific professions, the revision of content and hours of vocational classes and workshops, determination of school curriculum in line with the necessities of national economy, and training of staff (Forum Dergisi, 1957).

However, as one might expect, the process did not always go as smoothly as expected. American experts reported the difficulty of applying different education methods in rural and urban areas and that the teacher training system was not well-organized. Having similar ideas, some politicians from the DP changed the content of teaching certification [*Pedagojik Formasyon*] programs for teachers[12] and merged the programs of rural and urban schools (village institutes and teacher's training schools) teachers. Opposition parties, on the other hand, criticized the closing of village institutes and their transformation into primary schools by referring to these institutions' modernizing effects on village life. Apart from closing these progressive institutes, the new educational system did not meet the expectations of schooling, staff training, and increasing girls' school attendance. According to the opposition, girls' education and encouraging woman to be teachers were linked to motherhood and civic duty (Forum Dergisi, 1956a). Institutes were meeting the needs in accordance with the ideology of national education, raising healthcare, education, and administrative staff who were loyal to their village as well as spreading craft skills in public, and contributing to the economy of the country. Those were their unique assets (Tütengil,1956).

The DP also revised teachers' training programs. Proposals included readings about children's individual improvement, activities that would promote their independence, prioritization of applied courses along with theories, standardization of teachers' training and curriculums with focus on vocational and artistic topics (Arslan, 1952). Education provided in rural schools had always been a matter of debate.[13]Therefore, teachers were informed about the realities of village life and habits, and applied courses were seen as a way to increase student attendance in villages (Anıl, 1952). Additionally, it was also pointed out that teachers should take further responsibilities in village life, such as giving guidance for new schools in their areas (Binbaşıoğlu, 1952), and ensuring collective awareness through literacy projects (Çelik, 1952). The ideal teacher in the DP period was described as someone who would take on the mission of raising the country to the level of modern civilization not only by staying

12   Some courses including Sociology and History of Pedagogy in Teaching Certification Program were replaced with courses such as Psychology of Education and Sociology of Education, which was originated from the USA educational system. The contents of occupational publications for teachers were also radically changed.

13   Equivalents of village schools in USA were studied meticulously and final suggestions were shaped accordingly (Ülkümen, 1953a).

up to date on world and country affairs, but also by being constantly ready to shape his/her surroundings. For a village teacher, these requirements took a more concrete form that can be listed as knowing about the geographical cultural features of the village, raising public awareness about health, teaching new methods that would facilitate economic and household activities, and teaching reforms. On the other hand, urban teachers prioritized the knowledge of environment, the collaboration with student foundations, the improvement of cooperation with students, and the promotion of solidarity among teachers (Tütengil, 1957b).

There were recommendations to open gardens to enable students to apply what they had been taught in theoretical classes and promote their agricultural skills (Binbaşıoğlu, 1956). Educational practices were thought to provide local solutions for the public in line with the principles of a social state. A striking example was the planning of pavements between the village center and the school building by students as a part of their applied course (Binbaşığlu, 1954).[14] Productivity and organization were the essential tenets of this process. To make such a reform possible, a pedagogical transformation was necessary, which would incorporate the principles of communal life into the system of education as well as the integration of the scientific, economic, technical, spiritual, and emotional capacities. Along with the encouragement of students to get familiar with manufacturing and other aspects of economic and technical life, it was also desirable to combine the pedagogy of democracy with the pedagogy of work (Öztürk, 1952). Within this framework, school was the place in which life itself was supposed to be experienced (Binbaşıoğlu, 1953). Accordingly, the government gave priority to create technical workers with vocational education while, at the same time, transforming the existing educational system in line with conservative values and anti-Communism.[15]

It should also be noted that the relationship between the U.S and Turkey was reciprocal. Teachers from Turkey were also sent to the U.S with the aim of employing those teachers, who familiarized themselves with the U.S educational system, at vocational schools that were to be opened in major cities like Izmir and Istanbul (Tompkins, 1955).

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14   With this view, an ideal village is pictures as a place where all the young people support each other, no smoking and drinking, having cafes where only business is talked, safe and with children and youngsters attending school, symbolizing loyalty to Ataturk with bust, different views surviving together (Kurtuluş, 1952). Steps for develop the village are criticized as being too romantic, fanciful by the opposition politicians. According to them, development issue should be handled with a holistic view and realism. With this respect, productivity, production, and effective demand increase are suggested as solutions. Main elements of development were listed as increasing mobilization from country to city, establishing the proper infrastructure in urban areas, realizing individualist citizens out of patriarchal families, providing people with the opportunities to live by in cities, ensuring people to have a realist/secular vision based on winning and success (Yalçın, 1956).

15   Not only primary and high schools, but also universities were revised with some models. The most typical example of this were ODTU (Middle East Technical University) and Ankara University. Located close to Soviet Republic, the university built in Erzurum was especially significant in raising technical labor and mechanization as well as regional development and public health. It also focused on practice as well as theory (Garlitz,2013)

Pre-school education was another area that needed to be revised by U.S expertise. Accordingly, Turkish teachers observed pre-school classes and wrote reports. Consequently, it was emphasized that it was important to open pre-school institutions with the aim of preventing a dangerous and harmful community profile pointing out how important pre-schools are for the children's social development, personal ideas and independence, solidarity, development of emotional, artistic, intelligence, and also physical development (Karagöz, 1954b).

These were steps that were taken away from the solidarist-corporatist approach of the early republic and were requirements of capitalist production relations, which are to be discussed under the title of democracy. In this respect, reports, journal letters, and articles by bureaucrats and teachers[16] that were sent to the U.S from the Ministry of National Education in the 1950s were particularly interesting. In 1953, when the work of the education council and new draft laws were ongoing processes, "the features of an ideal teacher" took inspiration from the U.S, reflecting the wish to implement the same regulations in Turkey. Therefore, the above-mentioned features of an ideal teacher included a good education and vocational training, efficiency in interpersonal relations, physical and mental health, familiarity with democratic group techniques, creativity, a critical view, and the ability to transmit knowledge (Arslan, 1953). It cannot be ignored that the program had a specific emphasis on democracy. Along with the reflections on visits to schools, libraries, and teacher training institutions, it was not a coincidence that observers devoted significant place to reflections on raising "a democratic citizen" in the U.S journal articles. These articles underlined the relationship between the democracy, education, and individuality while they concluded that absolute equality in economic and social terms was not possible (Ülkümen, 1953b). Additionally, the U.S "constituted" luxury consumer products in every aspect of daily life in Turkey showing that it was the peak of the development of a country (Kolçak, 1953). In the outline of the U.S pedagogy system, priority was given to science, history, profession, and philosophy at schools as well as to the balance between home and school (Alpan, 1952). Moreover, examples were not limited to the U.S, and the educational system of other Western countries was also referred to from time to time (Godwin and Akman, 1952).

A local version of McCarthyism shaped the approach to childhood and education in Turkey in the 1950s. A pillar of this approach consisted of spreading religious and conservative values starting from primary school, while the other pillar was inspecting educators and

16   For example, in 1952 bureaucrats and teachers who went to Florida University Teaching College analyzed the U.S education system under the "Turkish Project" and attended foreign language courses. Many of them, including Osman Ülkümen, published their reflections in a journal named *Yeni Okul*.

children's publishing in line with anti-Communist concerns. We can easily see these tendencies in the statements of Ministers of National Education during the DP years, especially Tevfik İleri, who assumed a tough stance against communism.[17]

2.2. Religious Education to be used as an Antidote of Communism During DP

The DP was founded on a balance between Celal Bayar's secular views and the conservative arguments of religious freedom and freedom of thought. This balance not only rendered the discourse range and applications rich in variety but also served a political purpose. On the one hand, the DP tried to prove to republicans that they did not give up on secularity, and, on the other hand, they aimed to meet the demands of conservative actors.[18] With that in mind, it is possible to argue that during the DP governments, religion was promoted in the public sphere and used as a medium in the fight for political hegemony while following modernist arguments. As pointed out by Ali Gevgilili, Islam for the DP was the auxiliary power of "the action program in favor of westernization and capitalist" priorities, which took the form of a "white revolution" (Gevgilili, 1987). Moreover, the ruling party wished to have this power under its absolute control. Known as conservative reform arguments, conservative groups preferred negotiation and combined religious discussions with the capitalist developmentalist approach.[19] Islamist groups, which had to carry out underground activities during the single party period, started to be visible with the encouragement of DP policies. In the post-1950 period, Islamist groups had some conservative members of the DP MPs blame previous CHP governments for raising "children who were unaware of their own religion" (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 1950a) and threatened to take action about it. Emboldened by several regulations[20] such as the recitation of azan back in Arabic, the increase in the number of Qur'an courses and religious vocational schools, Islamic actors forced the government to "go further." In this context, the DP was also exposed

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17 The main actors of National Education during the DP years were as follows: Hüseyin Avni Başman, Nuri Özsan (parliament member), Tevfik İleri, R. Salim Burçak, Hüseyin Celal Yardımcı, Ahmet Özel, Tevfik İleri (second time as minister), Hüseyin Celal Yardımcı (second time as minister), Tevfik İleri (parliament member), Mehmet Atıf Benderlioğlu. Among these ministers, the most effective one was Tevfik Ileri, who served as different cabinet ministers approximately 4 years in total. As the chairman of Turkish Students' Association (MTTB), Ileri joined the the DP thanks to his nationalist-conservative ideology and made critical decisions while he was the Minister of National Education.

18 Demirel argues that Tanel Demirel Bayar objected the recitation of azan in Arabic and Qur'an recitations on radio. Menderes was the most suitable person to be affected by religious groups. Demirel also added that Menderes's relationship with conservative groups was contingent on changes in balances of power (Demirel, 2011).

19 In his analysis published in *Türk Düşüncesi*, Sinan Yıldırmaz stated that during the DP rule, conservative groups had the chance to express themselves directly. Mentioning the ideas of Baltacıoğlu, Yıldırmaz also examined the relation between development and religion (Yıldırmaz, 2011).

20 There were different dimensions of "politics of religion" in the early years of the DP (Nal, 2005).

to bigotry and fanaticism blamings on a frequent basis,[21] and the topics of childhood and education were among the main topics of discussion. As the ideological perspective of the second constitutionalism and the early republican cadres employed secular/national merits instead of religious divineness, their ideological and political framing of childhood faced not only liberal and conservative but also Islamist objections. Combining the ideas of economic liberalism and conservatism, the DP tried to incorporate these objections into government programs, political speeches, and the new educational system.

According to Ismail Kaplan, the DP programs were "totally a result of Cold War mindset" (Kaplan, 2005). The DP cadres were afraid and suspicious of left-wing movements while they also criticizing the single party period regarding the regulations about the economy and secularism. The two tendencies cross path at the freedoms of thought and religion. The DP government's general attitude was to bridge economic liberalism with nationalist-conservativism, and that also shaped its attitude towards education and childhood. The education policy of the DP, which can be summarized as the promotion of "moral/religious values" over the reign of rationalism and empiricism (Kaplan, 2005), was actually a search of balance between "humanitarian values" and "moral values" based on "national ethics", in Füsun Üstel's words (Üstel, 2005).[22] Even though the DP's education policy did not foresee a decisive break from that of the early republican era, it was a part of the strategy to consolidate its popular support. This approach, which was later described as "moral development" by right-wing politicians, suggested that science and technical progress are not enough on their own to depict a "divineness" powered by faith and grandmothers as the backbone of the society. In this respect, children were expected to carry out their duty and professions under the motivation of serving the country with strong bonds with Turkish morals and traditions (*İlk Öğretim Dergisi*, 1955). Therefore, secular resources of the republic, except for nationalism, were subordinated under the reason of reconciling religious groups with the "regime", engaging them within the system and hindering communism.

It is possible to talk about both continuities and shifts in opinion between the CHP and the DP in terms of their approach to education and childhood. An example of the former is the continuation of the national ethos and obedience-oriented indoctrination from a single party to a multi-party system. In both cases, we see that ethno-cultural and political forms of national

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21 Islamist groups took the DP's coming to office as an opportunity to criticize the republican project. Reactions took the form of the increase in vandalism against Ataturk busts. In cities, where busts were attacked such as Kırşehir, protests against reactionism appeared as well (Öymen,2009). The DP government then had no choice but to pass the law that is known as "Conservation of Atatürk's legacy."

22 The government programs that were concerned with education the most corresponded to the second Menderes government between March 9th 1951 and May 17th 1954.

identity were imposed on children and through them nationalist indoctrination was carried to parents. In that regard, the persistence of primary school curriculum, which was launched in 1948 with the purpose of nationalization, continued to be in effect for another twenty years despite all reform attempts (Üstel, 2005). Nonetheless, the DP policies differed from previous ones in defining the place of religion in education. In addition, they extended the ethno-cultural framework towards Sunni Islam. While the CHP made religious courses optional and opened institutions that provided "modern religious education"[23] prior to the 1950 elections, religious education become an integral part of public education in the DP years. The CHP's above-mentioned step was not only about building closer ties with the Western Bloc, but it also aimed to respond to the opposition parties' objections. Moreover, the overall attitude of civic and military bureaucracy, as the backbone of CHP cadres, continued its insistence on secular education along with a solidarist-corporatist worldview. The DP, on the other hand, linked education directly with anti-Communism, economic liberalism, and its project to establish close relations with the U.S. Within this framework, religious and moral education was regarded as the guarantee of national unity, and managers as well as school teachers had to assume additional responsibilities compared to the 1930s and 40s.[24]

Another education reform made during the CHP period was initiated under the leadership of the prime minister Şemsettin Günaltay, who was known for his conservative views. A memorandum, published in February 1, 1949, laid the ground for students to be able to take religious courses two hours a week as an extracurricular activity for fourth and fifth grade students with their parents' approval. The courses were scheduled on every Saturday afternoon and they were not related to children's academic success. Parents, who wished their children to attend religious course, were to inform related authorities of their consent at the beginning of the semester while no procedure was necessary for other parents; in other words, all students were exempt from the course as long as their parents stated otherwise. As soon as the DP came to power, this arrangement was changed and religious courses were included directly into the curriculum with a memorandum on November 7, 1950 (Öğretmen Rehberi, 1958; Şahin, 2012).This was in accordance with the objections coming from conservative and Islamic groups, who advocated that "the ones who do not want the course should inform,

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23   CHP brought about the question of secularism regarding the DP policies in the seventh general assembly. After the general assembly, strict executions of secularity were relaxed and, in the same vein, the first theology faculty was opened in Ankara University in which religious officials were trained. Some tombs were re-opened for public visits with legal changes on the law that mandated the closure of Islamic monasteries and tombs. In 1949, religion classes entered primary school curriculums as elective courses (Nal, 2005).

24   Tevfik Ileri, the then Minister of National Education, gave a speech in Teachers Association National Unity Moral Education Congress and gave some hints about his views on the relation between anti-Communism and religion/morals. (Milliyet, 1951, April 24).

not the ones who want them." The aim was not to facilitate the process but rather to meet conservative groups' demands and appease micro pressure groups.

Some DP MPs also stated that religious courses for fourth and fifth grade students were not enough. For instance, Mehmet Özbey, a DP MP of Burdur, advocated that religious courses should be compulsory rather than optional. Özbey also suggested that religious courses should start from the third grade since most village schools tended to give education only until the third grade. He called those religious courses an "antidote" of Communism and received a lot of support from his fellow DP MPs.[25] During budget discussions in parliament in 1955, Abdullah Aytemiz claimed that religious courses should be compulsory at all levels of education. Alluding to educational practices for non-Muslim groups, parents should be deprived of the right to choose on behalf of their children.[26] His speech on Islam and secularism caused harsh debates in parliament and the opposition party interpreted it as the government's stance. But they insisted on making religious courses compulsory (Milliyet, 1955, February 20). In the reflections of National Education Council Meeting V, we can see that there were attempts to render religious courses attractive for students, which would have them understand and respect ethical norms such as death and destiny as metaphysical fields. The council also decided to abstain from dogmatism and prioritize love and affection. As a result, religious courses became compulsory with credits (Seyhan, 1953).

In the coming years, DP politicians attempted to include Islam into the educational system as a precaution against the Communist threat and "radical activities." Some groups, who thought that CHP's understanding of secularity should be reformed in line with liberal values, also brought about similar arguments in the second half of the 1940s. However, unlike the CHP, the DP relied on "conservative" groups and the idea of "Turkish Muslim child" for justification.[27] In the National Education Council Meeting V (5-14 February, 1953) members declared their "loyalty to republican reforms" while they also discussed religious education. Despite objections against religious courses on the basis of maintaining secularism and

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25 Özbey said that religious courses should not be optional but compulsory because anyone without the fear of God might do all sorts of evil deeds and be a communist. He added that a community without morals would eventually collapse. For him, religious courses should start at third grade instead of fourth or fifth grade. (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 1950b).

26 Aytemiz stated that religious courses were only given at primary schools and merely optional. He also said that if parents didn't allow their children to attend the course, they would deprive their children of this honor for which they had no such right. For him, this was completely against Civil Code, which ordered parents to transfer their religion to children (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 1955).

27 A speech given by the Minister of National Education demonstrates the DP's attitude: "For us constructing bridges, highways and schools are the ways to serve the nation. Giving religious education is no different than a service for the nation, it is not about politics" (Milliyet, 1952, May 25).

Article 4 of the law that abolished the Department of Foundations and Religion [Evkaf ve Şer'iye Vekaleti], the then minister of education, Tevfik Ileri, defended religious courses for not being constitutional and but also useful for consolidating "national unity".[28] As a result, the council decided the inclusion of religious courses in student credits. A similar formula was pursued by the DP concerning secondary schools in 1956. The first indication was given by Adnan Menderes in Konya in January 7, 1956. In his speech, he said:

"Now I want to tell you about our concept of secularity. Secularity means the state of being separate from religion while it also means freedom of conscience. We do not have any hesitation separating state and religious affairs. However, when it comes to freedom of conscience, Turkish nation is Muslim and it will always be so. Indoctrinating its religion to new generations and transmitting the principles of Islam is the unquestionable requirement of staying Muslim. If there are no religious courses in schools, parents who want their children to be indoctrinated will be deprived of this opportunity. It is not nice to deprive Muslim children of the natural right to learn their religion. That kind of deprivation and impossibility is against freedom of conscience. As a result, it is a right decision to include religious courses into secondary school level. We believe that any nation without its religion cannot be everlasting" (Milliyet,1956).

The location of Menderes' speech and his audience was particularly symbolic.[29]Against the background of ongoing discussions of fanaticism, his speech addressed an enthusiastic crowd, which received strong criticisms from the opposition party. However, Prime Minister Menderes continued to lay emphasis on Islam as a constituent of national identity and advocated the extension of religious courses. In an article, the prominent conservative author, Peyami Safa, supported Menderes's promise about religious courses for being consistent with the DP's rhetoric from the beginning. It can be clearly seen that Safa's point was not incorrect given that Menderes' first government program brought the issue to the parliament (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 1950a). Safa, on the other hand, was in favor of religious courses as a government controlled "precaution" against reactionary activities. According to Safa, ninety percent of the nation demanded religious courses for their children and the ones who did not were only marginal groups.[30] What we see in Safa's views is the emphasise on Islam-based majoritarianism, which we will hear about more. Eventually, in September 1956, a

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28   The constitutional law professor Bulent Nuri Esen responded the critics of religious courses (Milliyet, 1953).

29   In the first years of the DP, reactionary demands were on the agenda such as forbidding women to be outside without headscarves and allowing men to marry more than one woman in the party congress in Konya. It was also suggested that religious courses should be extended to secondary and high schools (Öymen, 2009).

30   Safa wrote the following in a newspaper article: "Atheist and snob may not give their children consent to attend religious courses. They all have the right. But rejecting the demand of 90% is no business of a Prime Minister in a democratic country" (Safa, 1956).

cabinet decision replaced a free-time course in secondary school level with a religion class.[31]Attendance at this course, like its counterpart in primary school, was optional, but students, who took the course, had to pass the course to get through their education (Şahin, 2012).Similarly, in Autumn of 1956, the Ministry of National Education put another item on the agenda: giving "moral courses" along with religious courses in primary and secondary schools but the final decision was postponed.

The opposition disputed view evaluated the new arrangement of religious education with respect to the principle of objectivity. For them, adding Islamic religion to the national system of education was at odds with modern and contemporary values. Some authors criticized the content of religious education by pointing out problematic ideas in course books, some of which suggested that students along with their families should be and live like Muslims. According to the critics, such expressions set the stage for the revival of the old sultanate regime. They also compared current books with previous ones in order to emphasize the relative "objectivity" of the latter. [32]

In addition to permanent religious courses in formal education, the DP also opened several religious and vocational schools.[33] Conservative organizations played a significant role in the opening of such schools and they provided solutions for the accommodation problem of their students.[34]In this way, religious communities, which were previously excluded from the public sphere, continued their influence through their support for religious and vocational schools. There were many issues to be discussed including which courses were to be given to teachers' qualifications in religious vocational schools. At this point, an important disagreement arose within the Ministry of National Education and Directorate of Religious Affairs regarding the curriculum in the above-mentioned schools.[35]As some critics claimed,

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31   The Minister of Education, Ahmet Ozel announced the decision as follows: "It was decided that along with primary schools, there will be also religious courses at secondary schools. Having a meeting with the representatives from Faculty of Theology, Faculty of Language, History and Geograpy, as well as Religious Affairs directorate, we already prepared the curriculum for 1st and 2nd grades of secondary school" (Milliyet, 09 September 1956).

32   In this context, A. Halis's texts were alluded as an example of choosing Islam after studying each religion due to its suitability and simplicity (Mardin, 1956).

33   In an activity report dated 1951 by the Ministry of National Education, it was reported that the goal of turning religious vocational schools into schools was increasing employment (Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Faaliyet Raporu, 1951). First opened in 1951-52 in seven cities, religious vocational schools increased to seventeen cities between 1957-58 and served about 3000 students (İlk Öğretim, 1957).

34   The leading example is the İlim Yayma Cemiyeti (Science Dissemination Association).

35   It has been decided that in vocational schools along with religious courses, literature, maths, and foreign language would also be given by in-field-teachers. Teachers assigned by the Directorate of Religious Affairs Religious taught courses while other courses were taught by teachers assigned by the Ministry of National Education. Every few years, the curriculum was revised.

the Ministry of National Education had no choice but to report that all the precautions were taken so that there would be "no activity against reforms" (Milliyet, 1952, October 20). Moreover, the Religious Vocational School of Vefa initiated a gesture and prepared a commemoration for a symbolic figure and hero of the secular republics, namely the sub-lieutenant Kubilay, who was killed in the city of Menemen (near Izmir) but the controversies over religious fanaticism carried on. Additionally, the rapidly rising number of religious vocational schools triggered the questions (Şahin, 2012).

Two technical problems emerged with the inclusion of religious courses into thecurriculum and the extension of their scope as well as the opening of religious vocational schools. One was preparing new course books, and the other was teacher training for religious courses. In response, the government included religious courses into the curriculum of teacher training schools (Milliyet, 1951, September 1). In those schools, religious courses started to be compulsory in the ninth and tenth grades. By the end of the 1950s, everything was ready - including the laws - for High Islamic Institute. Opened in Istanbul, this institute took on the responsibility of training teachers for religious vocational schools as well as muftis and preachers who would later serve in the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Şahin, 2012).[36] The most important outcome of this process was the growing impact of conservative actors in education.

2.2.1. The Cold War in Schools in the 1950s: Control over Students and Lecturers

Aside from religious education, we should also focus on narratives of religious and national heroism, which became popular at the height of anti-Communism in the 1950s. In this period, there was an abundance of national ethos being transmitted (narrated) through sagas (legends) that were not much different from the examples of the early republican period. However, this time, anti-Communism and Islam came to prominence that went hand in hand with the Korean War and the 500th anniversary of Istanbul's conquest. With the Korean War, for instance, schools turned into an extension of the battlefront and politically affected students and educators. Students were encouraged to send gifts and letters to the soldiers fighting in Korea as a way of expressing solidarity and remembrance. During this period, schools organized Korean day celebrations and designed "Korean corners" in schools (Özcan, 2013). Since its establishment in the 1920s, the Turkish republic had been trying to give students a collective sense of collective space in history, geography and citizenship classes. Even though the Korean War took place far away from Turkey, the war geography was presented as Turks' former land in order to provide justification for sending Turkish

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36　During the opening of the institute, Tevfik Ileri said that the purpose of this establishment was to train qualified teachers who would give religious courses at secondary and teacher training schools (Milliyet 1959).

troops to such a distant location. In letters where the Turkish commander Tahsin Yazıcı was addressed as "father" and soldiers as "brothers," we observe that children identified with the army as a part of their family (Özcan, 2013).While synthesizing nationalism with the anti-Communist views, it is also possible to detect religious elements in the ideas of "Turkish forces fighting the communists" and the emphasis on "Turkish and Muslim ancestry." While adorning heroic elements with militaristic themes, students offer their loyalty by sending letters with their bloods spilled on them to the battlefield as a way to show their readiness to a part of the war but their age would not allow it (Özcan, 2013). By taking these examples into consideration, one can claim that the first years of the 1950s were critical in shaping the minds of children and adolescents in harmony with the ideological necessities of the Cold War (Özcan, 2013; Öztan 2014).Stories of bravery in the Korean War were not only limited to Turkish soldiers as they extend to the allies' similar deeds. In one story, the courageous acts of an American nurse are glorified (*İlk Öğretim Dergisi*, 1952). While Korea started to have a place among historical victories, in formal history writings the conquest of Istanbul and the Greco-Turkish War (also known as the Independence War in Turkey) were considered as examples of national power and awakening. Within this framework, concepts of border and distance lose their sense and consistency (Orhan, 1954 & Orhan, 1955).

Meanwhile, the rapprochement between the Turkish Armed Forces and civil schools was conspicuous. In the second half of the 1950s, the Ministry of National Education cooperated with military officers and organized events at schools, under the name of "National Defense Conferences." The aim of these events were to boost "heroic feelings" among Turkish adolescents (Milliyet, 1957). At the same time, revolution history classes were again on the agenda. In 1951, Ileri, the Minister of National Education, stated that the curriculum of Revolution History classes was revised and the principles of the Revolution were to be taught "impersonally" and "objectively" after listening to Enver Ziya Karal at the Turkish Revolution History Studies.[37]

The "Ottoman heritage" was another occasional source of reference in the construction of Turkish national identity. The "conquest" [*fetih*] of Istanbul was among the elements of national pride, and it was without doubt that the annual victory celebrations that were held during the Korean War featured a high level of militarism and national pride. Historical narratives weaved around this event, together with Sultan Mehmet the Conqueror's personality, and pre-Ottoman Istanbul was depicted as a miserable city in ruins and its

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37   Another decision was to underscore the significance and mission of UNESCO in curriculum (*Milliyet*, February 08, 1951).

commerce in the hands of foreigners. The Ottoman "conquest," in this context, brought about "salvation and reconstruction" by wiping out the exhausted empire of middle ages and starting a "new" order and reconstruction (Sürer, 1953).This was how the Ottoman image was portrayed in a positive light (Boran, 1953).In accordance with this narrative, Istanbul was handed to the Ottomans, who then turned it into the most glorious and important city of the world in the middle ages (Belen, 1953).[38] What we see in these texts is the self-confidence that derives from Muslim-Turkish ancestry (Öztan, 2012).This kind of worldview, that is, the capacity to make the world a better place due to one's ancestry, even bloodline, would also be functional in making sense of the Turkish presence in the Korean War. Not limited to this, it was seen that the official narrative also gave place to Kemalist interpretations. According to this, the regime continued to embrace Ataturk as the founding figure, military leader, and champion of Turkish nationalism (*İlk Öğretim Dergisi*, 1953).

As stated earlier, protecting children from Communism was the primary goal in the new curriculum during the DP years. However, the Ministry of National Education was not content merely with curriculum arrangements. Akin to CHP's last years in government, the DP made some efforts such as intervening schools' internal dynamics, controlling curricular and extra-curricular materials, and disciplining students in line with anti-Communist goals. The prior fields of focus were books and magazines within educational institutions. Libraries were re-modeled after their counterparts in the USA, as places of social control and political surveillance of library checkouts with the help of managers and teachers. In the issue 403.321/35 of a circular published by the Ministry of National Education on February 20,1954, the following statements can be seen about school libraries: "politically harmful books and magazines which preach against our national and social values must be sent to the publishing Management of Ministry of National Education with a brief report explaining the sufficient reasons." (Kınalı, 1995). A committee was assembled in the Ministry of National Education approximately five months after the circular, and one of its first decisions was to brand fifteen-something books as "mischievous" and "wrong directions" to be confiscated from the market (Milliyet, 1954, July 05).In 1955, an astronomy book that was taught in high schools was also banned on the pretense that two editions of the book had photos of Stalin and Lenin in them. An interrogation was launched about the book author and the publisher (Milliyet, 1955, March 09).

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38 Back-to-the-Ottomans and Ottomanism discourses drew critiques from various groups. It was debated especially because it was necessary to teach Ottoman Turkish at schools, and teaching cadres saw Ottoman literature as obsolete. Therefore, it is possible to talk about selectivity regarding the Ottoman history. The solution was turning towards the history Anatolia (*Forum Dergisi*, 1956b).

As a part of Turkey's integration with the West, students were encouraged to have pen-friends in other countries, which would enable them to learn foreign languages and more about the world. At the same time, the Cold War atmosphere made such correspondences suspicious. Given the possibility that "harmful ideologies" would spill from letters into children's mind, the school administration opened all letters beforehand to control their suitability. After the Constitutional Court did not allow such exercise without authorized court decision, the total responsibility was given to students and teachers. In a circular the Ministry published the following statement:

"As our schools are institutions of teaching and education and their aim is to protect students from various unfavorable effects and tendencies, our children, who already have high national duty consciousness, should be warned on a constant basis that harmful writings that come through in writing, should be submitted directly to the school administration." (Milliyet, 1952, April 22)

In the early 1950s, the media and parliament members repeatedly expressed uneasiness about students that were sent abroad for education showing tendency towards Communism. The person who started the discussion was the chairman of the Turkish National Student Union, which was an instrument of anti-Communism during the Cold War. Chairman Tasçıoğlu, who came back from Paris, claimed that sixty percent of the students were under Communist influence. Upon this, Turkish National Student Union asked the Ministry of National Education to call back the students studying in France with government scholarship and to cut the foreign exchange supply to those who studied with their own financial means (Milliyet, 1950). In the following days, the issue come to The Grand National Assembly of Turkey, and students' financial hardships abroad were associated with their tendency towards "abominable ideologies". Some members offered the enhancing of policing measures and keeping detailed track of students that had gone abroad.[39] We should also note that suspicions were raised also towards foreign students that came to Turkey. After two Iraqi students were deported for being members of the Communist Party, the police started to keep close track of Middle Eastern students in Turkey. Another measure was investigating the students who were to come at Turkish universities beforehand (*Milliyet*, 1954, May 28).

As the Ministry of National Education thought that Communism originated from external sources, the ministry sent a circular to city governors in 1958. In the circular, it was stated

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[39] Tevfik Ileri confessed that they sent inspectors to observe the students abroad but could not get effective results (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi,1950b)

that students, teachers and youth branches were prohibited from inviting foreign students to Turkey (Milliyet, 1958).

To keep teachers away from socialist ideologies, two measures were put in place. One focused on anti-Communist propaganda and the other was inspections. In the magazines intended for teachers it was claimed that communism was an enemy to democracy. As mentioned previously, there were arguments in educational texts that contravene the demand for absolute equality, and those efforts can be read as efforts to refute Socialism and Communism. For example, in a speech on the meaning of democracy and education, Necip Alpan told teachers the following:

"The psychology of individual differences shows us that there is no equality, no fabrication. There cannot be equality in society in the way that Communists acknowledge. To accept this equality means to act against nature. According to current realistic comprehension instead of family, school is a government institution that educates children according to society's ideals. Its aim is not to raise children to the same level but to improve their abilities according to their strong competences (Alpan, 1953)."

As was the case in the USA, McCarthy-like anti-Communism significantly affected the process of teacher training. After a long smear campaign and the closing down of Village Institutes for being centers of Communism,[40] nationalist/conservative circles constantly repeated their claim of leftist teachers that "poison" students. The DP rule took an instant action and justified the decision of closing Village Institutes (Göktan, 1954).

From the first days of the Democrat Party rule, the ministry brought denouncements about teachers' political activities to the agenda. For example, Tevfik Ileri, Minister of National Education, during the budget committee, announced that teachers who perform leftist activities were identified and would be sent to court after interrogation (Milliyet, 1951, January 18). On this subject, we see that the opposition, CHP, went along with the ruling party. Just like in the USA, high numbers of teachers were interrogated upon suspicion of spreading communism propaganda, and some of them were given discipline punishments and even imprisoned while others were discharged.[41]

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40 Revision about schools training teachers were the top topic in the agenda of the National Education Council V. One suggestion about combining teachers' training schools and village institutions was the closing of village institutions as a result of severe anti-Communist propaganda of this period.

41 Newspapers were full of news about arrested teachers as a result of denouncements (*Milliyet*, 1951, 12 February) (*Milliyet*, 1952, June, 08).

3. Conclusion

During the peak of the Cold War in the 1950s, the DP government built their policies upon the CHP's liberalization attempts, which were forced from outside, and took them to another level by adopting the USA education model. On the other hand, the DP increased religious references within national identity and belonging. There were some similarities between the early republican and DP policies in assigning education a crucial role in nationalist indoctrination. However, during the DP era, the solidarist corporatist approach of the early republican era was replaced by the image of the "Turkish Muslim child" and conservative populism.

Combining democracy discourse with anti-Communism, DP governments defined a relationship among development, individualism, and notions of freedom, which were limited by the ideals of economic liberalism and conservatism. This tendency was also visible in government policies of childhood and education. The change in the status of religion courses, the increasing number of religious vocational schools, allowing religious communities to accommodate students at those schools became the reality of the 1950s. Promotion of religious merits under the control of DP governments was framed and presented as a necessity in the fight against both bigotry and communism. Nevertheless, it can also be easily argued that anti-Communist practices stood in the way of new educational advancements and oppressed educators.

The U.S made significant progress in natural sciences in the 1950s. Unfortunately, it is not possible to say the same thing for DP's education policies which were based on the U.S model. Although the number of children attending school increased, there was no significant improvement of quality. Technical education, which was a popular concept during the rule of the DP, could not go further than developing the capacity to maintain and repair imported agricultural machinery. After the 1956-1957 academic year, vocational schools turned into mainstream secondary schools with more practical courses as institutions that guided students to professions because raising workers at vocational schools was considered to be directly related to national development. In the meantime, raising qualified students became a secondary concern. Among the factors that undermined the success of secondary school education were the relatively low number of qualified teachers as teaching became less appealing as a profession, the burden of preparing employment-oriented curriculum, unproductive free-time activities, and inefficient testing and grading systems (Cizrel, 1957).

To sum up, Turkey attempted to revise its education system by applying the U.S model with which it aimed to have close relationship. As a result, the new education system combined the basic principles and aspects of the U.S educational system with conservative elements and orientation towards national "development," especially in economic terms. In this context, religion was thought to serve as an ideological glue to hold Turkish national identity together and particularly an effective precaution against the threat of Communism.

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CHAPTER 6

THE BUREAUCRACY AND ITS DISCONTENTS IN MODERN TURKEY: LIBERALISM, NEO-LIBERALISM AND ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM

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Abstract

An important pillar of Ottoman and Turkish capitalist modernization has been the constitution of a legal-rational authority, which is strictly tied to the formation of a modern bureaucracy. The bureaucracy has attained a very special attention in academic writing, getting far beyond considering this category as one of the elements of Turkish modernization. Rather, the bureaucracy was declared as the very subject of this history, which acts according to a special blueprint designed to shape the society and politics. The objective of this chapter is to challenge this presumption by discussing the linkage between the thickening anti-intellectualism especially at the time of changes in the mode of accumulation and the negative approach adopted against the bureaucracy by the political authorities, which tend to establish an arbitrary rule. In this regard, it is asserted that the negative treatment of the traditional Republican bureaucracy, which made a peak in the 1950s and, later, in the 1980s, cannot be explained in a superficial manner with only a reaction to the bureaucratization and the rise in bureaucratic formalities. These two waves of anti-bureaucratism require special attention also because of their legacy that contributed to the vital erosion in the institutional framework of the state administration in the 2000s.

Keywords: Bureaucracy, modernization, anti-intellectualism, neo-liberalism, Turkey

1. Introduction

Throughout Turkish history, the sentiments towards the modern bureaucracy seemed to be very volatile, mainly because of the major shifts in the political circumstances of the country. There were sequences, such as the post-27 May period, which were marked by a strong trust in the bureaucracy above the political class, whereas there were other sequences, such as the 2000s, during which the traditional Republican *bureaucracy* was targeted systematically by the political power and its intellectual entourage for allegedly being a nest of plot against the elected government. In the mainstream liberal historiography, however, the modern bureaucracy appears as the real subject of Turkish history, capable of designing the society and politics according to a self-made blueprint marked by its own *raison d'etre* (see Mardin, 1973; Heper, 1985; Keyder, 1987). In the same vein, the bureaucracy is frequently presented as the culprit of whatever is seen as failures recorded and crimes committed throughout the Turkish history. Additionally, this outlook for the most part of this history assumes a relentless power struggle between the bureaucratic cadres, who allegedly consider themselves the owners of the country, and the civilian political authorities, striving for demarcating the sphere of authority between the representatives of the people and the unelected civil servants. Yalman (2002) defines this interpretation of the state-society relations in Turkey as "dissident but hegemonic" and then, offers an alternative approach to understand the same phenomenon through incorporating the neglected class relations into the analysis. This chapter does not propound an assessment of the debates around state-society relations in the literature, but rather attempts to place attention onto a neglected dimension of the issue. To state it very briefly, the main concern of this chapter is to shed light on the political, ideological and economic reasons of the rise in the anti-bureaucratic rhetoric, especially when it culminates into the form of an assault on bureaucracy at certain conjectures of modern Turkish history.

In this regard, the chapter focuses on two periods during which this type of attitude became a dominant thread of Turkish politics. The first such era was the 1950s, the governing years of the Democrat Party (DP) under the leadership of Adnan Menderes. The second was the era opened by the 12 September military *coup d'etat* and continued under the Mother Land Party (ANAP) government of Turgut Özal. The main argument of this chapter is that despite their differences, the anti-bureaucratic attitudes observed in these sequences are very much related to anti-intellectualism, which turns into an epidemic, especially at some specific moments of change in the accumulation regime. However, it must be emphasized that not all critical assessments of bureaucratism and interrogation of the role of bureaucracy in capitalist

societies are related to anti-intellectualism. Therefore, in order to differentiate the disdain for the modern bureaucracy, which has been the hallmark of some governments throughout Turkish history, this chapter picks the term "anti-bureaucratism", referring to a special type of negative perception of the bureaucracy in Turkey, which bears strong anti-intellectual connotations.

On the theoretical ground, Poulantzas's (1978) approach to the problem of bureaucracy in the framework of the capitalist formation is especially helpful to comprehend the bureaucracy within the context of class struggles. To put it very broadly, Poulantzas (1978, 351-359), in his analysis, emphasizes two important features of the bureaucracy. One is that the bureaucracy, as a social category, assumes a role of its own "but this does not confer on it a power of its own", and this role is determined by an ensemble of factors in the class struggle under capitalism. This evaluation opens up space to pursue how the impact of the changes occurred in the class relations penetrate the state institutions and its bureaucracy. Thus, without disregarding the class identity of the state in capitalism, this approach enables a historical review of the altering role of the bureaucracy in accordance with the trajectory of the class struggles in different national contexts. This type of an analysis is not extinct in Turkey (see Aydın, 2017), but it is far from setting the agenda in the literature on the role of the bureaucracy in Turkish history.

2. Aversion to Bureaucracy as a Symptom of Anti-intellectualism

Anti-intellectualism as a phenomenon is very difficult to fit into a single definition, as it is not possible to do justice to its historical and spatial complexity by only pointing at some aspects of it. It emerges blended with various other attitudes, sentiments or ideological positions. Therefore, it is better to remain at a simple yet broad level to have an umbrella formulation of the concept. Richard Hofstadter (1993, 7), the renowned writer of *Anti-Intellectualism in American Life*, formulates anti-intellectualism as "a resentment and suspicion of the life, of the mind and of those who were considered to represent it; and a disposition constantly to minimize the value of that life." There are few but sophisticated analyses of anti-intellectualism in the literature, which, although not dealing with the connection between anti-intellectualism and anti-bureaucratism, are still helpful in understanding how the two can closely interact (see White, 1962; Glasson, 2012; Shogan, 2007; Morelock; 2017).

In this regard, an important factor that contributes to the resentment at bureaucracy is the change of accumulation regimes, especially if it takes place in the form of a transition from

state-interventionism to free-market economic regimes. For instance, the ascendancy of *laissez-faire* economics under the conservative governments in the US, the UK and in countries like Turkey in the 1980s boosted the traditional anti-bureaucratic sentiments of conservative politics further. As these new political forces adhered to minimal government, deregulation, privatization and cutting down social services, they started to consider bureaucracy as an impediment to their agenda of downsizing the regulative and social roles of the state. Since the bureaucracy they had to work with whilst carrying out the neo-liberal reforms had been shaped by the proclivities of the welfare regime of the post-WII years, this conflict was not likely to be avoided.

A contributing factor to the dislike for bureaucracy during the neo-liberal epoch is the broad-scale dissemination of market values into all realms of human activity, including the political. In this way, the political leaders start to conceive their roles akin to the roles of businessmen. Such an identification is inevitably reflected in the priorities they assume in the decision-making process. Ambitious to take rapid action on his/her own initiative, this business type political-leadership increasingly inclines to disregard law and regulations, which they consider as nothing but mere impediments to swift government action (Shogan, 2007). In other words, the legal procedures and scientific standards that must be overseen in policy making are considered as humpbacks slowing down the efficient and effective decision-making. In this context, the primary quality expected from bureaucracy in a neo-liberal economic order is acquiring the operational standards and adopting the priorities of the market competition. Nevertheless, it must be noted that this does not always result in less bureaucratization in the meaning of a decrease in formalities (Hibou, 2015) as experienced lately.

Neo-liberalism is often invoked in relation to deepening poverty and increasing income inequality at social level and authoritarian or fascistic regimes. In the US, for instance, the neo-conservatism acquired militarization, re-Christianization and racism as ideological assets of its populist politics. Anti-intellectualism, as one of the components of populism (Oliver & Rahn, 2016), is frequently deployed by conservatives in the US and other parts of the world for discrediting the dissident views based on scientific and legal claims. In the same ideological climate, the bureaucrat occasionally finds itself as the object of resentment of the political demagogues and/or the capitalist classes. Disagreement about the benefits of the neo-liberal adjustment policies can be an adequate reason for allegations such as that the hesitant bureaucrats are the guardians of the establishment unwilling to abandon their privileges. In fact, the war wedged on "bureaucratism" by neo-liberal governments, in many

cases, epitomizes such an attitude. Moreover, setting the antagonism between "the state elite" and "the people," especially at times of deepening social grievances, is instrumental to place the responsibility on the shoulders of the former. This political strategy not only benefits the political class but also those sections of the capitalist classes, whose interests are served by the unbridled market liberalism.

Paradoxically, libertarian anti-statism might have played into the hands of conservative political forces in the neoliberal era. Baer (2017) asserts that neoliberalism proceeded through a libertarian ideology of individual sovereignty and unrestricted market freedom through appropriating the counterculture's anti-statist demands for personal expression and emancipation. Baer's point is important as it detects the predisposition for an ideological reconciliation between the conservative and libertarian ideologies in the neo-liberal times.

3. Early Reactions to the State and Modernization

The first National Assembly that convened in Ankara in 1920, whilst the War of Independence was going on in the fronts, became the scene of a fervent debate on how to ensure the people's participation in the new administrative structure and in the representative bodies at national and local levels. Some parliamentarians, who embraced populist-socialist views, stressed that in the new system, the centuries-long alienation of the people must come to an end. Interestingly though, during the debates, whenever they referred to the fractures in society, they located the main conflict between "the governing vs. the oppressed, governed class" as put by İsmail Suphi, a prominent figure of the first Assembly (TBMM ZC, 1920: 409 cited in Başaran-Lotz & Örnek, 2019). Mehmet Şükrü Bey, who was known as a communist, claimed that the primary conflict rested between the officers/bureaucracy and the people. He further argued that there was not a capitalist class in Turkey, as all people were using their labor to afford their living (TBMM ZC, 1920: 409 cited in Başaran-Lotz & Örnek, 2019). This interpretation of the people's alienation was of course reflecting the legacy of state-society relations in the Ottoman Empire, as well as the characteristics of the political thought at the turn of the 20th century.

The first factor determining the people's perception of the state was the grievances caused by the incessant series of wars starting with the First Balkan War in 1912, and continued until the Armistice at the end of the First World War. The unbearable tax burden on the poor used to cover war-costs, the never-ending conscription of the young Muslim men to be deployed to unknown fronts, the sharp decrease in agricultural production because of heavy taxation on the products and lack of work-force as the young men were recruited in the army for years,

the massive influx of refugees to the cities remained under the Ottoman rule that caused increasing poverty and serious sanitation problems in urban areas, etc., were the experiences the Ottoman people had with the state at the turn of the century.

An attempt to pursue the roots of anti-bureaucratism, however, should go back to the mid-19th century in order to decipher the codes of hostility towards the modernizing reforms especially among the critiques of Western-style modernity. During the climax of the *Tanzimat* reforms, a negative connotation of bureaucracy should have appeared, since *the Bab-ı Ali* bureaucracy, as the oppressive executer of the reforms, drew reactions from groups with different class positions and ideological affiliations. For instance, a fierce struggle was launched by the generation of young civil servants and intellectuals, the Young Ottomans, against the rule of Ali and Fuad pashas, who were involved in rapid modernization projects through adopting oppressive governing methods. But authoritarianism was not the only factor that spurred a widespread reaction against the reforms. The high-class elitism of the pashas was usually juxtaposed with the moderate background of the young civil servants in order to explain the latter's discontent for the former. In addition to that, a thorough explanation of averse to the *Tanzimat*-era modernizers could not be made without thinking over the social repercussions of the accompanying economic collapse and increasing economic dependency on the European powers. Over and above, such a reaction towards the *Tanzimat* was, in fact, directed not only at the state but the Christian *millets*, who, unlike the Muslims, benefitted from the increasing foreign dependency of the Ottoman economy (Berkes, 1975, p.206). Another source of distress was the provinces and the Anatolian countryside. As stated by Ortaylı (2018, 103), the hegemony of the *Bab-i Ali* meant the formation of modern centralization in Turkish history. This was the primary reason for the anti-*Tanzimat* sentiments of the Ottoman notables, which cut across religious and ethnic identities in the Ottoman countryside (see Berkes, 2006, 244-48). Furthermore, *Tanzimat* reforms introduced a novel idea into the administrative mentality of the Ottoman Empire: "institutions replacing individual rulers" (Heper& Berkman, 2009, p.69). The heavy-handed methods of handling matters, according to Heper and Berkman, was adopted to ensure the autonomy of the civil bureaucracy. Lastly, the role of the religious reactionaries, frustrated by the secularizing reforms and Westernized life-styles, must be considered in order to have an almost complete configuration of the critics of the *Tanzimat modernization*. These reasons enumerated here sketch out the legacy of the *Tanzimat,* which was effective in yielding a negative perception of the modernizing bureaucracy. In the ensuing debates, however, since the power center of the Empire shifted first to the palace again and, then, to the Committee

of Union and Progress after the 1908 revolution, the bureaucracy was relatively dislocated from its position of being the focus of the criticisms.

After the foundation of the Republic in 1923, the state and its bureaucracy were less a target among the political and intellectual figures, as a new state administration had to be established, replacing the centuries-old Ottoman state, which not only collapsed as a political entity but also shrank into a small-sized nation state from a vast, multi-territorial Empire. It should be reminded that a significant portion of the founding cadres of the Republic were also coming from the military bureaucracy of the Ottoman Empire trained in the modern institutions. Yet, this does not mean that the state policies in the early decades of the Turkish Republic were formulated to serve the interests of the bureaucratic class. It is important to note that, for years, the numerical size of the bureaucracy remained low. According to Şaylan, the main reason for that was the limited functions of the state apparatus, which gave priority to "order and security" as the main functions and, in addition to that, finance, foreign affairs, and justice bureaucracy contained the majority of the bureaucratic staff. This was not yet a state that operates effectively in the realms of social and economic matters, except for its support for the market mechanism to operate. The harmony between the political leadership and the bureaucracy during the one-party years of the Early Republican era, which reflected the bureaucracy's commitment to the former's mission of radical social transformation (Buğra, 2015, pp.221-222), was another important feature of the era.

4. Anti-communist Populism vs. the Bureaucracy of the Republic

The 1940s were very difficult years for the dissident intellectuals. Particularly in the second half of this decade, the political oppression took a new course and turned into a campaign against the left-leaning elements, not only in the artistic and intellectual circles, but also in the state apparatus. The symbolic incident in this vein was the Yücel-Öner court case, which was opened up in 1947 by Hasan Âli Yücel, the former Minister of National Education, against Kenan Öner, one of the founders of the Democrat Party. Yücel sued Öner for the latter's accusations of alleged communist activities in the Ministry during Yücel's ministerial years. Yücel won the case but could not prevent the appearance of false stories about him in the press (Çakır, 1997, p.131). The sensation created by Öner's accusations denoted a deliberate smear targeting the Ministry's progressive record. This was followed by a witch-hunt launched at university in 1948, which resulted in the expulsion of three socialist academics from the university (see Çelik, 1998). Again, this case was more than an occasional intolerance displayed towards some academics but a campaign aiming at intimidating the university community as a whole. These two key incidents of the 1940s, took place while the

Republican People's Party (RPP) was the governing party and Turkey was decidedly taking steps towards acquiring the status of the front-line country in the anti-Soviet crusade of the Cold War. Concomitantly, the government launched on a purge within the bureaucracy to get rid of the incompatible elements with the Cold War anti-communism.

Another aspect of the transformation Turkey proceeded in the second half of the 1940s was the change in accumulation regime. Turkey remained outside the Second World War but had to undertake the cost of military mobilization. During the war years, the RPP government, in order to restrict price increases, imposed price controls, which caused a black-market and intensive corruption. These conditions "gave those who were in a position to exploit the black market and government intervention (big farmers, importers and traders, and those officials who handled government contracts and permits) huge profit opportunities" (Zürcher, 1999). With this fresh capital accumulation in private hands and with the motivation of integrating Turkey to the world markets, and the new international economic regime created by the Bretton Woods system, the government stepped in to liberalize Turkey's trade regime and financial markets. Thus, with the change in the economic paradigm, the development plans prepared in 1946 and 1947 remained defunct (see Tekeli and İlkin, 1974). In the new liberal framework, the pivotal role in the economy was attributed to the private sector, thus the *statist industrialization* of the 1930s was abandoned.

In 1950, the DP, under the leadership of the Adnan Menderes, overthrew the decades long single-party rule of the RPP, but inherited the economic policies of its predecessor. The favoring world prices of the agricultural commodities helped the DP government to enjoy an economic spring in its initial years. This was also made possible by the American aid poured into Turkey for being a staunch Cold War ally. This fiscal support was used to pay for the widening trade deficits and to embark upon agricultural modernization. This favoring economic conditions did not last long though. When the impressive economic growth recorded in the first years of the 1950s ended abruptly, the DP government reacted with recourse to *ad hoc* measures, which were met with a general discontent. Facing this negative reception of its policies, the government, rather than taking the rising concerns into attention, moved to suppress the expression of criticisms. With the aim of discrediting the owners of dissident views existing among the bureaucratic cadres, the government resorted to an anti-intellectual and frequently an anti-bureaucratic rhetoric alongside the physical oppression. Despite this course of developments, it would be still misleading to treat the DP's anti-intellectualism solely as a reaction that occurred under distressing conditions. This attitude had salient features embedded in the class character of the government policies and in its

populist conservatism. During the governing years, the DP, through its policies, favored the big land-owners and tradesman, and garnered support from these classes, which should not be neglected when the dislike pervaded among the ruling circles for the traditional Republican bureaucracy is scrutinized. Since the traditional bureaucracy identified with statist policies and the republican value-set including notions such as "common interest," there were more than enough reasons for the ruling bloc to averse it. Yet, this aversion did not prevent some high-ranking members of the bureaucracy and the bourgeoisie from partaking in corruption, especially in the areas in which the state and bourgeoisie jointly carried out economic activities (Avcıoğlu, 1973, pp.727-757). On the other side, the bureaucratic cadres, imbued with the idealism and professional ethics, found it hard to accommodate the pragmatism of the era and the new form of relationship between politics and the bureaucracy (see Bener, 1991). Besides, the bold rhetoric of Prime Minister Menderes, displaying the self-assurance of a populist leader, boosted disrespect for regulations, procedures or scientific standards during these years. Heper and Berkman (2009, 74) reiterate the assumptions of the liberal historiography, such as "the bureaucratic elite asserted their right to rule", "they did not look with favor at the efforts to make them more responsive to closer public scrutiny", they were "imbued with a paternalist philosophy." While reiterating the basic arguments of the liberal historiography on the role of the bureaucracy in Turkish political life, Heper and Berkman (2009, 73-74), yet rightly point out the new path that Turkish politics had taken, that bothered the traditional bureaucracy: "the intellectual–bureaucratic elites thought that politics was no longer used 'to promote the interests of the nation as a whole,' but to promote the ends of 'a privileged few.' Second, because of concessions on the Westernization reforms, the 'irrational' was preferred to the 'rational.' Intellectualism was abandoned; politics were no longer based on 'reason'."

Last, but not least, the anti-communist malaise afflicting the political scene crowned the anti-intellectualist current of the era. Anti-communism was embraced so vigorously for a variety of reasons. One was the quick discovery of its functionality for both condemning the criticisms against the government policies for being variants of communistic ideas and convincing the power block to rally behind the anti-communist front led by the government. This was beneficial to stigmatize the dissidents as the alienated others, even as pawns of communism, who endeavored to impair the government due to its alleged loyalty to national values and ideals.

Adopting a combination of these features in varying doses, the DP, under the leadership of Menderes, refused to confer any of its policies either with the relevant groups in the society

or with the scientific/academic community or the bureaucrats in the field. The debates on economic planning exemplified this attitude. Even after the downturn of the economy in the second half of the 1950s, the DP government continued to rely on *ad hoc* measures ignoring the calls for proceeding with a development plan. As a matter of fact, the preachers of planning included the DP's foreign partners as well. Milor (1990) emphasizes how foreign creditors and the indigenous industrial bourgeoisie shared similar opinions concerning the irrationality of the DP's economic policies, and embraced planning as a solution. As a response to internal and external pressures, however, the DP adopted "a 'wait and see' tactic" in economy (Milor, 1990, p.10). Despite that, the government perpetually rejected planning through identifying it with communism. The idea of planning was conjuring up the memory of the statist years during which industrial plans directed the economic policies, which also urged the landowning class to reject this idea. Paradoxically, though, the DP's advocacy for liberal economic policies and the refusal of the statist policies of the previous decades did not prevent the government from extending state capitalism in Turkey, both in scope and in terms of activity.

Even before this uncompromising refusal of conferring the development perspective with the planning bureaucracy, the DP was displaying a kind of instinctive reaction to the institutions such as university, judiciary and bureaucratic offices. The DP's political propaganda rested on presenting itself as the advocator of the "national will" juxtaposed with the modernized intellectuals and bureaucrats, who allegedly harbored values alien to the religious beliefs and national culture of the Anatolian people. In the same manner, the key state institutions were regarded with disfavor for being the bastions of secular and modern character of the Republic. Thus, from the beginning, the DP government set out a rhetorical and legal assault on the traditional bureaucracy of the Republic, in order to enfeeble its power (Atılgan, 2016, pp.400-403). The government started to use different executive instruments in order to intimidate the discontented cadres, including "withdrawing to passive duty", "pensioning off the bureaucrats" and "prohibiting appeals against the decisions of the government." These measures targeted the high-ranking bureaucrats identified with the previous RPP government (Şaylan, 305). But not all measures were written-ones. Throughout the 1950s, the traditional bureaucracy faced a kind of negative wage discrimination that affected their economic prosperity. Thus, the high-ranking bureaucracy and the public employees, including the university professors or the military officers, found it hard to afford their living because of their decreasing purchasing power under inflationary conditions. Meanwhile, the state recruited technical personnel such as engineers, technicians or

economists. Compared to the traditional bureaucracy, these technical cadres were protected from the effects of the worsening inflation with a special wage policy. This led to a division in the bureaucracy between the traditional Republican bureaucracy and the technical bureaucratic cadres (Şaylan, 303-305).

Waging its war against the traditional Republican bureaucracy and the institutions assumed loyal to the Kemalist establishment, the government recoursed to Islamism as a leverage to win the masses on its side. In fact, Islamism had been burgeoning since the 1940s capitalized on the tacit tolerance of the governments, a phenomenon explained by the term "Islamic revivalism." Although the DP government, in its initial years, was careful to keep the Islamists under control, it did not eschew the power of Islamist ideology in manipulating the masses under the conditions of multiparty politics. As the economic and political crisis deepened, particularly Prime Minister Menderes started to lean on Islamist discourse more than ever. This had discursive advantages, as the Islamist messages helped the government to solidify its identification with the rural masses, despite the deteriorating economic situation. But this went beyond paying lip service to the Islamic values at the discursive level, since soon it appeared that the government had started to coalesce with some Islamist groups in the process of losing its credibility among the urbanized, educated sectors of the society. The most serious of such accusations was about the support the *Nurcus* gave to the DP government and the government's lenient attitude toward this group (Toprak, 1988, p.16), which was a watershed development in the history of the Republic.

Overall, towards the end of the 1950s, the DP found itself in dire straits in terms of intensifying political competition, deepening economic crisis and a stalemate in foreign affairs. In face of arbitrary, impulsive and unrestrained government action, the different compartments of the state apparatuses started to evoke their discontent and worries, which further enraged the government, especially Prime Minister Menderes. The tension increased further because of the DP's totally arbitrary and repressive measures against the opposition and the unsustainable economic conditions. As a consequence, Turkey witnessed the first military coup, which took place on May 27, 1960.

5. The 1980s and Onwards

The re-organization of the state apparatus was among the priorities of the military junta of September 12, 1980. This consisted of creation of new institutions, political purges in the bureaucracy and forged a new version of the Kemalist ideology, known as Atatürkism, aloof from all leftist and progressive elements but mingled with Islamism. The rationale behind

this set of measures was to reassure the cohesion of state apparatuses, which were paralyzed by the class struggles of the 1960s and 1970s. As Poulantzas (1974, 306) points out, the state apparatuses condense the intense ideological contradictions in society, which explains the politicization observed in the state bodies in the decades prior to the military coup. But Poulantzas (1974, 308) adds that the repressive state apparatus is an exception, since "the hegemonic class or fraction generally controls the apparatus." The developments in Turkey were incompatible with this general rule, as the rising impact of the left and the radical demands of the class movement permeated into the repressive state apparatus, as well as the army and the police. There are various reasons for this exceptionalism, a comprehensive elaboration of which remains out of the scope of this chapter. Even before the 1980s, during the March 12, 1971 military intervention, there were attempts to fix this political contamination of the police force. The ban on unionization within the police was a measure taken for this end, but remained short of eradicating the problem. Another effective method adopted by the March 12 regime was using political trials, the most sensational of which was "the Bomb case", to impose ideological uniformity on the bureaucracy. These trials were instrumental both to purge politically heretic elements from the military and civilian bureaucracy and to intimidate the incumbent civil servants and high-ranking bureaucrats to establish full uniformity with the mindset of the junta.

The strategy of the junta regime of 12 September was more ruthless as they started to dismiss the unwanted public employees and high-ranking bureaucrats through a couple of legal devices, which cannot be considered lawful. To this end, the Martial Law Act no. 1402 was used to fire ideologically unfitting public employees, including dissident academics. The Security Inspection Directive was used as a weapon to eliminate undesired candidates for bureaucratic positions, based on their background checks. The Supreme Board of Supervision was established, which was defined by Tachau and Heper (1981, 30) as the president's watchdog over the bureaucracy. The new regime changed the Government Employees Law in order to enlarge the scope of mandatory retirement. The Martial Law gave authority to martial law commanders to order public offices to dismiss their employees, and no judicial appeal could be made against these decisions. The 1982 Constitution, prepared by the junta regime, imposed constitutional restrictions on the right of association for members of the armed forces and other security forces and prohibited membership to political parties for civil servants.

These and many other measures taken in the same vein aimed at the purification of the state apparatuses from the influence of the socialist ideology and the reflection of the class

cleavages. Yet, this relentless operation was not intended to accomplish neither depoliticization of the bureaucracy nor the introduction of a recruitment policy based on meritocracy. In this new era, the primary criterion sought for serving in the state offices was designated as ideological loyalty to the Turkish-Islamic ideology. But this was not the only warrant for especially the high-ranking bureaucracy to work harmoniously with the junta regime and the subsequent civilian government of Turgut Özal's Motherland Party, which replaced the military rule in 1983. The hegemonic mindset of the post-1980 years can be encapsulated briefly in the definition "Turkish-Islamism molded with neo-liberalism". This amalgam was espoused by the military as well, which should come as no surprise since the military no longer insisted on the traditional statist policies of the early Republic, despite the exaggerated evocation of the symbol of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. This explains the junta leader General Kenan Evren's support for the economic austerity plan orchestrated by Turgut Özal (Tachau, 1988, p.116). In fact, high-commanding military officers were among the primary beneficiaries of the neo-liberal economy. The Armed Forces Trust and Pension Fund (OYAK) was a massive holding and a key economic actor in the economy, and contributed to the economic prosperity of the military officers (see Akça, 2017). Furthermore, in the 1980s, it was a widely applied policy among the holdings to appoint retired high-ranking military officers to their board of managers in order to take the advantage of their influence and ties within the state institutions.

Turgut Özal, the prime minister of the ANAP government, who came to power in 1983, found the most favorable conditions to implement the unpopular neo-liberal economic reforms. In fact, Özal had been appointed as the Deputy Under-Secretary of the Prime Minister in the Süleyman Demirel government, responsible from the implementation of the stabilization program known as "24 January 1980 decisions", months before the military coup. But now he was free of all social and political shackles. For one thing, all potential sources of political and social opposition were suppressed by the military. Thus, free from any contestation from political rivals or any resistance from society, Özal had a monopoly of power over the allocation of the resources available at his disposal, a power which he used arbitrarily. Thus, the neo-liberal transition of ANAP years was associated with partisanship and corruption, unprecedented in Turkish history. Especially the export incentives provided to the export-related industries without implementing strict regulations and necessary controls, which was legitimized by simplifying the procedures and, thus, promoting exports, gave an opportunity to this business group to extract huge public resources through "fictitious exports." The chain of fraud also included corrupted public employees and bureaucrats of the

responsible trade and economic offices. On top of everything, Özal explicitly refused to take legal action against these firms, which violated the law, with statements such as the one that envisaged "economic punishment for economic crimes" (Öniş, 2004, p.114).

Corruption at this extent became possible also because of the change in the bureaucratic organization, carried out through the installment of new institutions (Öniş, 2004, p.121) and hiring new bureaucratic cadres that altered the formation and mindset of the bureaucracy. The military, by bequeathing this task largely to Özal, gave him the opportunity to reshape the bureaucracy on his own will in the ensuing years. Enjoying the authority of a one-man order, Özal's favoritism imprinted the bureaucratic transformation of the 1980s. The ANAP governments monopolized the decision-making power in the hands of the executive. The dissolution of the traditional bureaucratic structures and hierarchies to give more authority to the government escalated the tension between the politicians and the bureaucrats (Buğra, 2015, p.228) In this process, he also benefitted from his own experience as a leader coming from a bureaucratic career himself. Öniş (2010, 49) argues that in the early phase of Turkish neo-liberalism, during the 1980s, a narrow bureaucratic elite, under the leadership of Turgut Özal, played a key role in the policy transformation. But this small cadre of Özal's, known as "Özal's princes," eschewed the legacy of the traditional bureaucracy of the Republic and its *etatist* mindset. They mostly consisted of the professionals Özal transferred from the private sector, who were acquainted with the global financial markets. In this cabinet, according to the information given by Arat (1991, 144), sixteen out of twenty ministers had a private sector background. Most interestingly, "his Ministers of Justice, Finance and Customs and a Minister of State had close ties with the Enka Holding Company, and another Minister of State with the Sabanci Group; both the Company and the Group had been leading TÜSİAD members. TÜSİAD had 'organic' links to the government in power." The owner of the one of the biggest holdings in Turkey, Sakıp Sabancı, recounts how Özal, with his colleagues from the State Planning Organization, with whom he had close relations, started to work for their companies. Özal himself played an intermediary role in the transfer of the bureaucrats to the private sector (Sönmez, 1987, p.48). The other way around, he gave positions to many young private sector professionals within his team in the economic administration. But, even these princes could not avoid the attacks directed at them by Turgut Özal and his fellows in his party. Buğra (2015, 228-229) gives interesting examples of the disputes between these two groups.

The spearhead of Özal's neo-liberal policies at the ideological front was an anti-intellectualist stance, mainly observed in the form of self-assurance and anti-bureaucratism.

A scrutiny of his anti-bureaucratic attitude reveals a multi-layered phenomenon with a variety of components. First, considering his leadership style, it should be stated that he exemplified a typical conservative neo-liberal, in the style of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan in the West, or Carlos Menem in the Third World. One of the features of his stance, acclaimed among the capitalists and mostly the anti-statist liberals, was his attitude of businessman-cum-politician. He had a bold pragmatic style giving a strong message to the markets that he virtually abdicated the social and economic role of the state. On the contrary, the only priority he had was triggering economic growth with all means and at all costs. Nor did he not hide his weak commitment to the legal framework. He publicly made statements like "no harm would be done by violating the Constitution once." Gönenç gives remarkable examples of how, during his term in the Presidency, he stretched the limits set by the Constitution, and even contravened the Constitutional principles (Gönenç, 2008, pp.506-510) Another interesting aspect of his style, which was in fact quite complementary to his disregard for law, was the instances when he popularized his disrespect for rules or formal procedures and customs of the state. He once inspected the military troops in swimming shorts, which was his way of giving a message to the military. It was proven in time though that such a loose style of leadership, contravening the customs and the rules of the state affairs, was conducive to the erosion of the institutional culture in the long run.

Another feature of the era that gave impetus to a distaste for the modern bureaucracy was the growing strength of the Islamist groups, not only in social and political life, but in the state apparatuses as well. There were accumulating evidences showing that Islamist *cemaats* and *tarikats* were infiltrating the state institutions, which could not have been achieved without the leniency and/or even endorsing approach of the Özal governments, as well as the military. At this point, it should be noted that, for decades after the 12 September coup, the military protected the position of being the last decision-maker in the essential policies regarding the domestic affairs and the national security. Özal's affiliation with the *Nakşibendis* and his brothers' radical religious orientations, and the strong ties they had with the newly rising Islamist financial institutions were no secret to the military. In these most favorable conditions, the Islamists capitalized on the neo-liberal assault on the traditional bureaucracy. There was an increasing appeal of the anti-establishment propaganda among the neo-liberal political cadres, liberal intellectuals and the Islamists, which basically accused the traditional bureaucrats, particularly the cadres in the judiciary, of holding on to their privileged status by adhering to an obsolete version of Republican *laicism* and therefore, rejecting the idea of change, which was allegedly imposing itself both from within the global environment and the

previously excluded segments of society. The traditional bureaucracy was accused of lacking the capacity to adapt to the necessities of a competitive-global economy, of relying on bookish knowledge, of developing an obsolete style of administration and therefore, of inhibiting the political and bureaucratic cadres equipped with the practical qualities that render them responsive to a rapidly changing environment. The attack on the traditional bureaucracy harboring such and similar accusations had strong anti-intellectual connotations.

But this does not mean that the traditional bureaucracy remained as a unified body and resisted change by insisting on a purely ethical position. Boratav (2005, 95), comparing the bureaucratic mindset of the 1970s and 1980s, points at a change in the approach of the bureaucracy to the state's endorsement of private interest. During the 1970s, according to Boratav, the bureaucracy considered itself as the owner of the state and opposed the abuse of the state resources. This "monitoring" role, although not favored by the individual capitalists, still worked for the general interests of the capitalist class by ensuring a certain level of stability. Aydın (2017, 233), in his research on the issue, sets forth a different explanation. He argues that the changing role of the bureaucracy in the 1980s cannot be explained solely by changes in their ideological affiliation or institutional ethics, but with the social relations of the era. The growth model of the 1960-1980 period was inward-oriented, i.e., depended on industrial production for the domestic markets, which entailed increase in the incomes of the people in order to ensure a certain level of consumption capacity. Thus, the policies accentuating relatively equal income distribution were implemented. However, Aydın aptly states that despite the social functions of the state, the state was still a capitalist state in the 1960s and 1970s. Despite the statist, social and pro-labour disposition, these were intermingled with policies protecting the interests of the capitalist sector. What changed in the 1980s, was the change in the accumulation regime of Turkish capitalism, which brought about the repudiation of these policies. This very same reason shook the status of the traditional bureaucracy and rendered the cadres loyal to a statist mindset vulnerable to the attacks from the neo-liberals including the Islamists.

6. In the Lieu of Conclusion

The history of anti-bureaucratism in Turkey follows a long and interesting path starting from the reactions to the institution-building *Tanzimat*. In short, it is convenient to conclude that the distaste shown for the traditional bureaucracy by the political power in different sequences had little connection with a real attempt at downsizing the state mechanism and its formalities. On the other hand, the intensification of such a negative attitude is correlated with changes in the accumulation regime, which necessitates an adaptation to the new class

interests without reservation. In Turkey, during the sequences analyzed in this chapter, because of the intolerance of the capitalist classes and their political representatives to the demands of the working class, and the unwillingness to grant concessions, pushes the state institutions and its bureaucracy too hard to adopt the new accumulation regime. Not surprisingly, because of the Republican mindset of the traditional bureaucracy in Turkey, which is known for giving priority to the well-being of the Republican unity, they had incompatibilities with the changes in these eras. In this confrontation, the governments frequently resorted to anti-intellectual claims, especially, when the struggle conveyed to the ideological sphere. And when the ideological cleavages form the ground, it becomes a frequently adopted strategy to accuse the traditional bureaucracy of lingering behind the necessities of the new order in both the economic and administrative planes.

Placing the 1950s, the 1980s and the last couple of decades under scrutiny also demonstrates how, in time, the anti-bureaucratic discourse and the actual policies to re-structure the state institutions and to staff the bureaucracy in the neo-liberal fashion has resulted in a serious erosion of the institutional infrastructure of Turkish capitalism. Thus, the ground had been prepared for the latest destruction of the the institutional context of the state administration and policy making in the 2000s. In this regard, it can be deduced that the anti-bureaucratic legacy of the previous decades contributed to the institutional collapse of the latest decades, of course, with the contribution of the latest wave of anti-intellectualism swaying the Turkish political and cultural life recently.

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CHAPTER 7

BUILDING A PUBLIC SPHERE: TURKISH-ORIGIN WORKERS IN GERMANY

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Abstract

Scores of migrants, who have been employed in various industries for decades, who pay taxes, are consumers and carry out their obligations are, however, unable to fully participate in the political process because of limitations and requirements of citizenship policies. In some cases, they are even barred from having a say in local administration. Representation and participation processes are however not limited to voting or being represented in the central or local administration. For instance, many Turkish-origin immigrants in Germany, who are unable to vote in municipal elections, can be elected as worker representatives and distinguish themselves as outstanding political figures, as they speak on behalf of all workers. This article elaborates on the transnational social spaces of immigrants as a unique form of public sphere, and demonstrates the similarities between the birth of the public sphere and the formation of the transnational social space, focusing on the experiences of Turkish-origin migrant workers in Germany.

Keywords: Public sphere, Turkish migration, guest workers, transnational social space, trade unions

1. Introduction

Migration is among the most important causes of contemporary social transformation. This puts significant pressure on the nation-state system that codifies the rights and obligations of states and citizens to one another. Political, social and economic rights and responsibilities of citizenship are brought into question once again with the emergence of large communities that do not have these rights. Demographic structures, which change within a matter of decades, may reinforce cultural, social and identity-based concerns on the part of the host societies. (Fraser, 2014; Faist, 2000).

Capitalist economies, on the one hand, need migrant flows as a source of cheap labour and a reserve army of labour; on the other hand, they try to manage flows of migration (Oner, 2012). However, migrants refuse to play this passive role. The desire to live in better conditions, or at the very least to prepare better conditions for children and future generations, is the primary motivation. With the participation of migrants in the economic and social life in large numbers and in a continuous way, reciprocal effects and relationships start to be formed in daily life (Kolb, 2008). This research focuses on migrant workers with Turkish origin. Here, the term "Turkish-origin immigrants" is used to refer different ethnic communities in Turkey and also to include immigrants from Turkey who hold German citizenship, and second and third generation migrants.

Large numbers of people, who have been employed in various industries for decades, who pay taxes, are consumers and carry out their obligations are, however, unable to fully participate in the political process because of limitations and requirements of citizenship policies. In some cases, they are even barred from having a say in the local administration. The representation and participation processes are, however, not limited to voting or being represented in the central or local administration (Nash, 2014). Many Turkish-origin immigrants, who are unable to vote in municipal elections, can be elected as worker representatives of their workplace or the local branch, and distinguish themselves as outstanding political figures, as they speak on behalf of all workers.

Immigrants may experience both countries (country of emigration and country of immigration) through transnational social spaces at the same time via networks, organizations and technology. Transnational social spaces enable immigrant communities to construct a unique identity. They do not simply adopt the dominant identity of the country of immigration or they are not simply an extension of the societies of country of emigration. They are also not a part of a dominant community of a certain nation-state. They construct an identity

which is a product of their constant, mutual relations with two societies based on their transnational social networks.

Majority of literature among transnational social spaces of Turkish immigrants focuses on their relation with Turkey such as how they internalize conflicts, confrontations and political polarizations exported from Turkey. This reflects one side of the transnational space and illuminates the importance of the Turkey reference. On the other hand, immigrants have constant and dynamic relations with natives and other immigrant communities in the country of immigration, and such relation has an essential impact over the characteristics of the transnational social space.

Today, the transnational social space of Turkish-origin immigrants in Germany is multi-layered. Even still, an important proportion of Turkish-origin immigrants works in German industry, they are not only employees; there is also an entrepreneur class. There is a widespread media network, while some are representatives of Turkish-based media, some others are directly managed by and for Turkish-origin immigrants, and even some were established in Europe to address certain communities living in Turkey. There are increasing number of immigrants in arts, sports and politics. Additionally, there are organizations that are directly or indirectly supported by Turkish and German authorities.

Progress in transportation and information technologies allows Turkish-origin immigrants to combine their relation between "home country" and "country of work" within their daily lives. Two countries' geographies became just a few hours' flight distance as a result of frequent economic charter flights. Internet, TV channels, newspapers, associations and certain economic activities allow Turkish immigrants to experience both countries at the same time in their daily lives (Öner, 2012), and these all developments demonstrate the dynamism of the transnational social space. (Faist, 1998) The transnational social space of Turkish-origin immigrants is not a passive and introverted space, but rather provides a lively public sphere that also includes sub-spheres such as Kurds, Alevis, some religious and political groupings, etc. (Ayhan&Kaya, 2007)

This offers them to the opportunity to live in a distinctive public sphere, which is constructed in a bottom up perspective, and may allow them to escape from the total hegemony of states to a certain extent. From another perspective, they also share common public spheres with natives, and internalize common values and principles as well.

This article argues that the transnational social space approach shall be elaborated together with the Habermasian "public sphere" theory. As will be expressed in following chapter, there

are remarkable similarities with the formation of historical bourgeois public spheres and the formation of the transnational social space of Turkish migrants in the last six decades. Additionally, evaluating the "transnational social space" concept with "the public sphere" shall contribute to answering the changing conditions coming from globalization and the existence of millions of non-citizen migrants living in Western democracies (Finlayson, 2005).

2. Migrant Networks and Transnational Social Spaces

The concept of transnational social space has been widely used in the literature since the 1960s, but the emphasis was on transnational organisations and transnational corporations. From the mid-1990s onward, however, it started to be applied to individuals and in particular to migrant networks. An important factor in the development of the idea of transnational social space was the realisation that viewing immigrant communities as a simple extension of the people of the country of origin was inadequate (Faist, 1998). Using the networks they form, immigrants establish reciprocal, stable and dynamic relationships with societies in both countries, and create a new identity of their own.

The transnational social spaces contribute to migrants' life strategies by reinforcing internal solidarity, preserving their ties with the country of origin and, at the same time, lowering the costs and risks of new migration processes (Preis, 2008). As Preis (2001) argues, transnational migrant networks should be described as pluri-local communities rather than local communities. Locals/citizens build their social spaces around a single locality, whereas migrants can form transnational social spaces around multiple localities and sustain relationships with both societies via different localities. The description of transnational social space as pluri-local, indicating that immigrants are in contact with multiple localities, is also important because it emphasises that the transnational social space is not an abstract, floating "space" independent of localities or physical spaces (Jurgens, 2001). It is not that localities disappear; rather, localities are multiplied and achieved across nation-state borders.

"Space" is composed of cultural, economic and political practices of actors and relations among different actors at a certain "place". (Faist, 2004) Kaya & Şahin (2007) define "space" as a concept that contains both material and discursive aspects including behaviours, practices and discourses. The space concept elaborates immigrants, not as passive individuals who are victims of global capitalism, but as the ones that are active agents that determine their own future. Social space is in relation with the public sphere because there is no hegemonic power centre, and it is constructed by communication, negotiation and trust based on common cultural values, interests and solidarity.

The distinctive feature of the transnational social space is that all imagined and constructed social practices, symbols and products are not limited within borders of a certain nation-state, rather they are imagined and constructed within the relation among two countries and two societies. Transnational social space is differentiated from other international and multinational structures and entities with its balanced and equivalent share of impact of both countries. For instance, for Turkish-origin people in Germany, while social practice may be more German-centred, symbolic systems, may be mainly referenced to Turkey and products may be transferred between both countries. Therefore, transnational social space includes organizations, immigrant networks, companies, diasporic entities and governmental agencies.

Transnational social spaces become more visible and concrete in today's world as a consequence of the development of communication and information technologies that make easier the movement of capital, workforce, product and services. Symbols, ideas, social practices and values are not necessarily produced and shared within a certain nation-state but also there are more opportunities for transnational interaction. (Preis, 2001; Şenay, 2010) The transnational social space provides a base for sustainable, durable, mutual, dynamic and intense sharing of symbols, ideas, products and practices. (Faist, 2000)

Within the scope of this paper, the continuous and dynamic transfer of ideas, symbols and products between Germany and Turkey indicates that immigrants are potentially open to being influenced by political and social developments in both countries, and have the potential to affect both countries. The transnational social space created by Turkish-origin immigrants in Germany has very dynamic aspects. A multi-layered transnational social space with political, cultural, religious and commercial networks, organisations and ties, together with an extensive media network, affect both Germany and Turkey (Evwals et.al., 2007). For example, immigrant workers can make social, political and economic demands via labour unions, even if they are not citizens of the host country. At the same time, they can contribute to the political processes of the country of origin, by utilising opportunities in the transnational social space, thanks to their citizenship ties.

3. The Public Sphere in Workplaces

The public sphere is an arena of political communication, one in which—in the ideal democratic sense—the ideas generated and the discourse advanced allow for criticism of the government, hold it accountable, and create pressure on the government to translate the public interest so articulated into law. This paper argues that the analysis of the public sphere

can be used to understand the formation of transnational social spaces of immigrants, which could be considered as a sort of public sphere.

The paper examines workplaces and workplace-based social organisations because these are places where immigrant workers spend a significant part of their daily lives together with local workers and have the chance to observe and communicate with one another. This article focuses on the experiences of Turkish-origin immigrants in Germany, where labour relations are characterised by concepts, such as "co-determination" and "workplace democracy". The labour union, DGB, represents a significant portion of the workforce, and offers democratic mechanisms in the workplace. Works councils are organisations that are required by German law, regardless of whether the workplace is unionised or not, to cover all employees, and are elected via democratic means which allow worker representatives to participate in the decision making process of the management of the corporation. Both labour unions and works councils provide lively public spheres for workers through elections, meetings and training programmes (FMLSA, 2013). In this public sphere, local and immigrant workers represent themselves, and enter into dialogue with one another. This opportunity provides immigrant workers a way to represent themselves and benefit from democratic mechanisms. regardless of their citizenship status.

Nevertheless, the visibility and engagement of immigrant workers in the public sphere may be influenced by their role in the transnational space, and some skills and opportunities may be transferred between two different spheres. For example, an immigrant worker might be a candidate in elections for workplace representative, not because of their previous labour union activism, but because of their activism in the transnational social space or vice versa.

Another motivation for focusing on immigrant workers employed in large heavy industry enterprises was to offer an analysis that takes into account the principle of socio-economic equality, an important characteristic of the public sphere. Industrial workers are essentially equal in terms of class position and socio-economic status: they have similar wages and similar working conditions, and the opportunity to participate in the same voluntary social organisations via labour unions and works councils, and also to observe, get to know one another and socialise during work and rest periods. Thus, compared with other immigrants, immigrant workers have more opportunities to come together and take collective action with their German colleagues and immigrants from other nationalities under the same roof in voluntary social organisations.

Habermas' public sphere is an arena of political communication, where, in a democratic environment, legitimate political ideas are generated that are critical of the government, hold

the government accountable, create pressure on the government and ultimately aim to become law (Dacheux, 2012). These characteristics make the public sphere a fundamental concept for democracy, and an ideal concerning equality and autonomy. Thus conceived, the public sphere is not an institution, but a space that is open to all actors, with no developmental 'end point', and one that is vulnerable to significant disruption and even attenuation (Specter, 2012; Onat, 2013; Dacheux, 2012).

An important principle for participation in the public sphere is equality; therefore, the bourgeois public sphere or mass democracy/parliamentary democracy is criticised for the social and class inequalities in society (Onat, 2013; Dacheux, 2012). Therefore, institutions that claim to offer a public sphere should provide conditions that allow internal critical reflection and an environment of open dialogue. An important distinction is whether the institution is participatory, in other words, whether or not there are marginalised groups. These institutions should not simply be platforms for interest intermediation; they should also be open to radical criticism. This and other reformulations of the public sphere can make it possible to avoid the manipulative character of the space offered by contemporary capitalism (Goode, 2015).

According to Fraser (2014), besides citizens, there are immigrants and refugees of various nationalities and holders of dual citizenship within the borders of nation states. As a result, political membership becomes less important for participating in the public sphere because citizens are not the only people affected by the outcomes of the political decision-making process. This gives rise to the question of how to make collective demands binding, whether they come from citizens or non-citizens. Therefore, rather than arguing for the disappearance of the public sphere, issues such as participation, solidarity, having a critical attitude and generating political power, which form the essence of the public sphere theory, should be reinterpreted in the light of changing conditions.

Essentially, the public sphere points the social organizations and networks of people independent from the dominance of state power. Indeed, trade unions and works councils may lose some aspects of their public sphere characteristics as a consequence of its relations with state and capital together with its bureaucratic structure, it shall still provide "public sphere" at the workplace level, where voluntary members may debate freely, decide and act jointly.

While discussing the relations of native and immigrant workers, and focusing on how they share a common public sphere at workplace level, different motivations and tendencies of migrant workers and native workers shall be analysed in order to understand compromise,

solidarity and tension among themselves. This may explain the reasons of the transfer of different qualifications and opportunities from one social space to another one. At this point, the Habermas' concepts of "life-world" and "system", and his approach of "the colonization of life-world by the system" under the "communicative action theory", shall provide a framework. According to Habermas, as a consequence of the collaboration of state, media and capital, "the System" invades and colonizes the "life-worlds" of people where people join the public sphere and experience solidarity. (Johnson, 2006) This restricts democratic participation and representation of citizens. Therefore, the native workers' struggles and demands at trade unions shall be defined as to preserve their life-worlds to counter the invasion of the system.

In the case of Turkish-origin immigrant workers, the majority moved Germany to work with legal work permits. At the first phases, they were "guest-workers", as being invited for a temporary time period, their aim was just to work and save money before returning their homelands. During the "guest worker period", Turkish-origin workers could achieve their social, political, cultural, ethnic, and religious demands and necessities through grassroots/ bottom-up initiatives. Even this could occur contrary to the German governments' attempts to limit the citizenship rights, and their aim to motivate migrants to return back to their home country in the 80s and 90s. (Akalın, 2012) From this perspective, migrant workers were thrown over the very deep parts of the "system", directly colonized by the system, and a "life-world" was not presented. Migrants achieve their "life-worlds" via their transnational social spaces and their struggles in the public sphere provided by organisations and institutions through their inner solidarity and own experiences.

Trade unions have become the first and the only social organizations in the first phases of migration where migrant workers are recruited together with native workers, enter the dialogue with them and demand/act together. If the migrant-native worker relation is compared from the perspective of Habermas' life world-system dichotomy, one may claim that, while native workers' principal aim is to preserve their life world and resist against the colonization of the system through the public sphere presented by trade unions, immigrant workers' principal goal is to liberate themselves from the total colonization of the system and create their own life-worlds. Such different motivations and expectations towards trade unions may explain the relations among native and migrant workers, and may demonstrate how the "transnational social space" coincides with the "public sphere".

Adler and Fichter's (2014) case study on immigrant workers' organisational efforts in Kiel also shares a similar approach. Since 1983, the IG Metall's Kiel Branch supported the

Migrant Committee within the branch, and the leadership of the branch has been shared with the president of the migrant committee as co-President since the 1990s. Also, all elections within the branch were done according to the migrant-native ratio of membership figures. Adler and Fichter (2014) defend that such experience resulted in a better integration of immigrants. For instance, as a result of the union's family support programmes, immigrant children could study in better schools, and many of them could have the opportunity to receive an undergraduate level education.

4. Turkish-origin Immigrants and Transnational Social Space as a Unique Public Sphere

Turkish-origin migrant workers' experience of almost 60 years resulted in the creation of a unique transnational social space between Turkey and Western European countries. A significant proportion of Turkish-origin immigrants are still citizens of the Republic of Turkey, and they have now become part of the society of the destination country. Because of the nation-state/ citizenship connection, many migrants do not hold citizenship, and the ones who are naturalised still face challenges to represent themselves within the democratic life (Crul et.al., 2010; SVR, 2015; Rühl, 2007).

This paper aims to demonstrate the significant similarity between the Habermasian narrative of the emergence of the public sphere in Western Europe and the formation of the transnational social space of Turkish-origin immigrants. Habermas (2005) examines 18th and 19th century England, France and Germany to define the ideal type of bourgeois public. He argues that literary and artistic debates held by small, well-educated and critical bourgeois circles in salons of France, tea houses of England and coffeehouses of Germany have over time acquired a political character, and led to the creation of an oppositional space independent and critical of the government (Habermas, 2005; Finlayson, 2005).

Similar to the emergence of public spheres through grassroots network, this paper defends that the formation of the transnational social space of Turkish-origin immigrants in Germany shares such features, and it is possible to claim that the transnational social space created by immigrants is a unique public sphere. This transnational social space is unique in that it is not based on citizenship or nation-state borders, and is referenced to Turkey, the country of origin. Because the model that was applied when Turkish-origin immigrants were invited to work from the early 1960s was temporary and based on rotation, immigrant workers were expected to work in Germany for a few years, and then return to Turkey. Therefore, apart from accommodation, immigrants were not provided with a particular social space or other

opportunities. There were no efforts made in this direction because both German and Turkish authorities considered the migration to be temporary. Turkish-origin immigrants in this period met their cultural, religious and social needs using their own means, via grassroots initiatives. (Akgönül, 2008). Coffeehouses, mosques and hometown associations or political organisations inspired by political developments in Turkey have in essence served as spaces where Turkish-origin immigrants reinforced their internal solidarity in a country that was foreign to them in all respects. They shared knowledge and experiences concerning the German state, authorities and laws, organised their religious activities, and met their social and cultural needs. Moreover, these communities, which consisted of voluntary individuals of the same socio-economic status and were formed without the intervention of the states of either country, became active in the political space of both countries, engaging with the German state and political parties, and political developments within Turkey. Turkish-origin immigrants tried to make their voices heard in Germany via transnational organisations, and labour unions, and took different positions regarding political developments in Turkey.

4.1. Historical Background of the Formation of the Transnational Social Space of Turkish-origin Immigrants

Turkish-origin immigrants in Germany form a unique transnational social space with an over 60 year-long experience. An important portion of these immigrants are still citizens of the Turkish Republic, and they became part of German society during these decades. As a consequence of Germany's citizenship policies, most immigrants may not enjoy primary citizenship rights. Even if they contribute to the economic wellbeing of the country of immigration for decades; immigrants holding Turkish citizenship only enjoy secondary political rights, including the right to unionise. On the other hand, millions of immigrants holding a Turkish passport have primary political rights in Turkey, but their economic and social contribution to Turkey is limited. Turkey is perceived as a country for tourism, family visits or investments. However, their political potential as voters and economic potential that fosters the trade cooperation accredit Turkish-origin immigrants as an important actor as well.

In modern Turkish history, the massive immigration movement began in the 1960s. Apart from Western Europe, there was labour immigration towards Australia, the USA and Canada, the Middle East and North Africa and after the Cold War, towards the former Soviet Republics. Today, almost 6 % of the Turkish population lives abroad (İçduygu, 2012). Labour immigration, family unification, refugees, asylum-seekers and students lead to the migration of millions. The majority of the Turkish-origin immigrants live in Europe, and within Europe,

the majority lives in Germany. While German authorities and industry benefited from low-cost immigrant labour, Turkish authorities received foreign currency, the unemployment rate fell, and remittances supported a vital segment of society under poverty conditions, which reduced the workload of social services of the authorities. (Toktaş, 2012)

The guest-worker program was initiated by the German Federal Republic to overcome the scarcity of labour-force in the heavy industry as a result of high growth rates and the rapid industrialisation in the post-War period. According to the program, guest-workers would be invited from selected countries; they would work temporarily based on the rotation system, and would return to their countries when their contract was terminated. The first agreement was signed with Italy in 1955, and then, between 1960 and 1968, Germany signed similar agreements with Yugoslavia, Tunisia, Portugal, Jordan, Turkey, Spain and Greece. Guest workers were mainly employed in the metal, automotive, mining and waste cleaning sectors. (Kolb, 2008) This program was designed on temporary employment and rotation of the workforce, and aimed to control the labour immigration process by the authorities. Being "guest" and working temporarily enabled the authorities to legally restrict some fundamental rights. Also, it could be possible to stop labour immigration during recession periods. Priority was given to the full employment of citizens. (Kuhn, 1978)

Turkey and the German Federal Republic signed the workforce agreement on 30th October 1961. Seven hundred ninety thousand workers went to Europe between 1961 and 1973, and 80 % of them arrived in Federal Germany. Turkish authorities encouraged labour immigration in the First Five Year Development Plan (1962-1967), as a part of the development strategy. Guest workers would send foreign currency, the unemployment rate would be lower, and when they returned, they would use their skills, experience and information for the industrialisation of Turkey. However, the majority of the labour immigrants did not turn back, and the ones who had returned preferred to use their savings in trade activities. (İçduygu, 2012)

The German Federal Employment Office was responsible for labour recruitment, and they invited workers following a selection process. According to the procedure, German companies requested the number and skills of workers they needed to the Employment Office, and the Office's Istanbul branch selected the applicants based on their skills, physical strength, health and criminal record. Workers, who passed all these examinations, received their train tickets. (Eryılmaz, 2002) This procedure was solely focused on economic expectations, and purely approached the labour force as a commodity. They did not consider the cultural and social needs of workers. The residence permit was bound to the work permit,

and the legal regulation was focused on the control of immigration instead of their rights and liberties. (Topal, 2011)

Turkish-origin guest-workers faced harsh living conditions. Many companies had offered 6 square metre hostel rooms or crowded dormitories. According to research, in 1971 at NRW, 10 % of hostels could not provide sufficient conditions for accommodations. Twenty people shared a shower on average; and ten people shared a toilet on average. As a result of hard-working conditions and temporary contracts, guest-workers could not learn the German language comprehensively.

This was the first time that German society met with an Islamic community in their daily lives, with the arrival of Muslim guest-workers. So there were not a mosque nor prayer rooms at factories, workers faced difficulties with Ramadan fasting and Eid al-Adha. There were also problems concerning food and shopping. Many workers had psychological problems due to the working conditions and being away from their families for long years. Even Italian, Greek and Spanish guest-workers could bring their families to Germany; Turkish-origin guest-workers were not permitted to bring their families with them. This was due to the agreement signed between the governments. Family unification could be possible for them following the 1965 Foreigners Act. According to the Act, immigrant workers who were working at least three years, having a long term contract and providing accommodation for their families could have the right to bring their families. (Eryılmaz, 2002; Topal, 2011)

On 12th December 1964, the German employer association demanded from the government to halt the rotation system by mentioning their satisfaction with the guest-workers' labour force, and this paved the way for the permanent residence for immigrant workers. One other reason was that it was taking time for workers to learn their jobs, and their contract period was terminating when the employer began to benefit from their performance. Even the guest-worker program was terminated by the 1973 Crisis, because of the demand for low-cost labour, authorities encouraged family unification if other family members were also able to work.

Additionally, struggles of immigrants' associations, trade unions, pro-immigrant political parties and decisions of legal courts based on the Basic Law (German constitution) on universal rights provided more rights and longer-term contracts for immigrants. (Kastoryano, 2000; Castles, 1986; Kaya, 2008)

In 1976, while 90 % of Italian guest-workers, 80 % of Spanish guest-workers, and 70 % of Greek guest-workers returned to their countries, only 50 % Yugoslavian guest-workers and

30% Turkish guest-workers did the same. (Costant and Massey, 2002) The political and economic conditions of Turkey in the 1970s, and the military regime in the 1980s, motivated Turkish-origin guest-workers to stay in Germany. Also, with the family unification and the formation of associations, mosques and other networks, their transnational social space enabled them to experience their culture, transfer their identity to the new generations and strengthen solidarity among themselves.

The number of Turkish-origin immigrants in Europe was 600 thousand in 1972. This number increased to 2 million in the first years of the 1980s, 3 million in 1990s and in 2010 it was over 3.5 million. These consist of labour immigrants, asylum-seekers, refugees, family unification, students and second and third generations. During these years, 1 million immigrants also returned to Turkey. (İçduygu, 2012)

In the 1970s and 1980s, when guest-workers became permanent workers, they began to be defined as foreigners (auslanders). Even over 4 million immigrants were working in the German Federal Republic in 1985; German authorities refused to recognise Germany as a country of immigration. (Castles, 1985) This continued for decades, and in 2000, Germany decided to recognise itself as a country of immigration, and began to take further positive steps on the citizenship rights of immigrants. (SVR, 2015)

4.2. Building a Public Sphere

Habermas (2005) analyses the 18th and 19th century Britain, France and Germany to define the ideal type of bourgeois public sphere. He argues that small intellectual bourgeois communities were meeting at saloons in France, tea houses in Britain and coffee houses in Germany to discuss literature, art and politics from a critical perspective, and formed an oppositional space independent from the authorities. The spread of such groups of educated bourgeoisie led to the formation of press and journalism, which acted as a communicative tool among different public communities and intensified their political power. The main feature of these communities was the socio-economic equality of voluntary members. As a consequence, in the 19th century, it was possible to witness the politicization of the social life, the rise of journalism and the spread of networks that struggled for freedom of expression. (Habermas, 2005; Finlayson, 2005)

By the 19th century, such initiatives were developed within the working class which had been excluded from the citizenship rights. Enlargement of the public sphere paved the way for the formation of the mass democracies. Such political and cultural mobilizations and initiatives lead to various and competitive public spheres. Exclusion of the culturally and

politically motivated lower classes mobilized and multiplied public spheres. (Habermas, 2005) It is possible to demonstrate remarkable similarities between the birth and formation of the transnational social space of Turkish-origin immigrants in the last six decades, with the formation of historical bourgeois public spheres, as explained by Habermas.

The transnational social space of Turkish-origin immigrants is a distinctive public sphere. Its distinction is based on the fact that this space is not formed within borders of a nation-state, demands for citizenship rights had a secondary importance, mainly focusing on the demand for double citizenship and reference was given to the country of emigration, Turkey. When Turkish-origin workers were invited to work in the 1960s, the guest-worker program was based on the temporariness and rotation of the workforce, so that Turkish-origin workers were expected to work a few years in Germany, and then, would return to Turkey. Therefore, only accommodation was provided by the authorities/companies. Social space was constructed by guest workers. Turkish-origin workers could address all their cultural, religious and social demands and necessities through grassroots initiatives. In a foreign environment from every aspect, through the establishment of coffee houses, mosques, fellow townsman associations and political associations, Turkish-origin immigrant workers tried to consolidate inner solidarity; shared experiences and information about laws, regulations, attitudes of authorities and working conditions; worshiped and celebrated religious festivals; and fulfilled their social and cultural necessities. As a consequence of all these Turkey-referenced associations and networks, Turkish-origin immigrant guest-workers found ways to stay permanently and provided opportunities for their families and other immigrants to migrate to Germany.

As a consequence of such transnational social space, struggles and polarizations of politics in Turkey could be transferred to Europe. Even the second and third generation immigrants, who have never lived in Turkey and never directly felt and experienced such problems, could engage in political movements, and may be polarized on the issues like Turks-Kurds or Sunnis-Alevis, and could re-produce such conflicts in the country of immigration. However, such confrontations, struggles and polarization are in parallel with the ones in Turkey but they are not the same, their dynamics vary and the problems are re-evaluated (Başer, 2013). The transnational social space provides a fertile ground for Turkey-referenced problems, contradictions and expectations, which are transferred and re-produced. Such events do not necessarily leave aside the Turkey reference, because feelings and approaches towards the home country for the second and third generation are not sourced solely from the symbols, traumas and values transferred from the previous generation, but also they can follow,

experience and contribute to the current developments, political agendas of Turkey on a daily basis via technological opportunities, i.e. TVs, newspapers, internet and frequent charter flights. Citizenship links of the majority of Turkish immigrants with Turkey and duties (i.e. military service) / rights (right to vote) of the citizenship also re-produce such relations.

These two spheres form a dynamic relation and feed each other. For instance, being elected to a position at the workplace, being active and visible in these organisations also brings prestige within the transnational social space. There are many instances where shop stewards or works council members transfer their skills and prestige between these two spheres. As a consequence of gaining years of experience of organisation, learning democratic mechanisms, creating alliances, representing people at various occasions, meeting thousands of workers and helping to support them when they face a problem, immigrant shop stewards can transfer such skills and knowledge to become active within their immigrant communities.

While Turkish-origin immigrant workers' social relations, inner solidarities or divisions within their own transnational social space influence the public sphere provided by workplace level social organizations, from the other point, being elected to a position at workplace level organizations, being active and visible in these organizations also bring prestige within the transnational social space.

4.3. Conclusion

The concept of migrant, particularly in Europe, is not limited to people who migrate but can be transferred, as if it were a genetic trait, from generation to generation. Large numbers of people who were born, educated, brought up, employed and married in the country to which their parents migrated are not able to shed the status of migrant because of their religion, native tongue, name, or the country of origin of their parents and fail to become part of the local population. Education and employment policies, in particular, shape the social status and opportunities of second and third generation migrants.

Once the period of being guest workers was over, Turkish-origin migrant workers settled permanently in Germany, renewed their work permits, brought over family members, and worked in the industry and the service sector. For nearly 60 years, Turkish-origin migrants have featured prominently in the historical experience of the German working class.

In Germany, during the 1970s and 1980s, the labour union was of particular significance to Turkish-origin migrants – since trade unions were the key organisations in which they

could defend their rights. The democratic mechanisms provided by the union for the representation of migrant workers gave the latter an opportunity to take collective action with German workers and workers from other nationalities. In this respect, it promoted the integration process of the migrant worker.

Trade unions, networks and voluntary associations of immigrants had a determinant role in answering their demands and expectations, such as shifting from temporary residence to a permanent one, guiding to newcomers, providing better accommodation conditions after the family merging process and looking for education and health services for family members. Apart from serving immigrants to adopt their new lives, such networks consolidated solidarity and defence against racist and discriminatory acts and attitudes, and re-produce social, cultural and religious values and transfer them to new generations. Such networks also enabled some workers to establish enterprises.

Additionally, networks, organizations and communities, which were formed as grassroots organizations based on voluntary participation of socio-economically equal members independent from any intervention of the political authorities, could involve both politics of Germany and Turkey. For instance, some communities, which are supposed to be oppressed and discriminated in Turkey, use the advantage of democratic opportunities in Germany to wage open, legal and mass activities, and aim to act as spokespersons of their communities living in Turkey. This also points to Habermas' (2005) self-organizing potential of communities.

Therefore, the dynamism of transnational social spaces of immigrants can coincide with the public sphere in the country of immigration. This allows skills, agendas and prestige to be transferred from one sphere to another, providing flexibility to immigrants and contributing to their survival strategies.

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CONCLUSION

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The departure point of this volume on *Faces of Republican Turkey* was that the prevailing paradigm for studying 20th-century Turkey, namely, the modernization paradigm, was based on a simplifying and opinionated approach to politics and society. The contributions collected in the present volume have proposed a manifold of methods for transcending, or sublating, the aforementioned paradigm. Each contribution is based on a specific methodology; however, they also share a common framework: A concern for testing widespread, textbook-based approaches through a contextual analysis.

A gender- and class-based reading of politics, society and intellectual life in the subsequent decades is necessary for a comprehensive re-writing of Turkey's contemporary history. Historical materialist analysis, when applied to 20th-century Turkey or to any other context, should take into consideration recent contributions regarding social property relations and social reproduction, as A. Ezgi Akyol has demonstrated in her chapter: Feminist publications of the 1910s were not part of a "march of intellect" culminating in an eschatological liberation taking place in the republican period, but a major component of the transformations of social property and gender relations. Cangül Örnek's analysis of the nexus between capitalist classes and bureaucracy gives equally important clues for bringing bureaucracy back to its

social context: Rather than being a supra-historical entity, bureaucracy is a political-social institution that has close links with the relations of social production, and with the accumulation regime.

Education reforms are generally conceived of as the results of a modernizing will of enlightened elites, both in European and non-European contexts. As recent scholarly research has demonstrated, major continuities and ruptures in education and academy are to be framed within a social, political and economic context. Sinan Yıldırmaz, Güven Gürkan Öztan and Elif Çağlı have demonstrated that transformations of school curriculum and academic knowledge are closely linked to many layers of social and political life: Everyday politics, international conjuncture, transformations within the modes of production and social property relations are all directly connected with changes in education, and in academic mentalities.

The emphasis on material conditions, social property and gender relations do not exclude the intellectual sphere. Architecture, monuments, visual culture, literature, and art are also part of social and political life. Thus, a thorough study of republican Turkey would be incomplete without a social analysis of art and culture. E. Zeynep Suda's analysis of self-representation of the early republican regime demonstrates that visual culture is not devoid of class- or elite-bias, and in many cases, it can reflect ideals related to social strata. Mehmet Arısan's study of two representative novels of the 1930s also demonstrates the close links between the artistic and cultural spheres with a wider political and social context. Further research might also be done for writing a gendered history of art and culture in Turkey.

No country is an island in itself, and an analysis of society and politics in republican Turkey would be incomplete without a translation approach. International relations as well as immigration and emigration movements are of major importance for contextualizing and understanding changes occurring in politics, and in the public sphere. In his chapter on Turkey-origin Workers in Germany, E. Eren Korkmaz has demonstrated that an analysis of the public sphere shall not be limited to the bourgeois public sphere in the Habermasian sense, but shall also include an investigation of transformations in the workers' public sphere. And in the Turkish case, migrant workers are a major component of labor studies. Further research might also be done on a gendered analysis of both domestic and transnational aspects of the workers' public sphere.